A Framework For Ontology : Objects are mentally constructed

[DocWatts]

I thought I might share a write up for a philosophy book that I'm writing, which touches upon ontology, epistemology, and our embodied experience within the world. In it, I attempt to present some of the phenomenological insights of Heideggar and Merleau-Ponty in a more accessible manner, as part of a broader effort to develop a metaphysically agnostic, pragmatic ontology that has its basis in our embodied interactions with the world.


Objects Are Mentally Constructed (But Not Imaginary)

In this section, we’ll be introducing an alternative to the common sense, or Objective View, of objects. Because this alternative is grounded in the world disclosure process we’ve been exploring, we’ll refer to it as the Disclosive View.

In contrast to the Objective View’s insistence that objects are absolute features of Reality, Disclosive View contends that objects are more akin to a lens for navigating Reality. This makes them fundamentally experiential, as they’re how our mind turns our surroundings into something that’s comprehendible for us.

In essence, objects are a type of interaction which happens between our embodied minds and our surroundings; neither existing ‘out there’ in some external Reality, nor as a pure fabrication of the mind (distinguishing them from hallucinations, which present us with non-existent phenomena). In sum, the gist of the Disclosive View is that objects are mentally constructed (but not imaginary). 

Before proceeding, let’s first clarify what a mental construct is. What a mental construct (or just a construct, for short) refers to is a distinction that our minds create and sustain, which is coupled to some observation about ourselves or our world. 

If we think more deeply about what an object actually is, it’s our mind’s way of drawing a boundary around some portion of our local Reality. The advantage of carving up Reality in this way is that it allows us to relate to what’s contained within a given boundary in a more concrete way (as a house or as a chair, for example). As such, the boundaries which mark where one object ends and another begins are not arbitrary; rather, they are functional in nature. They are our mind’s way of packaging our surroundings into more manageable ‘chunks’ that are easier to interact with and understand.

Because this point can be easily misconstrued, the contention here isn’t that objects are ‘imaginary’ (like how Santa Claus and the Tooth Fairy are imaginary). Instead, what’s being pointed out is that objects are the products of a cognitive process that puts us in direct contact with the world. As living beings that are adapted for survival, objects would be useless to us if they didn’t convey generally reliable information about Reality. This also explains why there’s a valid distinction between objects and hallucinations, despite both being mentally constructed. Since the former puts us in touch with our surroundings and our environment, while the latter does not.

Hence, objects are mentally constructed, but not imaginary.

[Someone here]

@DocWatts what are your thoughts on ontological nihilism?  It doesn't say objects are mental construction nor imaginary...it says there are literally no objects at all..nothing at all exists in truth. 

Edited June 4 by Someone here

[zurew]

@DocWatts

Most of the things you  wrote down seem to be very similar to John Vervaeke's position (as far as I understand his position on this).

Even the word "disclose" is a word that he often time uses, when he talks about the subject-object relationship and how you are not just receiving raw sense data from your senses and how you are not just creating objects in your mind, but there are real objects in the world, that exist independent of your mind, but they disclose themselves to you in a particular way and your perception and experience of those objects is depended on your cognition (and you are participating in that disclosure).

Do you have any particular disagreement with Vervaeke regarding his metaphysics or epistemology or ethics?

 

Btw your writing is very comprehensible  and accessible (even to me who is very poorly read in philosophy),  and it is easy to follow your deductions and thought process , so good job on that!

Edited June 4 by zurew

[DocWatts]

7 hours ago, Someone here said:

@DocWatts what are your thoughts on ontological nihilism?  It doesn't say objects are mental construction nor imaginary...it says there are literally no objects at all..nothing at all exists in truth. 

That sounds like it falls squarely in the preview of metaphysical ontology, whereas the perspective I propose is more about using ontology to better understand our subjective, embodied experience within the world.

To that end, what I propose is a type of pragmatically oriented metaphysical agnosticism. Having a living body with survival needs is a central to how we understand our surroundings and our world, it doesn't matter whether that body is composed of 'matter stuff ' or 'mind stuff'.

In general, I've found metaphysical speculation about the overall meaning and purpose of capital R 'Reality' to be less helpful than perspectives which are grounded in our subjective, lived experience.

Mind you I'm not saying that there aren't uses for metaphysical theories and speculation, I just find that in my personal experience, they introduce a lot of unnecessary baggage if our goal is self-understanding.

[DocWatts]

4 hours ago, zurew said:

@DocWatts

Most of the things you  wrote down seem to be very similar to John Vervaeke's position (as far as I understand his position on this).

Even the word "disclose" is a word that he often time uses, when he talks about the subject-object relationship and how you are not just receiving raw sense data from your senses and how you are not just creating objects in your mind, but there are real objects in the world, that exist independent of your mind, but they disclose themselves to you in a particular way and your perception and experience of those objects is depended on your cognition (and you are participating in that disclosure).

Do you have any particular disagreement with Vervaeke regarding his metaphysics or epistemology or ethics?

 

Btw your writing is very comprehensible  and accessible (even to me who is very poorly read in philosophy),  and it is easy to follow your deductions and thought process , so good job on that!

Thanks! One of my aims with this book was to do an in-depth exploration of philosophical concepts that's more accessible than what you'd find within an academic book or lecture (both Verveake and Leo do a very good job at this).

The concept of 'disclosure' is drawn directly from the philosopher Martin Heidegger, which Verveake and myself are both drawing up on. The shared domain that's being explored here is called 'embodied / enactive' cognition, so it makes sense that we'd be exploring similar ideas and concepts (I'll admit that Verveake is of course an influence on my work as well).

For the most part I agree with Verveake, we just have slightly different areas of emphasis. Verveake's main 'thing' (if he can be said to have just one primary area of emphasis) is the unfolding 'meaning crisis' within Western society. My own perspective is about cultivating a more construct aware perspective, so that we can learn to hold our attitudes and beliefs in a more provisional and self aware way. Both Verveake and myself emphasize meta-rationality, so one would expect there to be commonalities in our subject matter and approach.

[zurew]

3 minutes ago, DocWatts said:

For the most part I agree with Verveake, we just have slightly different areas of emphasis.

Maybe you two differ on ethics, because I think he would consider himself to be a moral realist, but im not 100% sure.  He did say that the is-ought gap doesn't really exist, and that there is no good argument for it.

 

[DocWatts]

26 minutes ago, zurew said:

Maybe you two differ on ethics, because I think he would consider himself to be a moral realist, but im not 100% sure.  He did say that the is-ought gap doesn't really exist, and that there is no good argument for it.

 

Thanks for the share, I'll admit that I've yet to hear Verveake talk at length about his views on ethics.

My broad perspective is that ethics is a skill and capacity that can be cultivated, having to do with how wide our 'circle of concern' for other beings extends, and how adept we are at understanding the perspective of others. Which I suppose would place me into the camp of virtue ethics.

This is in contrast to the idea that ethics is primarily a detached from of intellectual reasoning, which I tend to disagree with.

While there are certainly specific situations where adopting a more detached position can be useful and appropriate (for instance, for people in positions of authority whose role necessitates impartially), this is the exception rather than the rule.

Edited June 4 by DocWatts