BlueOak

@zazen 1) If Russia is suffering so bad economically and militarily I don't see why they would escalate to that level by attacking a NATO country. I advocate for a regional focus, but in this context, Zazen you are need a larger one. If BRICS fights NATO, Russia can take Estonia. Because NATO will be busy all over the globe. Nuclear war isn't happening over an invasion. I am not even sure all countries would go to fight either, are you? Can you imagine Hungary going to fight Russia over Estonia? Collectivists need to understand NATO is many voices, and when pressed, they won't always align. 2) China and India couldn't care less about European security. No action they've taken even suggests it. I'm open for you to prove this otherwise with actions, not just words. Authoritarian countries speak through actions; their words are largely meaningless. At the moment, every action they've taken says the exact opposite. Again - Russia didn't place itself in NATO expansions way, it was the other way round. 3) Yes it did. After all this you still don't see the other side of this. Russia project fear, threats and violence. Russia was directly responsible for other countries joining a defensive alliance to resist them. Just like I can understand a larger power fighting against its decline to a regional power, and using all these tools to try and remake the USSR, or push their influence outward. I also understand that as Russia declines, it loses its sphere. You can't understand that. You think it's entitled to a sphere for its mere existence. No, not if it's too weak to project it relative to its neighbours. The EU should recognize its own security interests by dealing with a non-EU member like Ukraine hitting the Druzhba pipeline which provides energy to two EU member states. 4) Your logic doesn't make sense. Europe prosecuting the country directly responsible for ensuring and fighting for their security interests is like some twisted Russia state TV babble. I might as well say BRICS should prosecute Russia for dragging them closer to the brink of war, completely nonsensical when that's how BRICS aligning itself anyway, as a direct competitor to NATO. This is war zazen. You take out your opponent's economy in war, its been a long time coming. Russia is acting like Germany, which tried to project it had a healthy economy all the way to the end of WW2, when in reality they were broke. Given BRICS material and manpower support to Russia, the delay in really arming Ukraine to fully win, the only win state here for Europe. if Putin will not negotiate peace, is the destruction of the Russian economy. Otherwise, WW3 is a possibility, and that 'win state' could hardly be called a win for anyone. - Though what's practically happening is steady economic pressure.

BRICS and NATO are moving and positioning as if in a larger strategic war. That's why: Trump is moving to Venezuela to hit it. Useful idiots on the left for BRICS don't understand the overall strategy (Trump probably doesn't either). This gives it a military presence near Brazil but also takes out the most vocal ally of BRICS in South America, it's been wanting to join over and over, but Brazil have refused it so far. North Korea is in Russia, and probing South Korea's borders. Israel is hitting its surrounding enemies. China is about to invade Taiwan and keeps stealing military tech. Russia is pressuring Eastern Europe with invasion and fighting in Ukraine. NATO is moving to 5% military. Iran has been pressuring shipping BRICS have been pressuring western democracies internally with far-right groups. India has picked a side; they are providing not just financial but also material support for Russia's weapon construction (indirectly or directly), as are China, only China also provide direct soft material goods, North Korea shells, and Iran missiles. Etc. I advocate for focusing on the region but also state now that this is NATO vs BRICS. It's a cold war with hot war flashpoints. I'll consider it WW3 if and when NATO directly engages BRICS in a hot war, at the moment this is what a cold war looks like. The country that will decide when that happens is China, because Russia is not going into Europe without their say so, probably as a prelude to Taiwan. People still fail to grasp that Russia can fight NATO if all these other countries are also. It'll lose because it'll be a proxy, but it can; it recently threatened Estonia with a false flag, its second false flag. Now it's just threatened a US carrier group with a sub.

More of these men please. This is the energy at the podium the Democrats need to show Trump a coddled, aging fascist. This man could have the complete opposite views to me on almost everything else, but if this was the way he was willing to stand up to fascists, and hold democracy from falling further, i'd vote for him.

The second false flag attempt by the Russians. Could just be probing for reactions, like the drone attack on Poland with our weak response; we'll see. - Weakness always encourages Putin, should have been a stronger response to it, and it should have been shot down. I have always agreed if (when) they invade the Baltics, a nuclear war will not be the immediate result. It'll be conventional. Putin knows, NATO knows, I know this. So that's quite a likely outcome, considerably more likely than people here admit. Russia's economy requires war to sustain itself now.

@Hatfort Elections don't happen in war. As has been stated, they effectively don't happen in Russia either. - If people really want this global alignment and authoritarianism that I hear every other week, there it is. That's probably the most effective Russian/BRICS aspect of this, how much they've influenced the West's internal governance, but somehow, when it's inconvenient to the Russian narrative, it conveniently doesn't apply. But that's for another discussion. Back to being objective: in wartime, maintaining legitimacy and authority is paramount; populations will always vote not to die. On both sides of this. That's obvious. But to maintain a country, not an individual, understandable survival instincts of an individual can't decide the outcome of a war. You try to frame everything as if it's a normal functioning country. No it's a war for its survival and future, and the future of Eastern Europe, and perhaps NATO itself. I'll expand in the next post.

@zazen Hitting the Russian refineries cripples the conventional economy. Fuel shortages hit agriculture, transport and civilian industries. This is magnified in Russia as its internal logistics are so vast and demand so much energy for travel. 12% of total exports is 1, Not something to dismiss at all in regards total GDP output in wartime when every ruble matters to sustain the strain, but more importantly, its effect on the domestic economy is disproportionately large; the country would grind to a halt. Even if I take the official Russian figures (I don't) 10% inflation is a significant fiscal strain, propped up by asset sales, draining their sovereign wealth fund, and things like issuing new money, bonds, credit etc. It's accurate to say BRICS is funding the war, its economic depth complicates the Western deeper strategy. But it's also fair to say that China's increasing dominance over Russian trade puts Russia in a junior role, its more a dependency than an alliance the more this goes on. Russia is increasingly a proxy of BRICS through your lens. On the workforce or demographics. You've failed to factor in Russia's large emigration from the war, disproportionately of its best and brightest youth, or if you have the million casualties it's suffered and will now carry. Whereas in Ukraine the women and children were welcome to leave, but the men were limited to the Ukranian borders and drafted early on. So it's not an accurate representation of the actual numbers able to fight and also fails to take into account the existing demographics of the countries. Deeper on inflation, i've pulled ChatGPT up as independent experts conclude its closer to 20% GPT Quote: Regarding Russia’s economic resilience, it’s important to distinguish between nominal stability and underlying structural risks. While it’s true that Russia has avoided hyperinflation and that sanctions have not entirely crippled the economy, there is strong evidence that Moscow has been engaging in both traditional and digital forms of monetary expansion to sustain wartime spending. 🔹 Money printing (physical and electronic): Russia’s Central Bank has reportedly increased the monetary base by trillions of rubles, primarily to finance state enterprises and cover defense expenditures. This includes a blend of physical cash printing and “electronic inflation” through subsidized credit channels. One source cites around 8.2 trillion rubles (~$90 billion) injected since the war began: Why did Russia launch the printing press? – Center for Countering Disinformation, Ukraine https://cpd.gov.ua/en/results/rf-en/why-did-russia-launch-the-printing-press/?utm_source=chatgpt.com There are even unverified internal leaks suggesting the Central Bank ordered up to 15 trillion rubles in new currency to be printed recently: Reddit: Central Bank leak discussion (unverified) https://www.reddit.com/r/tjournal_refugees/comments/1m250cb/центробанк_рф_запустил_печатный_станок_на_15_трлн/?utm_source=chatgpt.com Though its a less credible source compared to the others, I asked for a translation here for simplicity. Ukrainian hackers passed screenshots of internal correspondence from the Central Bank of Russia to the media project Newsader: On July 7, 2025, the head of the Central Bank, Elvira Nabiullina, signed a secret directive instructing Goznak (Russia’s state money printer) to print 15 trillion rubles in 1,000 and 5,000 ruble denominations by October. Officially, this is described as being for "inflation stabilization" and "financing of priority expenses," but in fact, according to the investigation's authors, it's for war, mobilization, and simulating social stability. The scale is historic: in just three months, the cash volume in Russia would double—a level not seen even in 1998. For comparison, a 3 trillion ruble issuance in 2022 caused inflation to nearly double; now they’re printing five times more, the report emphasizes. According to the forecast, by winter, Russia faces an inflationary shock: ruble collapse, price hikes, shortages, capital flight, gray markets, and mass impoverishment. The Central Bank reportedly foresees this but is hiding it from the public. 🔹 Structural inflation and war financing: Rather than direct cash giveaways, a significant share of this “money printing” is happening through state-directed lending via banks like VTB and Sberbank, effectively expanding the money supply without physically printing money. This has propped up war industries but also contributed to elevated inflation: FT Interview with Elina Ribakova – Russia’s War Economy Pressures https://www.ft.com/content/438e6f4b-dda6-4c93-bc8d-0c72aa9f6416?utm_source=chatgpt.com 🔹 Inflation pressures: Russia’s inflation hovers around 9–10% officially, but external observers argue it's likely higher due to data opacity and sectoral imbalances: Reuters: Russia faces more austerity and inflation risks In short, while Russia is not in hyperinflation territory, its wartime economy is being increasingly sustained by aggressive monetary expansion—what could reasonably be called “electronic inflation.” This strategy buys time, not sustainability. https://www.reuters.com/markets/asia/russia-under-war-spending-pressure-set-more-austerity-tax-hikes-2025-08-20/?utm_source=chatgpt.com End Quote Here's its objective conclusion on both sides, which I considered rewriting but agreed with largely. Strategic Impasse and the Role of Western Policy The missed opportunity of Istanbul 2022 and the overreliance on NATO-centric security frameworks remain critical failures of imagination. A multilateral, non-aligned security arrangement—one that includes Turkey, China, and neutral European states—could have offered a credible alternative. The West frames Russian defeat as essential for peace and long-term European security. Russia frames Western support as an existential encirclement, justifying prolonged militarization. Ukraine, caught in the middle, bleeds manpower, infrastructure, and sovereignty. Meanwhile, the weaker Russia becomes, the more it risks turning into a de facto proxy of BRICS powers, particularly China and India, whose strategic interests now shape the viability and direction of the Russian war effort—economically, diplomatically, and potentially militarily. Zazen’s point about Ukraine’s declining sovereignty is worth considering, but saying Ukraine has only “15%” left is an exaggeration. Wartime conditions always limit democratic processes, yet Ukraine’s loss of sovereignty is not total—it retains agency, even if constrained by dependence on Western support.

@Ajay0 Both your statements are false. 1) Russia's stated nuclear doctrine is for a large-scale invasion of Russian territory, nuclear attacks against Russia or its allies. 2) Show me this corporate coercion. I can show you where citizens, specifically, in the UK, for example, were told not to go. Though class-based inequality in wartime is generally sadly a factor of it, see how Russia have mobilised the poorer areas of its country first. China and India. China and India's size doesn't translate into superiority. The west has a large technological edge, neither of these country's have the ability to project power globally like the US. They don't have the combat experience, and NATO has tightly integrated strategic structures and command protocols, whereas China and India have divergent interests and strategic aims. (Though granted this final point can shift) While China has strong production capabilities, India is still transitioning to one. But. My argument specifically stated it should be non-escalatory, as i've seen how quick these countries are to want to get involved further. I stated trade flows or foreign factories inside Russia, either on the ground or financially, just as the Russians have just done to the US. That's considerably more measured than direct escalation and limits it to the theatre. Again though if India and China don't recognize European security interests, then that needs to be addressed. That's the Russian narrative and excuse for all of this waste of human life after all.

Yeah it's much slower I agree. This war would have been over two years ago if not for BRICS. The Russian population is also suppressed enough to accept a lower quality of life and death for land. All true. But a country can't run without fuel, for example; that's a clear problem right now they are suffering with because of the hits on their refineries and its robbing them of their dominant export. It can't run well without enough demographics to support a working population. Its companies are going bust and they are printing money. China is buying it up bit by bit. Its a perfect debt trap long-term for the chinese. So it all depends how much China and india are actually funding this war. If India turns around and starts selling their fuel back to the Russians, for example, that's one thing to note. If they are just straight giving them cash, it doesn't save the Russian economy, it leads to hyperinflation which is what's going on there now. - I'm sure there are ways India and China can take on their debt, and thus the debt of the war, however. In that case Ukraine would be more directly in a war with China, India and BRICS generally. And we'd have to address that if it's the case, and target their economies and trade directly. Peace is not an option now. Putin will not negotiate, that's obvious, he won't even recognize Zelensky to talk to him. So if that's going to be the reality going forward, and Europe's security concerns are ignored by the Indians and Chinese at that point the gloves need to come off Again please note I am suggesting to counter things where possible against these countries, not escalate. That takes smarter men than me with greater economic minds on the problem, or just directly targeting any oil/trade as it comes in. As Russia have done with the US factory manufacturing consumer goods on the Ukrainian-Hungarian border just recently.

Conventional spiritual thinking is you are going to start where you finished, or a reflection of the last lifetime. As you'll build things based on pain, either avoidance, resistance, freezing, cowering, appeasement to it etc. Whatever you are chosing now as your pattern. You might say i'll design the exact opposite life! And therein would be the issue, the exact opposite isn't an integration of what you were struggling with this time either; in fact it'll just be the mirror problem. I also think about it occasionally. What stops me is a couple of things. Although I loathe the way the outer world is now, internally I am much more at peace than I ever was, and that's what's going with me. Its like I put myself in a pressure cooker and now things are fine, they are not good but they are okay. You'll get there if you do a lot trauma and regression work. Teal was great for that, even though I hate how much of a business they've become over there. Taking an idea I gave them an monetising it so I can't afford it! LOL Anyway, all I am saying is it gets better, your internal state if you work on it and are good to yourself. I can absolutely 100% assure you you'll die sometime, no need to rush it. Its gonna happen. What won't happen is any moment you've ever had again, even the terrible ones are completely unique and yours. I found pain quite addictive during my healing work; its quite tangible almost, especially when you start to get the choice to live in it or not. Life almost has less in it without that internal pain, less juice but more peace. All the best.

You are still not being specific enough. What exactly did I say that's propaganda? If you mean generally, I can speak generally but its not going to help. Let me try to cite a few things i've said? Do you mean where I say interest rates are tanking their economy, or they are printing money every few months, or that some of their major companies have gone bankrupt? Do you mean their demographics are terrible and have gotten worse? That they are running out of fuel? Do you want sources for China buying up their industries or becoming their main trade partner? What is needed here? Specific, please. Or do you mean the battlefield casualty rates, the rate at which they are gaining land, the current stockpiles, fuel reserves, momentum, or kill ratio between the two sides vs their manpower? The overall strategic picture as it was from 2014 to now? No major country is doing well now comparatively; a 'wonderful' economy is a daydream in regards to any country least of all one at war. Immune to sanctions is also a fantasy, but I can start there specifically if you like, as I agree 'sanctions' need to be much broader for them to be effective; hitting India was a start, but saying they are immune is quite frankly a lie and can be easily proven. - They are, however, very ineffective when compared to hard power or weapons given to Ukraine. I do agree.

Comparing Apples to Oranges. Or do you really want Russian style elections in Ukraine? Kill everyone involved, and give yourself 97% Elections in wartime do not help win wars. - War is never popular with the people dying, despite what Russian propaganda would have you believe, nobody likes dying over there either. Alright Hatford show me where my propaganda is specifically. And I will address it. Its unlikely you have a better grasp of the battlefield than I do, as I watched so damned much of it. But sure, point it out. If I learn something i'll appreciate it.

No. Again this propaganda. Leaders DO NOT have elections in wartime. Period. The cause isn't lost because the strategy is working. Russia is getting measurably weaker and less threatening the more the war goes on. Its actually working better than I expected with all the hits on Russian fuel right now.

@Hatfort Countries don't have elections in wartime. Russia has never wanted peace. They refuse all negotiations. I think you are the first person to acknowledge it from the pro Russian position. Ever. Thank you. Because you are right, making small steady gains is their plan. Whereas the west's plan is to bleed them dry of men and resources. That's the two strategies. It has been now for years. Some people can see them both, some people can only see one. Few people can accept both as fulfilling both major powers' objectives. Whereas Ukraine's and Eastern Europe's objectives are fulfilled if Russia is no longer able to threaten them. So if we achieve that globally, in all three perspectives, stability is achieved on the battlefield; if not it continues in some form. For all perspectives to be met. Not just one. It requires Ukraine losing Land, Russia losing enough power that it cannot advance further, the west guaranteeing Ukraine more strongly, and Russia accepting the Baltics and Finland on its border. There is a possibility of a greater war with the buildup for the war games from China, Iran, Russia, North Korea and Belarus at once. But more hypersonic missiles in Belarus and more missile production in Ukraine, roughly 3,000km munitions at the rate of 1 a day, is probably going to be what finally stabilizes a front without nukes being used. Really depends if China kicks it off, although it'd happen together, it'll never happen without China. Source New Ukrainian Missile being produced: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flamingo_(missile) Oh and all you need do is suck up to Trump, its incredibly easy to manipulate a narcissist, but also he flips his opinion every 5 minutes if multiple people do it. Putin repeated every word he liked also and he swooned.

Russia's cost for softening some of its ideology would have been the bridge between east and west, the oil and mineral resources, and trading empire to fuel a world, which it was doing quite nicely. It could have been a pivotal center of the globe, like Turkey is becoming. They have all the land and all the natural resources; it could have been an investment rush with a great quality of life upgrade. It could have if not defined, at least shaped the future of East-West relations. Instead, they wanted a buffer zone more than to accept some liberalism, because change was too difficult. The EU and the USA have adjusted to a more authoritarian stance for about 20 years, but Russia didn't move an inch to align over the last decades, Whereas China did a lot of work. Russia chose to keep pushing fear outward and listening to its own fears rather than choose another course. Even if they wanted the fear and violence approach, there were far better options than invading en masse, with much less fallout. They had all the leverage they needed at the very start of this, and it was barely even used. Now they have very little. Trade leverage, military pressure, assassinations, arms deals, and energy leverage (a big one at the start of this before war). - But better than all that would be to actually align with their neighbors more, as the EU have done with BRICS and if Russia accepted the reality that they are not as strong as they once were. You compare Western social issues with Russian ones. The difference with me Zazen (or England and Russia), is when I zoom out to a global or even national perspective, I can tell you England has acted stupidly, as can the UK press. Whereas you defend the inane positions Russia takes, and Russia covers it up. Brexxit was a disaster. Covid responses were too slow. Nationalist isolationism is a disaster in England. BRICS vs NATO is a disaster. Unlimited migration is a disaster. - All UK problems. Russia's war was a disaster. Its imperialist ambition to restore the USSR are delusional. Its fear of liberal democracy is also a way for a few oligarchs to retain power. Nobody on this earth is going to tell me this was a good, preferred, or useful outcome for Russia itself compared to where it was before this, or the choices it had. Putin is not Russia, despite what he would want you to believe, he's an old man running out of years, and then everyone's left to pick up what's left. The same way Russia is now running out of fuel (like its youth), and that's also if its current economic strains weren't enough, because its refineries are under constant attack. Though your 'tent city' in one park is how i'd describe a lot of the villages and towns in the east of Russia. Run down, no infrastructure, most of the men used up, everything's overpriced, and many of the men are now dead. As for demographics, Europe gained a lot of refugees from Ukraine and some from Russia, so it actually gained some demographics at the expense of its adversary. The UK's demographics thanks to migration are better than many places actually and i'd personally accept a thousand tent cities to keep it that way until AI evolves enough. Your entire framing of this is some necessary or beneficial strategic move, when to me its the behaviour of a desperate country making dumb choices to keep aging dictators in power at the expense of their youth. Kinda of like Brexxit, only much more violent, and with wannabe Tsars not wannabe economic experts, but both stuck in ages gone by not the real world. Russia is an aging relic that cannot change, and yes, the UK has that element in it, but thankfully, they are not in power yet. Point me at the gain here for Russia Zazen How are they better off now than they were 10 years ago?

@zazen Buffers without consent are just occupations. Again spheres describe behaviour, they don’t create rights Zazen. A buffer only stabilises if all great powers restrain themselves and the frontline state consents to it, you keep missing this last bit, it's why perpetual war exists in a multipolar system. Example: Thousands of years of history, or more recently Russia’s breach of the Budapest assurances and its 2014 and 2022 invasions broke the trust Finland would need, whatever reason you cite for this that was the eventual outcome from the Finnish perspective. That’s why Finland decided neutrality no longer brought it safety. GPT Quote: If the stronger actor won’t self-bind, buffer becomes a euphemism for veto over a neighbour’s choices—guaranteeing the balancing you dislike. But how are you arbitrarily deciding what a buffer should be, what size, and which regions? I asked the AI for some objective points above. And how can perpetual hostilities be avoided when a state’s own agency is not considered? (Think all regions around the globe, Syria for example) There is no liberal utopia in my perception of the world, though I will address that in another thread, as you've brought it up, because that mirror goes both ways. You have abandoned that set of values to supersede it with another. Asymmetric realism. If Russia’s drive for depth is natural, again Europe’s denial and balance of it is equally natural. Calling one prudent and the other provocative is picking a side while claiming to be above sides. Again: Recognition of multipolarity isn’t capitulation, it’s competitive coexistence where small states keep agency. You refuse to address this because you cannot in your line of argument, and further dismiss one side's ideology to only reflect the other. You'll probably focus on the ideology point, rather than the strategic one, so I considered ignoring it. GPT Quote: The test is simple: does the front-line state consent? If not, the “red line” is a demand, not a settlement. That’s the argument, and it’s a good one, Russian supporters or sympathizers can only side-step it never address it, because it makes the whole thing much more multipolar and nuanced, and by definition, then liberal. The paradox large collective states trying to push their influence outward find themselves in, while claiming they are for a multipolar world. Chat GPT disagreed with me here on nukes, direct quote: Nukes in Ukraine (Or Belarus) are the wrong medicine. Deterrence equals maximal escalation. Forward-basing nuclear weapons in a hot war zone would blow up what’s left of the non-proliferation regime, shorten decision times, and make accidents more likely. Europe gets more stability by hardening conventional denial (air defence, long-range strike, ISR, mines, EW) than by normalising new nuclear basing east of NATO. Me: Sadly Russia is not going this route, they are putting hypersonic missiles right inside Belarus on the border now. So they are pushing for a buffer zone in Poland, which simply put, will never happen without WW3. See the big flaw in your argument is, Russia is arbitrarily deciding where their sphere ends, and you suggest Europe should just accept it. Life doesn't work that way, this is what happens when life tries to work that way. GPT Quote: So what does a grown-up multipolar settlement look like? Armistice with teeth: verified lines, 24/7 sensors, and automatic snap-back penalties for violations. Reciprocal non-deployment rules: no IRBMs, no strike UAV basing within agreed belts; intrusive inspections both sides. Conditional sanctions relief: phased, tied to compliance—not vibes. Enduring deterrence: Europe funds Ukrainian AD/arty/ISR at scale for years; NATO re-arms to raise the price of renewed aggression. Energy/finance choke-point enforcement: tighten the shadow-fleet/insurance and LNG trans-shipment loopholes; hit facilitators, not just flags. That’s not liberal utopianism; it’s classic denial-deterrence plus verifiable restraints. You’re right that law can’t erase power. But power without rules just recreates the problem you’re diagnosing: permanent war over “buffers.” If buffers are needed, they must be anchored in consent, reciprocity, and enforcement—or they’re just the next casus belli. End Quote

So to start I asked the AI to define the topic objectively. Me: In such a system What defines what a buffer would look like objectively? in a concise objective statement? The Political Mind said: Thought for 6s A buffer is a territorially fixed state/zone whose status is set by mutually agreed, reciprocal, and verifiably enforced limits on alliances and offensive deployments—consented to by the buffer itself and neighboring powers, with automatic penalties for violations. You said: And how objectively does a state redefine a buffer. The Political Mind said: Thought for 19s Here’s a compact, criteria-driven way to state it: A state may redefine its buffer status when all of the following objective tests and procedures are met: Consent test (domestic legitimacy): Super-majority parliamentary vote (e.g., ≥⅔) and a national referendum ≥60% in favor of change. Breach test (cause): A certified material breach of the buffer treaty by a guarantor (e.g., prohibited systems deployed, cross-border attack), or ≥3 verified serious violations within 12 months. Risk-threshold test (environmental change): independently verified metrics exceed agreed caps, for example: Warning time to capital/critical nodes falls below 6 minutes due to new forward-based missiles. Basing distance of prohibited strike assets < 300 km from border, or range > 500 km within a no-deploy belt. Force density above 5 battalion tactical groups per 100 km of front for ≥90 days. Verification: Violations and thresholds confirmed by a designated inspectorate (e.g., OSCE-style mission with persistent sensors/inspections). Notice & standstill (procedure): Formal notification to guarantors + depositary; 90–180 day standstill for mediation while existing limits remain in force. Reciprocity offer (good faith): The redefining state tables alternative, reciprocal limits (e.g., “no IRBMs / no foreign bases within X km” on both sides) to replace the old regime. Entry into force & enforcement: If mediation fails, change takes effect on a fixed date; automatic penalties (snap-back sanctions/aid suspensions) apply to any party violating the new terms; verification continues. In one line: a buffer can be redefined when domestic consent + verified cause or risk shift + due process are satisfied, and the new status is reciprocal, monitorable, and enforceable. You said: This assumes a state acting independently. When the buffer state is considered along with all the larger powers. How is it brought into reality. Assuming that not taking into account the smaller buffer state itself can lead to perpetual hostilities. The Political Mind said: Thought for 22s Great question. Here’s a concise, power-aware way to make a buffer real while preserving the smaller state’s agency. Blueprint: Consent-Anchored Buffer Regime (CABR) Principle: Power sets constraints; consent + reciprocity + verification make them governable. 1) Parties & roles Buffer state (B): primacy of consent; proposes/accepts limits. Adjacent great powers (A, C): reciprocal restraint; no veto without B’s assent. Guarantors (G): a neutral coalition (e.g., OSCE core states + Switzerland/Finland/Austria/Ireland) that verifies and enforces. Depositary: OSCE (or a neutral state) holds the treaty; public registry. 2) Entry conditions (before talks) Ceasefire with monitors on the line of contact. Non-annexation pledge by A and C during talks. Sanctions standstill (no new measures unless violations occur). 3) Consent architecture (prevents “about you, without you”) Domestic super-majority + referendum in B to adopt any regime. Triple-consent rule for changes: B + A + C (and recorded by G). Minority rights & demilitarized policing plan inside B to reduce internal veto players. 4) The restraint envelope (objective limits) No-deploy belts (e.g., 300–500 km) for specified strike systems on both sides. Force-density caps (e.g., ≤5 BTGs/100 km for ≥90 days). No foreign bases in B; training missions capped, declared, inspected. Transparency: 24/7 sensors, open data feeds, flight/ship transponder rules, snap inspections. 5) Verification body (VEA) A treaty-created Verification & Enforcement Authority staffed by neutral states; Mandate: continuous ISR, inspections, incident forensics, quarterly public reports. 6) Enforcement ladder (automaticity beats rhetoric) Violations trigger pre-agreed, automatic steps within 72h: Notice & fix window (72h). Financial snap-backs (targeted sanctions/insurance bans) by G. Suspension of trade preferences/visas relative to the violator. Security offset: if A violates, B may receive specified systems (e.g., extra air defense/ATACMS) from G; if B violates, assistance pauses. Binding arbitration (30 days) with VEA’s panel; non-compliance escalates steps 2–4. 7) Incentive stack (why sign and comply) Escrowed sanctions relief: staged unfreezing/tariff cuts tied to verified compliance milestones. Stability Fund for B (administered by a neutral bank/BIS) for grid repair, air defense, demining—released only on VEA certifications. Civil corridors (grain/power) protected by joint incident cells. 8) Dispute resolution & crisis brakes Hotlines (military + political levels). 30-day arbitration clock with interim measures; failure triggers step-wise automatic penalties, not bargaining. 9) Review, exit, and redefinition 5-year reviews; earlier only if breach test or risk-threshold test (pre-agreed metrics like warning time, basing distance) is met. Exit requires Triple-consent and a replacement regime—or VEA declares breach and moves to Enforcement 4. 10) Public legitimacy Transparency portal: publish maps, inspections, violations, and penalties in real time to reduce propaganda and keep domestic consent aligned. One-line summary: A buffer becomes real when great-power restraints are made reciprocal and verifiable, the buffer state’s consent is constitutionally primary, and enforcement is automatic, pre-priced, and tied to concrete security and economic incentives.

Russia's economy is cooked. As was the prediction. Despite all the aid, a crutch only goes so far. So its endgame now is to try and appear diplomatic and make desperate pushes to take territory they claim is theirs (before they had it), which get an entire battalion cut off. I thought it was a group but it was a battalion. In the name of a political gambit. They have to now pressure Ukraine diplomatically. Because they can't keep up the facade that everything is fine when you take a million casualties and throw so many billions into a war. People arguing that are so biased that you can't speak to them most of the time.

Your justification of targeting civilians answers the question people ask me time to time. Why do you think we are pro Russia? Because largely raze you appeal to a moral center in people, and do it in a way people listen. This is a morally skewed position you are taking. Just say it, just come out and say, bombing civilians in war is abhorrent. No justification, no threading a needle, just that. Its really simple and it brings every atrocity into focus. Otherwise, the moral argument is cut into sides and nothing improves because you are just arguing details. If you are moving to a different non-moral argument, Russia's actions to retake 20% of something they held 100% of have been a strategic failure and a complete waste of a million+ lives and a country that had an 'okay' economic outlook, bad demographics but it was in a good place. Now its not.

Can anyone else ultimately be responsible for your choices in life? For people who don't understand everything is themselves. Yes. Just like all the decisions the right has made now, it leads to the radicalization of the left in the next shift. It's how consciousness does small steps up societally/collectively in a two-party political system. Which is flawed to begin with because it apparently relies on high drama to execute these changes effectively, in this 6-second attention span tiktok reality, wheras a multiparty system is more balanced but makes for more boring TV. People can point to where this isn't the case, but i'd ask them what is people's experience of this, what do they consciously remember, talk about, live and embrace. The high drama, not the bureaucratic steps. They may have all these silent background things contributing to their life, but unless the child grows up to understand what the parents did for them, they remain narcissistic, entitled brats with their heads in their phones. - Modelling how most kids grow up, into the larger model here, because they are the future voters making waves now.

Both parties no longer consider economic issues or the economic status of their population as important, because it's bad for their donors and moneyed interests, and things are changing so rapidly. Otherwise, it'd be the number one thing being talked about right now with people struggling. Instead, it's always high drama identity politics that mean little to people's daily lives. Big shows from the republicans with little actual benefit, and lots of words from the democrats so they can keep the status quo ticking along. Traditionally, the democratic party has more of a push to tax the rich, and put more money/resources back into people's lives. Whereas the republicans give the rich more tax breaks and take money/resources out of people's lives. There are different arguments for this; i've heard several and never seen one I agreed with fully. Because: People can be greedy, and those in business are generally greedy for money, its what drives them. So when you give them the option of taking more revenue, they do, it doesn't get passed down to the population. The good counterargument is that bureaucracy is wasteful, and thus some of that money gets used up on admin, but it also keeps rich billionaires in check so they don't run amok so easily. The perfect scenario in America would be to motivate people to create businesses for something other than money. But when you pair that against someone who is all about the numbers competitively, it doesn't win, not unless it was done en masse using bureaucracy and/or the media, and local interest groups to support it. Real grass-roots business/organisations something nationalists often reach for but fall short of, because they focus too broadly.

I've been banging that drum for about 5 years now. You have to step outside of your own perspective. These are collective minds, or using the collective perspective at least to make their posts. Nothing wrong with that at all btw, just a different outlook. It would help if they could step into a more individualist mind when making their replies at times, if their want was to build bridges as it were, or gain nuance in regions such as Europe, Central asia, the middle east etc. You can do the same while recognizing the collective expression of the West, but also the individuality of regional powers or smaller sovereign countries within it. This is critical because not doing this is why spheres of influence end up eternally fighting over what they see as smaller pawns, countries too small to exert a large sphere of influence. If these were recognised more in their sovereignty, wars over them would be less frequent. Conflict would still happen, but it would be more isolated and less sphere vs sphere in nature, because in people's minds and perception, that individuality of cultures or societies would carry more weight. (Both in accountability for their mistakes, but also the preservation of peaceful, independent coexistence, not just as proxies)

Sourced by Chat GPT if any are broken let me know, checked several EU oil/gas dependence & trade with Russia Eurostat (oil share): https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_trade_with_Russia_-_latest_developments Reuters (EU gas: 45% → ~19%): https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russian-energy-export-disruptions-since-start-ukraine-war-2025-08-15/ Reuters (EU gas ~19% in 2024; ~13% in 2025): https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/eu-lawmakers-eye-faster-russian-gas-phase-out-documents-show-2025-07-25/ Eurostat (imports down 86% since Q1 2022): https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_trade_with_Russia_-_latest_developments Reuters (EU trade still exists but far lower; oil share ~2%): https://www.reuters.com/world/three-years-into-war-us-and-europe-keep-billions-trade-with-russia-2025-08-05/ LNG shifts & U.S./Norway replacement European Commission (US supplied ~45% of EU LNG in 2024; Norway top pipeline): https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/carbon-management-and-fossil-fuels/liquefied-natural-gas_en Reuters (US share ~44% of EU LNG in 2024): https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/eus-250-billion-per-year-spending-us-energy-is-unrealistic-2025-07-28/ EIA background (US nearly half of Europe’s LNG in 2023): https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61483 EU sanctions on Russian LNG & shadow fleet enforcement European Commission Q&A (14th sanctions package; bans LNG transshipment via EU ports after 9-month transition): https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_24_3425 EEAS note (same package overview): https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-adopts-14th-package-sanctions-against-russia-its-continued-illegal-war-against-ukraine_en S&P Global explainer (effect on LNG transshipment): https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/natural-gas/062424-eu-council-formally-adopts-14th-russian-sanctions-package-targeting-lng Reuters (sanctions targeting shadow fleet tankers): https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/shadow-tanker-fleet-grows-more-slowly-western-sanctions-target-russian-oil-2025-08-13/ Reuters (U.S. enforcement fund for “ghost fleet”): https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/us-bill-creates-fund-enforce-oil-sanctions-russias-ghost-fleet-2025-04-09/ Bank of Finland blog (Urals running ~$15 below Brent on average): https://www.bofbulletin.fi/en/blogs/2025/new-oil-price-cap-adds-to-russia-s-economic-distress/ Power of Siberia-2 (Russia→China gas) Reuters (talks ongoing; no finalized contract as of May 2025; capacity ~50 bcm): https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/russian-chinese-firms-active-talks-power-siberia-2-gas-pipeline-tass-reports-2025-05-08/ Russia’s macro/war-economy indicators Reuters (defence spending ~6.3% of GDP in 2025): https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-hikes-national-defence-spending-by-23-2025-2024-09-30/ Reuters (2025 deficit target raised to ~1.7% of GDP): https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russia-raises-2025-deficit-forecast-threefold-due-low-oil-price-risks-2025-04-30/ Bank of Russia (key rate cut to 18% on July 25, 2025; peaked at 21%): https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/pr/?file=25072025_133000key_e.htm Reuters (rate cut coverage): https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russian-central-bank-slashes-key-rate-by-200-bps-biggest-cut-since-may-2022-2025-07-25/ Losses/casualties estimates CSIS assessment (toward ~1M Russian casualties by summer 2025): https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-battlefield-woes-ukraine Reuters citing UK Defence Intelligence (~1M killed/wounded): https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-gates-how-ukraine-defended-strategic-city-months-2025-07-28/ Ukrainian public opinion on ending the war Gallup (69% favor negotiating an end “as soon as possible”): https://news.gallup.com/poll/693203/ukrainian-support-war-effort-collapses.aspx Russia Matters roundup of polls (support for negotiations vs. concessions): https://www.russiamatters.org/blog/polls-show-ukrainians-increasingly-want-end-war-not-under-russias-terms NATO/EU defence-spending trend Reuters (NATO’s new “5%” framework: 3.5% core + 1.5% broader security): https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/what-is-natos-new-5-defence-spending-target-2025-06-23/ NATO page (context on allies meeting/exceeding 2% in 2025): https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm Reuters (Poland 4.7% of GDP in 2025; aiming for 5% in 2026): https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-wants-spend-5-gdp-defence-2026-minister-says-2025-04-03/ Reuters (UK to 2.5% by 2027; intent signalled): https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-defence-spending-reach-25-gdp-by-2027-pm-starmer-says-2025-02-25/ International-law principle on alignment choice OSCE: Helsinki Final Act (text/overview): https://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act U.S. Helsinki Commission (PDF of the Act):

@zazen Premise: If we take multipolarity seriously, then what you call Russia’s natural push for buffers has an equally natural counterbalance: Europe’s balancing and denial. That’s the security dilemma, not a moral failure or a reason to demonize in your recognition of it. Spheres explain behaviour, they don’t confer rights or vetoes. Again recognising a multipolar world isn’t capitulation; it’s a competitive coexistence (Something i've resisted accepting). In such a system, small states have agency also: Ukraine, Poland or Georgia aren’t just buffer zones, without recognition of that, we have eternal conflict using them as pawns. In a region with clashing ideologies, history and cultural memories over a thousand years of it, friction is predictable; you aren't acknowledging that enough. Yes, the standard should be consent and non-aggression, but not deference to a power’s sphere because you or I favor its position. Europe rearming and backing Ukraine is a predictable and normal balancing response. 1) Why not just deal with Russia? This is dealing with Russia. Its a perfect understandable mirror over cultures and populations that share a long conflicting history, many similar cultural values (in the immediate region), but conflicting ideologies, in a new multipolar dynamic with competing interests. It's like asking why don't Russia just deal with these many countries to its west? Well they are. @PurpleTreeOn Nukes, yes. I've called for that for years. That's why Putin did it in Belarus. It'll help deter invasion of Belarus in the coming decades. Its exactly what needs to happen to secure that zone of conflict for a few decades. 1A) An addition: Europe still funds Russia. No. You keep posting this in different threads @zazen, so I'll post it here again. The scale has flipped As I've just sourced this with Chat GPT, i'll just copy paste GPT conclusions: Quote: Oil: The EU cut Russian crude and products from ~29% of its oil imports in 2021 to ~2% in early-2025. That’s orders-of-magnitude smaller revenue than pre-war. Gas: Russia’s share of EU gas fell from ~45% pre-war to ~15–19% in 2024/25 (mix of pipeline + LNG). Norway and U.S. LNG have largely displaced it. Total trade: EU goods imports from Russia dropped ~78–86% vs early-2022, even if some flows (nickel, LNG) remain. The direction of travel is clear. Reuters Yes, India and China absorbed much of the oil, at a discount. That’s why Moscow leaned on a shadow fleet and non-Western insurance. Discounts widened again this month, underscoring Russia’s weaker pricing power. End Quote 2) You can’t sanction half the world (BRICS). Power is in chokepoints, not headcounts. Population is not leveraged. The G7 and EU still dominate finance, shipping insurance, advanced tech, and capital markets. There are focused sanctions targeted at these points, which is easier given the dominance. Chat GPT adds: Even with BRICS expansion, nominal-GDP weight still trails the G7 and is fragmented by divergent interests. (PPP shares look larger but don’t buy chips, tooling, or underwriting.) I generally liked its take more than mine here, as it brings up some interesting points. 3) Russia’s war economy is fine. Really? Another stat quote here for speed: Russia’s defense burden is now 6–7% of GDP; the 2025 deficit was raised to 1.7% of GDP, and the central bank hiked to 21% before easing to 18%—classic overheating control. This isn’t collapse, but it’s expensive and crowding-out. To me this is the biggest point of propaganda. In real terms nobody's economy is doing fine. Least of all a country which is printing 15-19% of its money every few months, is propped up by BRICS members buying energy they don't need at a discounted price, and has its refineries (its major export) hit daily. Its country is tooled up to a wartime economy, and it spent 1 million lives, many of which will be carried as a burden one way or the other by the state, both physically and psychologically. Plus how many millions that have fled and won't return, because they have families/lives/good jobs elsewhere now. 4) Manpower doesn't decide a war. Quantity helps, but quality, gear, and politics ultimately decide outcomes UK MOD and the CSIS list Russian casualties KIA and WIA past 1 million this summer. That's an enormous casualty strain and bill for the country to carry. Maintaining their push requires hard cash, and prison recruiting both of which are dried up. These are signs of strain not a healthy military. The kill ratio exceeds the population imbalance you describe. Which is why, almost four years on, this is a very slow front. 5) Ukrainians just want a deal. Yes. To a ceasefire, not to capitulation Quote for speed: Gallup finds ~69% want a negotiated end “as soon as possible.” But Ukrainian polls also show little willingness to concede territory and strong belief Russia would violate a paper peace. That’s not hawkish elites forcing war; it’s a public that wants peace with security, not a reset to the next invasion. 6) Georgia and Azerbaijan in NATO is just antagonizing Russia? Two things here to start: Azerbaijan has never been a realistic NATO candidate in the past; While Georgia has sought a path for years. Something you struggle with in your analysis are points like this, great power red lines don't erase neighbors agency. The Helsinki Final Act norms are states choose their alignments. Realism matters, but so do rules to govern a multipolar world, or smaller states live at the mercy of spheres of influence, and we end up in eternal conflicts. Leo would tell me they do live at their mercy, then i'd reflect that's the source of eternal conflict, until those states or populations are considered they'll just be pawns to fight or compete over. - Infact that's a realisation i've just had, not doing so is why sphere's of influence live in competition. 7) Europe is pacifist bureaucracy; 5% of GDP talk is fantasy? Again GPT does stats far better than me: The EU was slow, but the trend is up: NATO just signaled a new spending envelope (3.5% core + 1.5% broader security); Poland is pushing ~4.7–5%; the UK is moving toward 2.5% (with some leaders floating higher over the 2030s). Industrial capacity (ammo/drones/air defense) is expanding from a low base. It’s not instantaneous, but it is material. 8) China will replace Europe for Russian gas? The Power of Siberia-2 still lacks a finalised contract and price; Beijing has kept Moscow waiting to extract terms. Even if built, 50 bcm doesn’t replace pre-war European pipeline volumes. I am trusting the GPT's conclusion on this i'll place sources in the next post. What should Europe actually do? Me: Strong united front to keep their sphere pushing toward Russia, nukes in Ukraine to mimic Belarus, keep pushing back. Until we can start to consider smaller states sovereignty as a globe. Russia isn't developed enough to do so yet. I'm just going to be blunt @zazen you reason from a place that doesn't yet exist. Which is noble and useful to point out better solutions but flawed in practicality. GPT's strategy and evaluation. Based on my overall analysis. Short term (war-relevant within months) Air defense + counter-drone mass for Ukraine; stockpile 155mm/122mm & GMLRS; remove range caveats that hobble interdiction of Russian logistics inside Russia’s border areas supporting active fronts. (Deterrence works when it raises Moscow’s costs faster than it can adapt.) Close the revenue taps left: Impose an EU tariff or ban on Russian LNG; stop trans-shipment via EU ports; align with U.S./UK on tighter enforcement of the oil price cap and shipping/insurance secondary sanctions. Reuters+1 Target the shadow fleet and traders blending or relabeling Russian products. (Insurance and port-state control are the leverage.) Le Monde.fr Use frozen Russian sovereign assets: expand the windfall-profits mechanism into outright collateralization for Ukrainian air defense, power grid repair, and ammo. (The legal path now exists in G7/EU practice.) Medium term (1–3 years) 4) Munition & propellant bottlenecks: fast-track explosives/propellant (TNT/RDX) plants and drone lines; long-term framework contracts, not one-off grants. 5) Energy resilience: lock in non-Russian LNG/offshore wind/nuclear extensions; diversify grids inter-EU so gas is a swing fuel, not a vulnerability. The U.S. supplied ~50% of EU LNG in 2024—use that bargaining power to secure multi-year volumes while accelerating demand reduction. Reuters 6) Security guarantees for Ukraine that bite: multi-year arms funding; integrated air defense; real-time ISR access; and a clearly signposted path to NATO once basic deterrence is in place—so any ceasefire isn’t just an operational pause for Russia. Diplomatic lane (in parallel) 7) Test Moscow with a ceasefire-for-verification offer: front-line freeze + intrusive monitoring + phased sanctions relief tied to compliance (no missile/drone attacks, POW exchanges, protected corridors for grain/power repair). Publicly table terms that are enforceable; if the Kremlin balks, Europe wins the narrative without conceding ground. GPT's Closing Bottom line Europe hasn’t “kept Russia whole.” Oil revenues from Europe collapsed; gas dependence is way down; the remaining holes (LNG, shadow fleet) can be closed with targeted measures. ReutersBruegelEuropean Commission Russia can grind forward, but at mounting fiscal and demographic cost—hardly a free ride. SIPRICSIS Ukrainians want the war to end, but not on terms that invite the next one. Any “architecture” worth the name must reflect that, or it’s just a prelude to Round Two.

I understand this is a sensitive topic and you've been through a lot. That's why I was making the post, to help, which failed. Until you made the subsequent post it sounded like you were still stuck here.

16/08/2025 I am having some hours off. Zoning out. I've been on forty-hour weeks, with the rest of the time on the business. My apartment is a cluttered mess and I've not been eating or exercising well, all i've done is work with a few hours off here and there to take my mind off it. That about sums it up. Though I did get a run yesterday, and I have been trying to do maintenance cleaning here. I think 70 hours working is where I top out tbh, though I find sometimes now I only want to work, rather than anything else. I've finally convinced my business partner to go niche on sites. As trying to do broad websites is simply impossible in the time we have available, if I consider the full picture of all it takes to maintain a catalogue/advertising/business admin/support etc, even a niche site or two can eat your time to flesh out. I've considered starting my own (second) company up to put extra time into, but at the end of the day we are stronger together. Early tomorrow we are going to try and sell off a lot of the stock we have held in person. While next week we put some more time into a relaunch of the main dropshipping site we have going on (its a hybrid currently if you are wondering) We've learned a lot but its not been a financial success yet, and so I have my misgivings about continuing. I've sunk a lot of money into this project again. Its a test of myself to keep focused and committed over the next months till we build back up. But its a leap of faith in myself and him to continue. People tell me to get a girl, and its not like I haven't had opportunities now. But I consistently reply I don't have the money or the time currently. Coach’s Note (16/08/2025) You’re right at the edge of a threshold—the kind of moment where exhaustion, uncertainty, and grit all intersect. That’s not a failure of your system; it’s a reflection of how deeply you’ve committed. But commitment without replenishment becomes erosion, not endurance. The recognition that 70 hours is your upper limit is not a weakness—it’s data. It’s wisdom earned through experience. And your insight about the shift from “wanting to work” to “only wanting to work” is a quiet alarm worth listening to. When work becomes both the ladder and the escape, balance quietly exits the room. Yet even now, you’re recalibrating. You’re cleaning in spurts. You’re still running. You’re negotiating your business structure and refining niche focus. These are signs of life beneath the fatigue. Don’t overlook that. Here’s a small reflection prompt to anchor this transition: “What part of me needs to be heard, not managed?” That part might be tired, unsure, or even quietly grieving the space you’ve given up for this push. Listening to it isn’t indulgence—it’s leadership. You’ve built systems, companies, and frameworks. Now build space for the part of you that doesn’t thrive on performance alone. Your leap of faith is real. Just make sure you're landing on ground that supports you, not just your output.