The relativity of meta-lenses

[Carl-Richard]

There is a tendency to forget that higher perspectives, as far as they pertain to thought, are still relative. To remind oneself of sayings like "the map is not the territory" or "the more you know, the more you know that you don't know" can help to keep this somewhat in check, but despite this, there is still a sneaky impulse to smuggle claims about universality, even to models that are highly culturally dependent, when that is not as warranted as one might want to claim.
 

Let's do away with the basic stuff first (the highly culturally dependent stuff) and then some more subtle points (less obviously culturally dependent):

There is an idea that models like Spiral Dynamics, or Developmental Psychology as a whole, is able to establish strong claims of universality, that is truths about the human organism independent of cultural factors. This is far from the case. (This might seem highly confrontational and dry at first, but please hang on until the end before you leave your comment to get the full gist of my message).
 

This first point is on its own not the most critical point about universality per se, but it's nevertheless relevant to the problem of Eurocentrism:

Developmental psychology as a whole is an European invention with Eurocentric biases. For example, the idea of explaining the human condition in terms of linear ontogeny (stage models; a step-by-step process with a definite start and end) is highly Western. This in itself isn't a judgement of whether or not we should use such models, but I will come to that later. A contrast to stage models are contextual models without linear step-by-step assumptions (focus on different factors in the environment that influences development), as for example Bronfenbrenner's ecological systems theory. Said in another way: the way we structure our models is highly culturally dependent, and this informs how we interpret empirical data and further build our models.
 

When it comes to empirical data, there are likewise Eurocentric biases all throughout not just developmental psychology, but all of psychology, which can be refered to as WEIRD bias:

Quote

They found that people from Western, educated, industrialized, rich and democratic (WEIRD) societies — who represent as much as 80 percent of study participants, but only 12 percent of the world's population — are not only unrepresentative of humans as a species, but on many measures they're outliers.

(American Psychological Association): https://www.apa.org/monitor/2010/05/weird

 

More generally, it's a context blind bias, as it involves the tendency to not control for things like socioeconomic status:

Quote

In an analysis of papers, 90% failed to note participants' socioeconomic status. Of those that mentioned nationality, 94% were from WEIRD samples.

(Global Health Now): https://www.globalhealthnow.org/2020-01/weird-psychological-bias

 

This might seem avoidable by actually doing intercultural research, which does exist, but not to any satisfactory degree. This also doesn't change the fact that there still exists biases in the structure of the models (intercultural data being filtered through an European construct).

 

Yet, there is an even bigger problem: the extreme lack of cross-cultural research, that is people who grow up influenced by two or more cultures. How does this affect development and how does it pertain to linear assumptions? Very little is known about this, and it potentially questions the entire validity of linear ontogeny, especially when you take into account the epic variability that exists in the cross-cultural domain (and the increased globalization in the world today):

Now add to that the possibility of three, four or five etc. cultures and you're on a ride. Not to mention the fact that the internet is technically a cross-cultural domain as well.

 

As far as developmental meta-lenses go, Spiral Dynamics is also affected by these constraints, both on a structural and empirical level:

Quote

Graves's primary data set, which produced the CP-B'O' levels, consisted entirely of students taking his "Normal Psychology" course, raising concerns of sampling bias and lack of diverse life perspectives.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Graves's_emergent_cyclical_levels_of_existence#Criticism

 

Yes, in the case of SD, there has been intercultural research, like Beck & Cowan's work in South Africa, but while I'm not saying this is necessarily the case, such research is very susceptible to post-hoc verification (applying the model to "see if it makes sense"), or in the case of actually replicating Graves' student essay methodology – just simply inhabiting the same structural assumptions of linear ontogeny. I don't know what they actually did. I'm just providing a few possibilities.

 

Now on to the more subtler points. Let's take a strong case for universality and assume you've studied many developmental meta-lenses (Kuhn, Wilber, Graves, Commons etc.) and you've managed to distill the general underlying principles, and you apply this meta-meta-lens to your own life (your own development), and you conclude that it makes sense. Notice that this is a post-hoc verification ("I apply the model, it makes sense, and therefore I keep the model"). You're also applying it to your life, not somebody else's (unless you have also studied an in-depth biography of some other person). Just like your own life is unique and not universal, your experience of different meta-lenses and potential biographies of other people is likewise unique and not universal. Also, if some other person were to study a few meta-lenses, he would have his own understanding of them, his own life experiences to verify them with, and he might have even studied widely different models from you. You can argue that if you were to have a discussion with this person that you may find similarities and common ground in your understanding, but this also assumes that you have a common cultural lens to even communicate in the first place (shared language, concepts etc.). So if you even were to be able to communicate, you would already have so much in common that it would be a little weird to not find commonalities when you compare such wide lenses, and thus this is also a case of post-hoc verification and not indicative of true universality (certainly not if the models are WEIRD).
 

Is this just pessimistic puritanism? Is universality even desirable? Do you who is reading this not know all this already? Well, I'm pretty sure you're able to understand me when I point this out to you, as this is based on my own experience, which is highly influenced by this culture which we share here, so of course. It's nevertheless true that, if not just discovering, but getting complacent, at a certain level of analysis can seem blinding to otherwise previously consolidated understandings about epistemological humility etc., and that if I may invoke some model-esque action myself; it's a process of fluctuation between humility and arrogance, awareness and blindness; and that as you grow, different lenses morph and even shatter as they get re-contextualized into an even higher understanding. So this is just a reminder, that you're not really at the final stretch yet, and that you never will be (as far as abstract frameworks go; direct experience is another matter completely, or not). The process of discovering reality only keeps evolving more and more, and one has to be TRULY humble and not squint too hard onto one's lenses, despite how meta they may appear to be from one's current position.

[Leo Gura]

The better the model the bigger the problem

[DocWatts]

Excellent post. 

My own take is that this is instinctively tied to the innate drive within humans to construct meaning. In order to do so, a nomological order is required to make sense of and ground our experiences in an intersubjective world.

My view on Stage models and meta-cognitive modalities is that they're modern attempts to construct a nomological order that's more truthful and more relevant compared to some of its predecessors (such as Abrahamic religions, scientific materialism, and postmodern relativism).

There are limits to this way of understanding and relating to the world, as there are for every nomological order. While at the end of the day it's still just one of many valid perspectives (rather than a 'correct' view of reality), I'd argue that it's an admirable attempt to construct a nomological order that can meet people's needs in our modern era.

Edited February 10, 2022 by DocWatts

[Carl-Richard]

42 minutes ago, DocWatts said:

My own take is that this is instinctively tied to the innate drive within humans to construct meaning. In order to do so, a nomological order is required to make sense of and ground our experiences in an intersubjective world.

My view on Stage models and meta-cognitive modalities is that they're modern attempts to construct a nomological order that's more truthful and more relevant compared to some of its predecessors (such as Abrahamic religions, scientific materialism, and postmodern relativism).

I agree. If I can borrow your terms to reiterate: I'm pointing out the potential danger that arises in this new elevated position; of affirming that you've already acknowledged the lessons of the last predecessor (postmodern relativism), and to then inadvertently smuggle some of the thinking from the earlier predecessors (order, universality, progress) into places where they may not belong, in a way that de-emphasizes the postmodern lessons, maybe just as a form of a retrograde amnesia ("it's been a while since I've done a thorough postmodern account of my worldview"), and that it's therefore again only a reminder and a point on emphasis (as the lessons were in fact already learned). You could say it's a type of post-metamodern analysis 

Basically, it's a roundabout way of saying that one must be eternally aware of one's self-biases 

[DocWatts]

1 hour ago, Carl-Richard said:

I agree. If I can borrow your terms and reiterate: I'm pointing out the potential danger that arises in this new elevated position; of affirming that you've already acknowledged the lessons of the last predecessor (postmodern relativism), and to then inadvertently smuggle some of the thinking from the earlier predecessors (order, universality, progress) into places where they may not belong, in a way that de-emphasizes the postmodern lessons, maybe just as a form of a retrograde amnesia ("it's been a while since I've done a thorough postmodern account of my worldview"), and that it's therefore again only a reminder and a point about emphasis (as the lessons were in fact already learned). You could say it's a type of post-metamodern analysis 

Basically, it's a roundabout way of saying that one must be eternally aware of one's self-bias 

'Retrograde amnesia' is a really good way of phrasing it, in regards to the ways that Metamodernism has the potential to insufficiently apply lessons from the paradigms it's attempting to integrate.

I suspect that the topic of spiritual bypassing, which describes the act of grasping for knowledge without going through the required internal transformations that are necessary for embodiment, will be an important component of post-metamodern analysis when it arrives.

Edited February 10, 2022 by DocWatts

[Carl-Richard]

7 hours ago, DocWatts said:

I suspect that the topic of spiritual bypassing, which describes the act of grasping for knowledge without going through the required internal transformations that are necessary for embodiment, will be an important component of post-metamodern analysis when it arrives.

Man that's a cool thought. So a more expanded form of spiritual bypassing (applied to knowledge in general). Epistemic bypassing? ☺ Is it like when Orange thinks it is Yellow? ? 

 

(I'm not sure if this is coherent at all. It's a pretty off-the-wall late-night bed thought):

So in the post-metamodern application of epistemic bypassing, the internal transformation would be described using a metamodern developmental framework (e.g. SD), which then would be used to critique a person's level of understanding of the metamodern level of analysis itself (either that very framework, i.e. SD, or a comparable model), so it's interlooping with itself pretty hard. Is this interlooping action what MHC (Commons) refers to by denoting "performative-recursive" in meta-cross-paradigmatic cognition?

[DocWatts]

1 hour ago, Carl-Richard said:

Man that's a cool thought. So a more expanded form of spiritual bypassing (applied to knowledge in general). Epistemic bypassing? ☺ Is it like when Orange thinks it is Yellow? ? 

 

(I'm not sure if this is coherent at all. It's a pretty off-the-wall late-night bed thought):

So in the post-metamodern application of epistemic bypassing, the internal transformation would be described using a metamodern developmental framework (e.g. SD), which then would be used to critique a person's level of understanding of the metamodern level of analysis itself (either that very framework, i.e. SD, or a comparable model), so it's interlooping with itself pretty hard. Is this interlooping action what MHC (Commons) refers to by denoting "performative-recursive" in meta-cross-paradigmatic cognition?

While I was thinking more along the lines of the misuse of stage models like Spiral Dynamics when I wrote that, the idea of an 'epistemic bypassing' which repurposes stage models in a performative-recursive way is a really cool concept.

Hell, I guess even my own understanding of what a meta-cross-paradigmatic modality is is self demonstrating in a way, since I can imagine what that modality might entail in a very limited, skeletal way, but haven't gone through the necessary internal transformations for embodiment and integration to truly grok it. I don't have the 'grammar' for it so to speak, in the way that I have a relatively pre-reflective 'grammar' for systematic and paradigmatic modalities.

Reading Heidegger lately, the participatory aspect being of a being-in-the-world has been on my mind as of late and has been influencing my thinking in this area 

[Matt23]

I think it's hard to deny development when you look at the difference between a 2, 10, 18, and 40 year old, even probably across many cultures and time periods.  

I bet 2 year olds in ancient Rome were similarly more self-centered as 2 year olds in modern America.  Likewise, those two two year olds probably both eventually 'developed' into more selfless, empathic, and considerate-of-others types of people.  

But hey, I guess, to quote the great American hero Jeff Lebowski, aka The Dude, "That's just like, your [my] opinion man."  lol.  in jokes.

Anyway.  I just think it's kinda obvious there's some sort of development happening.  

I dunno... perhaps there's a way to swing words n stuff to mean there isn't.  But for all practical purposes, it seems like the case.  Some people are more selfish while others more selfless.  Some people feel more fear and some feel less fear.  And yeah, I agree we do put value-judgements to create a "better" and "worse" (e.g. feel less fear is better than more fear, being able to walk is better than not since you can run from prey and not die, being able to speak is better than not, etc.).  So ya, I suppose maybe in like an ultimate sense it's all value-judgements (I could see that, though I don't necessarily agree or believe it all at once), for all practical purposes it makes sense to me to be able to use these judgements of "better" and "worse" (leading to developmental hierarchies) as a way to show progress n stuff and to ultimately lead to healthier, happier, and more functional human beings and cultures.  

Seems to be heavily connected to survival. 

 

[Preety_India]

Even if something is centric to a culture, it's not necessary that it can't apply to the whole world/universe. Maybe the model is a standalone concept and has nothing to do with culture itself. 

Geographic location shouldn't matter. 

 

[Carl-Richard]

8 hours ago, Matt23 said:

I think it's hard to deny development

Anyway.  I just think it's kinda obvious there's some sort of development happening. 

Who denies development? The critique is about claims of universality of linear, non-contextual stage models with empirical WEIRD bias.

[Carl-Richard]

1 hour ago, Preety_India said:

Even if something is centric to a culture, it's not necessary that it can't apply to the whole world/universe. Maybe the model is a standalone concept and has nothing to do with culture itself.

True. Science is about testing if that is the case. You can't get around structuring a model a certain way (Western assumptions or not), but you can at least try to do sober empirical research (circumventing WEIRD bias).

[Preety_India]

5 minutes ago, Carl-Richard said:

you can at least try to do sober empirical research (circumventing WEIRD bias).

Can you really give me a real life example of such empirical research? 

(I don't know how this would be possible, what would your sample look like?) 

[Carl-Richard]

1 hour ago, Preety_India said:

Can you really give me a real life example of such empirical research? 

(I don't know how this would be possible, what would your sample look like?) 

In the case of linear ontogeny, it can be something like Graves' student essay methodology, only applied to a huge data set with different categories of cross-cultural people (something like the image I posted).

At some point, we'll probably have extremely advanced cross-cultural developmental models that work like computer simulations where you can plot in dozens of contextual variables (education, current nationality, past nationalities, socioeconomic status etc.) and get a detailed report of a person's developmental trajectory. It might have some linear stage theory aspects as well (maybe not an universal one, but several possible paths).

It would probably require an AI that could create standarized values for each contextual variable for each person and some revolutionary data gathering instrument (as opposed to highly inaccurate self-assessment sheets). AI would also be useful for running algorithms for things like Graves' student essay methodology with huge complex data sets.

[Preety_India]

1 minute ago, Carl-Richard said:

It can be something like Graves' student essay methodology, only applied to a huge data set with different categories of cross-cultural people (something like the image I posted).

At some point, we'll probably have extremely advanced cross-cultural developmental models that works like a computer simulation where you can plot in dozens of contextual variables (education, nationality, socioeconomic status etc.) and get a detailed report of a person's developmental trajectory. It might have some linear stage theory aspects as well (maybe not an universal one, but several paths).

It would probably require an AI that could create standarized values for each contextual variable for each person and some revolutionary data gathering instrument (as opposed to highly inaccurate self-assessment sheets). AI would also be useful for running algorithms for things like Graves' student essay methodology with huge complex data sets.

This doesn't sound realistic to me. 

If you're talking about empirical research, shouldn't it be something that is  more realistic and observable/measurable? 

You can't imagine parameters by drawing diagrams or computer animation. You need data on hand. 

This means years of ground research on the field across generations, meaning organizations committed to research over decades and recording phenomena the way they do for animal species or weather phenomena in a place 

You would need a place like NASA for that. 

 

[Carl-Richard]

14 minutes ago, Preety_India said:

This doesn't sound realistic to me. 

If you're talking about empirical research, shouldn't it be something that is  more realistic and observable/measurable? 

There is growing research in cross-cultural developmental psychology, but none of the grand narrative models are linear stage models. They look more like Bronfenbrenner (contextual models). If you want a grand model, you need grand effort

[Preety_India]

Just now, Carl-Richard said:

There is growing research in cross-cultural developmental psychology, but none of the grand narrative models are linear stage models. They look more like Bronfenbrenner (contextual models). If you want a grand model, you need grand effort

The bottom line is you can't have effective empirical research without grand effort. And you can't have a near perfect model even with all the grand effort. 

But you would definitely need something gigantic to at least get realistic results, as close to reality as possible. 

Otherwise they would mimic the thought experiments of Sam Harris and those would be a disaster! 

 

[Carl-Richard]

2 minutes ago, Preety_India said:

The bottom line is you can't have effective empirical research without grand effort. And you can't have a near perfect model even with all the grand effort. 

But you would definitely need something gigantic to at least get realistic results, as close to reality as possible. 

Otherwise they would mimic the thought experiments of Sam Harris and those would be a disaster! 

Ah, the Sam Harris method: "imagine..." ?

[DocWatts]

27 minutes ago, Carl-Richard said:

Ah, the Sam Harris method: "imagine..." ?