The substratum on which dream objects are superimposed

[Nak Khid]

Siddhantabindu Of Madhusudana Sarasvati
(Commentary on Dasasloki of Sri Sankara Bhagavatpada)
(English translation by S.N.Sastri)

 

154. What is the substratum on which the dream objects are superimposed? Some say that it is the jiva, who is consciousness limited by the mind. Others hold that it is Brahman limited by primal ignorance. Which view is correct? Both, depending on different points of view. (The arguments against the second view and in support of the first view are now being stated)-- If Brahman is the substratum, then the dream objects will not disappear on waking up, because any delusion will cease only when the substratum of the delusion is known. Brahman cannot be known on waking up every day. If Brahman is known, then the entire duality will disappear, and not only the dream objects. Moreover, the sruti says, ”He (the jiva) is the creator (of the dream objects)” (Br.Up.4.3.10). Brahman limited by primal ignorance i.e. Isvara is the creator of the entire universe starting with space. So Brahman limited by primal ignorance cannot be the substratum of the dream objects. Note. A shell appears as silver only when it is known only in a general way as ‘this’ without its specific character of shellness. This illusion will disappear only when the special character of the substratum, namely, shellness, is known. Similarly, if Brahman limited by primal ignorance is held to be the substratum for the appearance of objects in dream, then the dream objects will continue to be seen even after the person wakes up, because Brahman is not known merely on waking up from sleep. If Brahman is known, then the entire world of duality will itself be found to be unreal. Moreover, Brahman limited by primal nescience is the creator of the entire universe, but the sruti quoted above speaks only about the creation of dream objects, and so the reference cannot be to Brahman. 155. Obj: Since the jiva is not covered, and is always fully manifest, how can it be the substratum of an illusion? Note. Brahman is covered by nescience and so is not known till the nescience is removed by knowledge. But this is not the case with the jiva. Each jiva knows his own general as well as special characteristics (in the vyaavahaarika sense). A thing can become the substratum of an illusion only when it is known only in a general way without its special characteristics. This cannot happen to the jiva. So how can the jiva be the substratum of an illusion? 156. What you say is true (that the jiva is manifest). But we postulate a modal ignorance which is favourable to the appearance of illusion in the dream state, but prevents the knowledge of the dealings in the empirical state. (Because of this, the nature of the jiva as he is in the waking state is not fully known during dream. So some characteristics of the jiva are not known in the dream state and this makes the superimposition of an illusion possible). In the dream state the knowledge in the form ‘I am a man’, etc., is with regard to a body different from that in the waking state; so also the knowledge ‘I am lying on a bed’ is also with reference to a different bed from that in the waking state. The means of knowledge (the external senses) are absent in respect both kinds of knowledge. Note. In dream there is a particular modal ignorance which is conducive to the projection of dream objects. At the same time this ignorance prevents the rise of the knowledge which arises in the empirical state such as ‘I am so-and-so’, ‘this is my house’, ‘these are my children’, etc., which is caused only by the primal ignorance (mula-ajnaana). This modal ignorance in the dream state has to be accepted as different from the ignorance which operates in the waking state, as otherwise the difference between waking and dream states cannot be explained. The difference between the two is clear. The experiences of the waking state are not negated in any other state. They are not felt to be illusory during dream. On the other hand, as soon as a person wakes up from sleep he realizes that everything experienced in dream was unreal. In the waking state the upadhi (limiting adjunct) of the jiva is the mind with vasanas and vrittis. In dream the upadhi is mind with vasanas, but without vrittis. In deep sleep the mind remaining merely in the form of vasanas is the upadhi. In the waking state the jiva has the knowledge that he is awake. Then he remembers what he experienced in the dream and deep sleep states. But in the dream state he does not have the knowledge that he is dreaming, nor does he then have any recollection of what happened in the other two states. Because of these differences between the waking and dream states it follows that the ignorance in the dream state is different from that in the waking state. By this particular type of ignorance in the dream state the nature of the jiva which is recognized in the waking state in the form ‘I am a man’, etc., is partly covered. This non-manifestation of a part of the nature of the jiva in the dream state makes it fit to be the substratum of the dream projections. The body of the dreamer as well as all objects experienced in dream are merely conjured up by the particular modal ignorance relating to the dream state. 157. Obj: Since the knowledge of empirical matters such as ‘I am a man’ is not the product of any valid means of knowledge, how can it cause the cessation of the modal ignorance (pertaining to the dreamstate)? If you say that the cessation of this ignorance is due to the waking state being a different state, then knowledge which negates the dream experiences should arise in deep sleep also, since that is also adifferent state from dreaming (i.e. even when one goes into dreamless sleep the knowledge that the dream experiences are false should arise).That is not acceptable, because in that case the deep sleep state wouldbe equated with the waking state. Note. The knowledge ‘I am a man’ is not produced by a vritti of the mind, but it is revealed by the witness-consciousness (saakshi-bhaasyam). That is why the opponent says that it is not produced by a pramaana (valid means of knowledge). An illusion such as that of silver on a shell is destroyed only by the knowledge of the shell produced by a valid means of knowledge, namely the eye here. So the opponent asks how the knowledge ‘I am a man’ which is not produced by a means of knowledge can destroy the illusion of the dream objects. 158. That is very cleverly said! (But I am not putting forward any such theory; my explanation is quite different). The deep sleep state is nothing but the modal ignorance pertaining to the dream state accompanied by the dormancy of the mind and so there is no destruction of the modal ignorance of the dream state then. (What happens in the deep sleep state is not the destruction of the modalignorance as in the case of the waking state. As stated in the Note under para 152 above, the vasanas in the mind are the efficient cause for projecting the dream objects. In deep sleep the mind is dormant and so the vasanas in the mind cannot function as the efficient cause for projecting the dream objects. It is because of this that the dream objects are not projected in deep sleep). In the waking state, however, there is the experience that the appearances in dream were illusory,and so even though the knowledge ‘I am a man’ is not caused by any valid means of knowledge, it is correct knowledge. Since the cognition of the body, etc., is caused by valid means of knowledge (by the eye and other sense organs) its capacity to destroy the modal ignorance relating to the dream state is established by experience. Any specific ignorance does not however cease without the mental modification (vritti) produced by a valid means of knowledge (such as the eye). The inability of the witness-consciousness to destroy ignorance is testified by its revealing the ignorance as well as the person who possesses it. (The witness-consciousness, that is, consciousness with ignorance as its limiting adjunct, cannot destroy ignorance. On the contrary, it is what enables a person to know that he has ignorance. The ignorance can be destroyed only by an appropriate vritti of the mind). Thus there is no inconsistency. Note. Ignorance is revealed by the witness-consciousness itself, unlike objects such as pot which are reveled only by a vritti of the mind. 159. It is accepted that there are as many modal ignorances as there are knowledges. By the empirical knowledge in the form ‘I am a man’ the modal ignorance of the dream state is destroyed. But just as even after the knowledge of illusory silver is once negated when the shell is known, the illusion of silver may arise again with another shell, similarly even after the general modal ignorance of the dream state is destroyed once by empirical knowledge there is no inconsistency in adream illusion appearing again. So there is no defect in the view that the jiva-consciousness is the substratum of the dream. 160. (After establishing the view the jiva-consciousness limited by the mind is the substratum of dream, the author now proceeds to establish the second alternative theory that Brahman-consciousness limited byprimal ignorance is the substratum of dream). In the view that Brahman-consciousness limited by primal ignorance is the substratum of dream, though ignorance can be destroyed completely only by the knowledge of Brahman, the illusion of the dream state can be hidden by the illusion of the waking state even without the knowledge of the substratum (Brahman) arising, just as the illusion of a snake on a rope is hidden by the illusion of a stick arising on the same rope subsequently. In view of this, there is no defect in the theory that Brahman-consciousness is the substratum of the superimposition of the dream. The fact that the dream of each jiva is unique and different from the dreams of others is attributable to the uniqueness of the vasanas in the mind of each person. Note. Brahman cannot be known even in the waking state. If it is known the empirical state (vyaavahaarika state) itself will come to an end. It can therefore be contended against this view that the modal ignorance of the dream state will not be destroyed on waking up and so the dream will continue, which is absurd. The answer to this is that though the ignorance is not destroyed, the delusion of the dream state will be hidden by the delusion of the waking state in the form ‘I am a man’. This is similar to the delusion of a snake on a rope being hidden (disappearing) by the delusion of a stick arising on the same rope subsequently. The delusion of a snake will be destroyed only when the rope is known, but this illusion disappears when a delusion of a stick arises on the same rope. Here a distinction is made between the destruction of an illusion and the mere non-appearance of it because of another delusion arising. By this argument it is pointed out that the second view that Brahman is the substratum of the dream can also be justified. 161. (Now a third view is stated). The substratum of the dream is Brahman-consciousness limited by the mind. In this view also since the modal ignorance is accepted to be covering it, there is no inconsistency. That is why it is stated so in some places in the scriptures. 162. Obj: If consciousness limited by the mind is the substratum, then the cognition should be only in the form ‘I am an elephant’, since the superimposed object, elephant, should be in the same grammatical case as ego-sense which is the substratum, just as in the cognition ‘this is silver’ the superimposed object ‘silver’ is in the same grammatical case as the substratum ‘this’ which refers to the shell. The cognition cannot be ‘this is an elephant’. In the view in which the substratum is Brahman-consciousness, the cognition should be only‘elephant’ and not ‘this is an elephant’, since there too there is no external object which could be referred to as ‘this’. Note. In the first theory mentioned in para 154 above and in the third theory stated in para 161 the substratum of the dream is consciousness limited by the mind. That is the jiva who refers to himself as ‘I’. So, just as when a shell appears as silver the cognition is ‘this (the substratum) is silver’, so also the elephant in the dream should be cognized as ‘I am an elephant’, since the substratum is ‘I’ and not as ‘this is an elephant’. In the second theory mentioned in para 154 the substratum of the dream is Brahman limited by primal ignorance which cannot be cognized as ‘this’ like an object in front such as a shell. So in this view also a cognition in the form ‘this is an elephant’ cannot arise. The cognition under this theory can be only ‘elephant’. This is the objection. 163. Answer: No. In the first theory the ego-sense is the limitor (or determinant) of the substratum in dream perception, just as shell-ness is the determinant of the substratum, shell, in the shell-silver illusion. The cognition in the shell-silver illusion is not in the form ‘the shell is silver’ (because if the shell is known as such there can be no illusory cognition of silver. The cognition is ‘this -the object in front- is silver’). Similarly in the case of dream the cognition cannot be ‘I am an elephant’ (because the ‘I’ or ego-sense is in the same position as shell-ness in the shell-silver example. What is covered is the ego-sense in the case of dream and shell-ness in the case of shell-silver illusion). The knowledge ‘I am’ is, like the knowledge ‘this is a shell’, opposed to the appearance of illusion. In the shell-silver illusion, the ‘this’ aspect is not opposed to the appearance of illusion (as is seen from the fact that the illusion is in the form ‘this is silver’). In dream, the ‘this’ aspect is also merely conjured up like the appearance of the elephant (because there is no object in front which can be referred to as ‘this’ as in the waking state). Though both (‘this’ and ‘elephant’) are negated as illusory, this does not result in a void because the underlying consciousness which is the substratum cannot be negated. In the waking state also, it is seen that there is an illusory appearance in the form ‘this is silver’ which is different from the cognition in the form ‘this is a shell’. (In the cognition ‘this is a shell’ both ‘this’ and ‘shell’ have empirical reality; but in the cognition ‘this is silver’, the ‘this’ has only illusory status as it is associated with the illusory silver). As stated in Samkshepasariraka, I.36, in an illusion only the superimposed object appears. Even if the ‘this’ aspect associated with the shell is considered to shine (as an empirical realty), the reality of the ‘this’ aspect is not a necessary condition for the production of an illusion; what is necessary is only that the substratum should be real. The substratum here (in dream) is the witness-consciousness, just as it is the unknown pure consciousness limited by the shell in the case of the illusory shell-silver. (Any empirical object is in reality pure consciousness limited by that object, because empirical objects are all only superimpositions on Brahman, or pure consciousness). Therefore there is no defect in either of the two views. 164. The enjoyer of the dream objects is known as ‘Taijasa’ because of the prominence of the brilliance called bile, or because it shines even without the help of lights such as the sun. 165. When the jiva is tired after experiencing objects in the two states of waking and dream, and when the karma (fruits of past actions) which is the cause of these two states is exhausted, the inner organwhich is characterized by the power to know and has vasanas in it goes into its causal state (i.e. it takes the form of nescience which is the causal body). This is the state of deep sleep which is the place of rest. Deep sleep is the state in which there is awareness of the cause (ignorance) alone, as indicated by the recollection (on waking up) in the form ‘I knew nothing at all’. In that state, even though there is no knowledge of the objects of experience of the waking and dream states,