There is a tendency to forget that higher perspectives, as far as they pertain to thought, are still relative. To remind oneself of sayings like "the map is not the territory" or "the more you know, the more you know that you don't know" can help to keep this somewhat in check, but despite this, there is still a sneaky impulse to smuggle claims about universality, even to models that are highly culturally dependent, when that is not as warranted as one might want to claim.
  Let's do away with the basic stuff first (the highly culturally dependent stuff) and then some more subtle points (less obviously culturally dependent): There is an idea that models like Spiral Dynamics, or Developmental Psychology as a whole, is able to establish strong claims of universality, that is truths about the human organism independent of cultural factors. This is far from the case. (This might seem highly confrontational and dry at first, but please hang on until the end before you leave your comment to get the full gist of my message).
  This first point is on its own not the most critical point about universality per se, but it's nevertheless relevant to the problem of Eurocentrism: Developmental psychology as a whole is an European invention with Eurocentric biases. For example, the idea of explaining the human condition in terms of linear ontogeny (stage models; a step-by-step process with a definite start and end) is highly Western. This in itself isn't a judgement of whether or not we should use such models, but I will come to that later. A contrast to stage models are contextual models without linear step-by-step assumptions (focus on different factors in the environment that influences development), as for example Bronfenbrenner's ecological systems theory. Said in another way: the way we structure our models is highly culturally dependent, and this informs how we interpret empirical data and further build our models.
  When it comes to empirical data, there are likewise Eurocentric biases all throughout not just developmental psychology, but all of psychology, which can be refered to as WEIRD bias: (American Psychological Association): https://www.apa.org/monitor/2010/05/weird   More generally, it's a context blind bias, as it involves the tendency to not control for things like socioeconomic status: (Global Health Now): https://www.globalhealthnow.org/2020-01/weird-psychological-bias   This might seem avoidable by actually doing intercultural research, which does exist, but not to any satisfactory degree. This also doesn't change the fact that there still exists biases in the structure of the models (intercultural data being filtered through an European construct).   Yet, there is an even bigger problem: the extreme lack of cross-cultural research, that is people who grow up influenced by two or more cultures. How does this affect development and how does it pertain to linear assumptions? Very little is known about this, and it potentially questions the entire validity of linear ontogeny, especially when you take into account the epic variability that exists in the cross-cultural domain (and the increased globalization in the world today): Now add to that the possibility of three, four or five etc. cultures and you're on a ride. Not to mention the fact that the internet is technically a cross-cultural domain as well.   As far as developmental meta-lenses go, Spiral Dynamics is also affected by these constraints, both on a structural and empirical level: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graves's_emergent_cyclical_levels_of_existence#Criticism   Yes, in the case of SD, there has been intercultural research, like Beck & Cowan's work in South Africa, but while I'm not saying this is necessarily the case, such research is very susceptible to post-hoc verification (applying the model to "see if it makes sense"), or in the case of actually replicating Graves' student essay methodology – just simply inhabiting the same structural assumptions of linear ontogeny. I don't know what they actually did. I'm just providing a few possibilities.   Now on to the more subtler points. Let's take a strong case for universality and assume you've studied many developmental meta-lenses (Kuhn, Wilber, Graves, Commons etc.) and you've managed to distill the general underlying principles, and you apply this meta-meta-lens to your own life (your own development), and you conclude that it makes sense. Notice that this is a post-hoc verification ("I apply the model, it makes sense, and therefore I keep the model"). You're also applying it to your life, not somebody else's (unless you have also studied an in-depth biography of some other person). Just like your own life is unique and not universal, your experience of different meta-lenses and potential biographies of other people is likewise unique and not universal. Also, if some other person were to study a few meta-lenses, he would have his own understanding of them, his own life experiences to verify them with, and he might have even studied widely different models from you. You can argue that if you were to have a discussion with this person that you may find similarities and common ground in your understanding, but this also assumes that you have a common cultural lens to even communicate in the first place (shared language, concepts etc.). So if you even were to be able to communicate, you would already have so much in common that it would be a little weird to not find commonalities when you compare such wide lenses, and thus this is also a case of post-hoc verification and not indicative of true universality (certainly not if the models are WEIRD).
  Is this just pessimistic puritanism? Is universality even desirable? Do you who is reading this not know all this already? Well, I'm pretty sure you're able to understand me when I point this out to you, as this is based on my own experience, which is highly influenced by this culture which we share here, so of course. It's nevertheless true that, if not just discovering, but getting complacent, at a certain level of analysis can seem blinding to otherwise previously consolidated understandings about epistemological humility etc., and that if I may invoke some model-esque action myself; it's a process of fluctuation between humility and arrogance, awareness and blindness; and that as you grow, different lenses morph and even shatter as they get re-contextualized into an even higher understanding. So this is just a reminder, that you're not really at the final stretch yet, and that you never will be (as far as abstract frameworks go; direct experience is another matter completely, or not). The process of discovering reality only keeps evolving more and more, and one has to be TRULY humble and not squint too hard onto one's lenses, despite how meta they may appear to be from one's current position.