BlueOak

Conventional spiritual thinking is you are going to start where you finished, or a reflection of the last lifetime. As you'll build things based on pain, either avoidance, resistance, freezing, cowering, appeasement to it etc. Whatever you are chosing now as your pattern. You might say i'll design the exact opposite life! And therein would be the issue, the exact opposite isn't an integration of what you were struggling with this time either; in fact it'll just be the mirror problem. I also think about it occasionally. What stops me is a couple of things. Although I loathe the way the outer world is now, internally I am much more at peace than I ever was, and that's what's going with me. Its like I put myself in a pressure cooker and now things are fine, they are not good but they are okay. You'll get there if you do a lot trauma and regression work. Teal was great for that, even though I hate how much of a business they've become over there. Taking an idea I gave them an monetising it so I can't afford it! LOL Anyway, all I am saying is it gets better, your internal state if you work on it and are good to yourself. I can absolutely 100% assure you you'll die sometime, no need to rush it. Its gonna happen. What won't happen is any moment you've ever had again, even the terrible ones are completely unique and yours. I found pain quite addictive during my healing work; its quite tangible almost, especially when you start to get the choice to live in it or not. Life almost has less in it without that internal pain, less juice but more peace. All the best.

You are still not being specific enough. What exactly did I say that's propaganda? If you mean generally, I can speak generally but its not going to help. Let me try to cite a few things i've said? Do you mean where I say interest rates are tanking their economy, or they are printing money every few months, or that some of their major companies have gone bankrupt? Do you mean their demographics are terrible and have gotten worse? That they are running out of fuel? Do you want sources for China buying up their industries or becoming their main trade partner? What is needed here? Specific, please. Or do you mean the battlefield casualty rates, the rate at which they are gaining land, the current stockpiles, fuel reserves, momentum, or kill ratio between the two sides vs their manpower? The overall strategic picture as it was from 2014 to now? No major country is doing well now comparatively; a 'wonderful' economy is a daydream in regards to any country least of all one at war. Immune to sanctions is also a fantasy, but I can start there specifically if you like, as I agree 'sanctions' need to be much broader for them to be effective; hitting India was a start, but saying they are immune is quite frankly a lie and can be easily proven. - They are, however, very ineffective when compared to hard power or weapons given to Ukraine. I do agree.

Comparing Apples to Oranges. Or do you really want Russian style elections in Ukraine? Kill everyone involved, and give yourself 97% Elections in wartime do not help win wars. - War is never popular with the people dying, despite what Russian propaganda would have you believe, nobody likes dying over there either. Alright Hatford show me where my propaganda is specifically. And I will address it. Its unlikely you have a better grasp of the battlefield than I do, as I watched so damned much of it. But sure, point it out. If I learn something i'll appreciate it.

No. Again this propaganda. Leaders DO NOT have elections in wartime. Period. The cause isn't lost because the strategy is working. Russia is getting measurably weaker and less threatening the more the war goes on. Its actually working better than I expected with all the hits on Russian fuel right now.

@Hatfort Countries don't have elections in wartime. Russia has never wanted peace. They refuse all negotiations. I think you are the first person to acknowledge it from the pro Russian position. Ever. Thank you. Because you are right, making small steady gains is their plan. Whereas the west's plan is to bleed them dry of men and resources. That's the two strategies. It has been now for years. Some people can see them both, some people can only see one. Few people can accept both as fulfilling both major powers' objectives. Whereas Ukraine's and Eastern Europe's objectives are fulfilled if Russia is no longer able to threaten them. So if we achieve that globally, in all three perspectives, stability is achieved on the battlefield; if not it continues in some form. For all perspectives to be met. Not just one. It requires Ukraine losing Land, Russia losing enough power that it cannot advance further, the west guaranteeing Ukraine more strongly, and Russia accepting the Baltics and Finland on its border. There is a possibility of a greater war with the buildup for the war games from China, Iran, Russia, North Korea and Belarus at once. But more hypersonic missiles in Belarus and more missile production in Ukraine, roughly 3,000km munitions at the rate of 1 a day, is probably going to be what finally stabilizes a front without nukes being used. Really depends if China kicks it off, although it'd happen together, it'll never happen without China. Source New Ukrainian Missile being produced: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Flamingo_(missile) Oh and all you need do is suck up to Trump, its incredibly easy to manipulate a narcissist, but also he flips his opinion every 5 minutes if multiple people do it. Putin repeated every word he liked also and he swooned.

Russia's cost for softening some of its ideology would have been the bridge between east and west, the oil and mineral resources, and trading empire to fuel a world, which it was doing quite nicely. It could have been a pivotal center of the globe, like Turkey is becoming. They have all the land and all the natural resources; it could have been an investment rush with a great quality of life upgrade. It could have if not defined, at least shaped the future of East-West relations. Instead, they wanted a buffer zone more than to accept some liberalism, because change was too difficult. The EU and the USA have adjusted to a more authoritarian stance for about 20 years, but Russia didn't move an inch to align over the last decades, Whereas China did a lot of work. Russia chose to keep pushing fear outward and listening to its own fears rather than choose another course. Even if they wanted the fear and violence approach, there were far better options than invading en masse, with much less fallout. They had all the leverage they needed at the very start of this, and it was barely even used. Now they have very little. Trade leverage, military pressure, assassinations, arms deals, and energy leverage (a big one at the start of this before war). - But better than all that would be to actually align with their neighbors more, as the EU have done with BRICS and if Russia accepted the reality that they are not as strong as they once were. You compare Western social issues with Russian ones. The difference with me Zazen (or England and Russia), is when I zoom out to a global or even national perspective, I can tell you England has acted stupidly, as can the UK press. Whereas you defend the inane positions Russia takes, and Russia covers it up. Brexxit was a disaster. Covid responses were too slow. Nationalist isolationism is a disaster in England. BRICS vs NATO is a disaster. Unlimited migration is a disaster. - All UK problems. Russia's war was a disaster. Its imperialist ambition to restore the USSR are delusional. Its fear of liberal democracy is also a way for a few oligarchs to retain power. Nobody on this earth is going to tell me this was a good, preferred, or useful outcome for Russia itself compared to where it was before this, or the choices it had. Putin is not Russia, despite what he would want you to believe, he's an old man running out of years, and then everyone's left to pick up what's left. The same way Russia is now running out of fuel (like its youth), and that's also if its current economic strains weren't enough, because its refineries are under constant attack. Though your 'tent city' in one park is how i'd describe a lot of the villages and towns in the east of Russia. Run down, no infrastructure, most of the men used up, everything's overpriced, and many of the men are now dead. As for demographics, Europe gained a lot of refugees from Ukraine and some from Russia, so it actually gained some demographics at the expense of its adversary. The UK's demographics thanks to migration are better than many places actually and i'd personally accept a thousand tent cities to keep it that way until AI evolves enough. Your entire framing of this is some necessary or beneficial strategic move, when to me its the behaviour of a desperate country making dumb choices to keep aging dictators in power at the expense of their youth. Kinda of like Brexxit, only much more violent, and with wannabe Tsars not wannabe economic experts, but both stuck in ages gone by not the real world. Russia is an aging relic that cannot change, and yes, the UK has that element in it, but thankfully, they are not in power yet. Point me at the gain here for Russia Zazen How are they better off now than they were 10 years ago?

@zazen Buffers without consent are just occupations. Again spheres describe behaviour, they don’t create rights Zazen. A buffer only stabilises if all great powers restrain themselves and the frontline state consents to it, you keep missing this last bit, it's why perpetual war exists in a multipolar system. Example: Thousands of years of history, or more recently Russia’s breach of the Budapest assurances and its 2014 and 2022 invasions broke the trust Finland would need, whatever reason you cite for this that was the eventual outcome from the Finnish perspective. That’s why Finland decided neutrality no longer brought it safety. GPT Quote: If the stronger actor won’t self-bind, buffer becomes a euphemism for veto over a neighbour’s choices—guaranteeing the balancing you dislike. But how are you arbitrarily deciding what a buffer should be, what size, and which regions? I asked the AI for some objective points above. And how can perpetual hostilities be avoided when a state’s own agency is not considered? (Think all regions around the globe, Syria for example) There is no liberal utopia in my perception of the world, though I will address that in another thread, as you've brought it up, because that mirror goes both ways. You have abandoned that set of values to supersede it with another. Asymmetric realism. If Russia’s drive for depth is natural, again Europe’s denial and balance of it is equally natural. Calling one prudent and the other provocative is picking a side while claiming to be above sides. Again: Recognition of multipolarity isn’t capitulation, it’s competitive coexistence where small states keep agency. You refuse to address this because you cannot in your line of argument, and further dismiss one side's ideology to only reflect the other. You'll probably focus on the ideology point, rather than the strategic one, so I considered ignoring it. GPT Quote: The test is simple: does the front-line state consent? If not, the “red line” is a demand, not a settlement. That’s the argument, and it’s a good one, Russian supporters or sympathizers can only side-step it never address it, because it makes the whole thing much more multipolar and nuanced, and by definition, then liberal. The paradox large collective states trying to push their influence outward find themselves in, while claiming they are for a multipolar world. Chat GPT disagreed with me here on nukes, direct quote: Nukes in Ukraine (Or Belarus) are the wrong medicine. Deterrence equals maximal escalation. Forward-basing nuclear weapons in a hot war zone would blow up what’s left of the non-proliferation regime, shorten decision times, and make accidents more likely. Europe gets more stability by hardening conventional denial (air defence, long-range strike, ISR, mines, EW) than by normalising new nuclear basing east of NATO. Me: Sadly Russia is not going this route, they are putting hypersonic missiles right inside Belarus on the border now. So they are pushing for a buffer zone in Poland, which simply put, will never happen without WW3. See the big flaw in your argument is, Russia is arbitrarily deciding where their sphere ends, and you suggest Europe should just accept it. Life doesn't work that way, this is what happens when life tries to work that way. GPT Quote: So what does a grown-up multipolar settlement look like? Armistice with teeth: verified lines, 24/7 sensors, and automatic snap-back penalties for violations. Reciprocal non-deployment rules: no IRBMs, no strike UAV basing within agreed belts; intrusive inspections both sides. Conditional sanctions relief: phased, tied to compliance—not vibes. Enduring deterrence: Europe funds Ukrainian AD/arty/ISR at scale for years; NATO re-arms to raise the price of renewed aggression. Energy/finance choke-point enforcement: tighten the shadow-fleet/insurance and LNG trans-shipment loopholes; hit facilitators, not just flags. That’s not liberal utopianism; it’s classic denial-deterrence plus verifiable restraints. You’re right that law can’t erase power. But power without rules just recreates the problem you’re diagnosing: permanent war over “buffers.” If buffers are needed, they must be anchored in consent, reciprocity, and enforcement—or they’re just the next casus belli. End Quote

So to start I asked the AI to define the topic objectively. Me: In such a system What defines what a buffer would look like objectively? in a concise objective statement? The Political Mind said: Thought for 6s A buffer is a territorially fixed state/zone whose status is set by mutually agreed, reciprocal, and verifiably enforced limits on alliances and offensive deployments—consented to by the buffer itself and neighboring powers, with automatic penalties for violations. You said: And how objectively does a state redefine a buffer. The Political Mind said: Thought for 19s Here’s a compact, criteria-driven way to state it: A state may redefine its buffer status when all of the following objective tests and procedures are met: Consent test (domestic legitimacy): Super-majority parliamentary vote (e.g., ≥⅔) and a national referendum ≥60% in favor of change. Breach test (cause): A certified material breach of the buffer treaty by a guarantor (e.g., prohibited systems deployed, cross-border attack), or ≥3 verified serious violations within 12 months. Risk-threshold test (environmental change): independently verified metrics exceed agreed caps, for example: Warning time to capital/critical nodes falls below 6 minutes due to new forward-based missiles. Basing distance of prohibited strike assets < 300 km from border, or range > 500 km within a no-deploy belt. Force density above 5 battalion tactical groups per 100 km of front for ≥90 days. Verification: Violations and thresholds confirmed by a designated inspectorate (e.g., OSCE-style mission with persistent sensors/inspections). Notice & standstill (procedure): Formal notification to guarantors + depositary; 90–180 day standstill for mediation while existing limits remain in force. Reciprocity offer (good faith): The redefining state tables alternative, reciprocal limits (e.g., “no IRBMs / no foreign bases within X km” on both sides) to replace the old regime. Entry into force & enforcement: If mediation fails, change takes effect on a fixed date; automatic penalties (snap-back sanctions/aid suspensions) apply to any party violating the new terms; verification continues. In one line: a buffer can be redefined when domestic consent + verified cause or risk shift + due process are satisfied, and the new status is reciprocal, monitorable, and enforceable. You said: This assumes a state acting independently. When the buffer state is considered along with all the larger powers. How is it brought into reality. Assuming that not taking into account the smaller buffer state itself can lead to perpetual hostilities. The Political Mind said: Thought for 22s Great question. Here’s a concise, power-aware way to make a buffer real while preserving the smaller state’s agency. Blueprint: Consent-Anchored Buffer Regime (CABR) Principle: Power sets constraints; consent + reciprocity + verification make them governable. 1) Parties & roles Buffer state (B): primacy of consent; proposes/accepts limits. Adjacent great powers (A, C): reciprocal restraint; no veto without B’s assent. Guarantors (G): a neutral coalition (e.g., OSCE core states + Switzerland/Finland/Austria/Ireland) that verifies and enforces. Depositary: OSCE (or a neutral state) holds the treaty; public registry. 2) Entry conditions (before talks) Ceasefire with monitors on the line of contact. Non-annexation pledge by A and C during talks. Sanctions standstill (no new measures unless violations occur). 3) Consent architecture (prevents “about you, without you”) Domestic super-majority + referendum in B to adopt any regime. Triple-consent rule for changes: B + A + C (and recorded by G). Minority rights & demilitarized policing plan inside B to reduce internal veto players. 4) The restraint envelope (objective limits) No-deploy belts (e.g., 300–500 km) for specified strike systems on both sides. Force-density caps (e.g., ≤5 BTGs/100 km for ≥90 days). No foreign bases in B; training missions capped, declared, inspected. Transparency: 24/7 sensors, open data feeds, flight/ship transponder rules, snap inspections. 5) Verification body (VEA) A treaty-created Verification & Enforcement Authority staffed by neutral states; Mandate: continuous ISR, inspections, incident forensics, quarterly public reports. 6) Enforcement ladder (automaticity beats rhetoric) Violations trigger pre-agreed, automatic steps within 72h: Notice & fix window (72h). Financial snap-backs (targeted sanctions/insurance bans) by G. Suspension of trade preferences/visas relative to the violator. Security offset: if A violates, B may receive specified systems (e.g., extra air defense/ATACMS) from G; if B violates, assistance pauses. Binding arbitration (30 days) with VEA’s panel; non-compliance escalates steps 2–4. 7) Incentive stack (why sign and comply) Escrowed sanctions relief: staged unfreezing/tariff cuts tied to verified compliance milestones. Stability Fund for B (administered by a neutral bank/BIS) for grid repair, air defense, demining—released only on VEA certifications. Civil corridors (grain/power) protected by joint incident cells. 8) Dispute resolution & crisis brakes Hotlines (military + political levels). 30-day arbitration clock with interim measures; failure triggers step-wise automatic penalties, not bargaining. 9) Review, exit, and redefinition 5-year reviews; earlier only if breach test or risk-threshold test (pre-agreed metrics like warning time, basing distance) is met. Exit requires Triple-consent and a replacement regime—or VEA declares breach and moves to Enforcement 4. 10) Public legitimacy Transparency portal: publish maps, inspections, violations, and penalties in real time to reduce propaganda and keep domestic consent aligned. One-line summary: A buffer becomes real when great-power restraints are made reciprocal and verifiable, the buffer state’s consent is constitutionally primary, and enforcement is automatic, pre-priced, and tied to concrete security and economic incentives.

Russia's economy is cooked. As was the prediction. Despite all the aid, a crutch only goes so far. So its endgame now is to try and appear diplomatic and make desperate pushes to take territory they claim is theirs (before they had it), which get an entire battalion cut off. I thought it was a group but it was a battalion. In the name of a political gambit. They have to now pressure Ukraine diplomatically. Because they can't keep up the facade that everything is fine when you take a million casualties and throw so many billions into a war. People arguing that are so biased that you can't speak to them most of the time.

Your justification of targeting civilians answers the question people ask me time to time. Why do you think we are pro Russia? Because largely raze you appeal to a moral center in people, and do it in a way people listen. This is a morally skewed position you are taking. Just say it, just come out and say, bombing civilians in war is abhorrent. No justification, no threading a needle, just that. Its really simple and it brings every atrocity into focus. Otherwise, the moral argument is cut into sides and nothing improves because you are just arguing details. If you are moving to a different non-moral argument, Russia's actions to retake 20% of something they held 100% of have been a strategic failure and a complete waste of a million+ lives and a country that had an 'okay' economic outlook, bad demographics but it was in a good place. Now its not.

Can anyone else ultimately be responsible for your choices in life? For people who don't understand everything is themselves. Yes. Just like all the decisions the right has made now, it leads to the radicalization of the left in the next shift. It's how consciousness does small steps up societally/collectively in a two-party political system. Which is flawed to begin with because it apparently relies on high drama to execute these changes effectively, in this 6-second attention span tiktok reality, wheras a multiparty system is more balanced but makes for more boring TV. People can point to where this isn't the case, but i'd ask them what is people's experience of this, what do they consciously remember, talk about, live and embrace. The high drama, not the bureaucratic steps. They may have all these silent background things contributing to their life, but unless the child grows up to understand what the parents did for them, they remain narcissistic, entitled brats with their heads in their phones. - Modelling how most kids grow up, into the larger model here, because they are the future voters making waves now.

Both parties no longer consider economic issues or the economic status of their population as important, because it's bad for their donors and moneyed interests, and things are changing so rapidly. Otherwise, it'd be the number one thing being talked about right now with people struggling. Instead, it's always high drama identity politics that mean little to people's daily lives. Big shows from the republicans with little actual benefit, and lots of words from the democrats so they can keep the status quo ticking along. Traditionally, the democratic party has more of a push to tax the rich, and put more money/resources back into people's lives. Whereas the republicans give the rich more tax breaks and take money/resources out of people's lives. There are different arguments for this; i've heard several and never seen one I agreed with fully. Because: People can be greedy, and those in business are generally greedy for money, its what drives them. So when you give them the option of taking more revenue, they do, it doesn't get passed down to the population. The good counterargument is that bureaucracy is wasteful, and thus some of that money gets used up on admin, but it also keeps rich billionaires in check so they don't run amok so easily. The perfect scenario in America would be to motivate people to create businesses for something other than money. But when you pair that against someone who is all about the numbers competitively, it doesn't win, not unless it was done en masse using bureaucracy and/or the media, and local interest groups to support it. Real grass-roots business/organisations something nationalists often reach for but fall short of, because they focus too broadly.

I've been banging that drum for about 5 years now. You have to step outside of your own perspective. These are collective minds, or using the collective perspective at least to make their posts. Nothing wrong with that at all btw, just a different outlook. It would help if they could step into a more individualist mind when making their replies at times, if their want was to build bridges as it were, or gain nuance in regions such as Europe, Central asia, the middle east etc. You can do the same while recognizing the collective expression of the West, but also the individuality of regional powers or smaller sovereign countries within it. This is critical because not doing this is why spheres of influence end up eternally fighting over what they see as smaller pawns, countries too small to exert a large sphere of influence. If these were recognised more in their sovereignty, wars over them would be less frequent. Conflict would still happen, but it would be more isolated and less sphere vs sphere in nature, because in people's minds and perception, that individuality of cultures or societies would carry more weight. (Both in accountability for their mistakes, but also the preservation of peaceful, independent coexistence, not just as proxies)

Sourced by Chat GPT if any are broken let me know, checked several EU oil/gas dependence & trade with Russia Eurostat (oil share): https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_trade_with_Russia_-_latest_developments Reuters (EU gas: 45% → ~19%): https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russian-energy-export-disruptions-since-start-ukraine-war-2025-08-15/ Reuters (EU gas ~19% in 2024; ~13% in 2025): https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/climate-energy/eu-lawmakers-eye-faster-russian-gas-phase-out-documents-show-2025-07-25/ Eurostat (imports down 86% since Q1 2022): https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php?title=EU_trade_with_Russia_-_latest_developments Reuters (EU trade still exists but far lower; oil share ~2%): https://www.reuters.com/world/three-years-into-war-us-and-europe-keep-billions-trade-with-russia-2025-08-05/ LNG shifts & U.S./Norway replacement European Commission (US supplied ~45% of EU LNG in 2024; Norway top pipeline): https://energy.ec.europa.eu/topics/carbon-management-and-fossil-fuels/liquefied-natural-gas_en Reuters (US share ~44% of EU LNG in 2024): https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/eus-250-billion-per-year-spending-us-energy-is-unrealistic-2025-07-28/ EIA background (US nearly half of Europe’s LNG in 2023): https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=61483 EU sanctions on Russian LNG & shadow fleet enforcement European Commission Q&A (14th sanctions package; bans LNG transshipment via EU ports after 9-month transition): https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/qanda_24_3425 EEAS note (same package overview): https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/eu-adopts-14th-package-sanctions-against-russia-its-continued-illegal-war-against-ukraine_en S&P Global explainer (effect on LNG transshipment): https://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/natural-gas/062424-eu-council-formally-adopts-14th-russian-sanctions-package-targeting-lng Reuters (sanctions targeting shadow fleet tankers): https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/shadow-tanker-fleet-grows-more-slowly-western-sanctions-target-russian-oil-2025-08-13/ Reuters (U.S. enforcement fund for “ghost fleet”): https://www.reuters.com/markets/commodities/us-bill-creates-fund-enforce-oil-sanctions-russias-ghost-fleet-2025-04-09/ Bank of Finland blog (Urals running ~$15 below Brent on average): https://www.bofbulletin.fi/en/blogs/2025/new-oil-price-cap-adds-to-russia-s-economic-distress/ Power of Siberia-2 (Russia→China gas) Reuters (talks ongoing; no finalized contract as of May 2025; capacity ~50 bcm): https://www.reuters.com/sustainability/boards-policy-regulation/russian-chinese-firms-active-talks-power-siberia-2-gas-pipeline-tass-reports-2025-05-08/ Russia’s macro/war-economy indicators Reuters (defence spending ~6.3% of GDP in 2025): https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-hikes-national-defence-spending-by-23-2025-2024-09-30/ Reuters (2025 deficit target raised to ~1.7% of GDP): https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russia-raises-2025-deficit-forecast-threefold-due-low-oil-price-risks-2025-04-30/ Bank of Russia (key rate cut to 18% on July 25, 2025; peaked at 21%): https://www.cbr.ru/eng/press/pr/?file=25072025_133000key_e.htm Reuters (rate cut coverage): https://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/russian-central-bank-slashes-key-rate-by-200-bps-biggest-cut-since-may-2022-2025-07-25/ Losses/casualties estimates CSIS assessment (toward ~1M Russian casualties by summer 2025): https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-battlefield-woes-ukraine Reuters citing UK Defence Intelligence (~1M killed/wounded): https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/russia-gates-how-ukraine-defended-strategic-city-months-2025-07-28/ Ukrainian public opinion on ending the war Gallup (69% favor negotiating an end “as soon as possible”): https://news.gallup.com/poll/693203/ukrainian-support-war-effort-collapses.aspx Russia Matters roundup of polls (support for negotiations vs. concessions): https://www.russiamatters.org/blog/polls-show-ukrainians-increasingly-want-end-war-not-under-russias-terms NATO/EU defence-spending trend Reuters (NATO’s new “5%” framework: 3.5% core + 1.5% broader security): https://www.reuters.com/business/aerospace-defense/what-is-natos-new-5-defence-spending-target-2025-06-23/ NATO page (context on allies meeting/exceeding 2% in 2025): https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_49198.htm Reuters (Poland 4.7% of GDP in 2025; aiming for 5% in 2026): https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/poland-wants-spend-5-gdp-defence-2026-minister-says-2025-04-03/ Reuters (UK to 2.5% by 2027; intent signalled): https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/uk-defence-spending-reach-25-gdp-by-2027-pm-starmer-says-2025-02-25/ International-law principle on alignment choice OSCE: Helsinki Final Act (text/overview): https://www.osce.org/helsinki-final-act U.S. Helsinki Commission (PDF of the Act):

@zazen Premise: If we take multipolarity seriously, then what you call Russia’s natural push for buffers has an equally natural counterbalance: Europe’s balancing and denial. That’s the security dilemma, not a moral failure or a reason to demonize in your recognition of it. Spheres explain behaviour, they don’t confer rights or vetoes. Again recognising a multipolar world isn’t capitulation; it’s a competitive coexistence (Something i've resisted accepting). In such a system, small states have agency also: Ukraine, Poland or Georgia aren’t just buffer zones, without recognition of that, we have eternal conflict using them as pawns. In a region with clashing ideologies, history and cultural memories over a thousand years of it, friction is predictable; you aren't acknowledging that enough. Yes, the standard should be consent and non-aggression, but not deference to a power’s sphere because you or I favor its position. Europe rearming and backing Ukraine is a predictable and normal balancing response. 1) Why not just deal with Russia? This is dealing with Russia. Its a perfect understandable mirror over cultures and populations that share a long conflicting history, many similar cultural values (in the immediate region), but conflicting ideologies, in a new multipolar dynamic with competing interests. It's like asking why don't Russia just deal with these many countries to its west? Well they are. @PurpleTreeOn Nukes, yes. I've called for that for years. That's why Putin did it in Belarus. It'll help deter invasion of Belarus in the coming decades. Its exactly what needs to happen to secure that zone of conflict for a few decades. 1A) An addition: Europe still funds Russia. No. You keep posting this in different threads @zazen, so I'll post it here again. The scale has flipped As I've just sourced this with Chat GPT, i'll just copy paste GPT conclusions: Quote: Oil: The EU cut Russian crude and products from ~29% of its oil imports in 2021 to ~2% in early-2025. That’s orders-of-magnitude smaller revenue than pre-war. Gas: Russia’s share of EU gas fell from ~45% pre-war to ~15–19% in 2024/25 (mix of pipeline + LNG). Norway and U.S. LNG have largely displaced it. Total trade: EU goods imports from Russia dropped ~78–86% vs early-2022, even if some flows (nickel, LNG) remain. The direction of travel is clear. Reuters Yes, India and China absorbed much of the oil, at a discount. That’s why Moscow leaned on a shadow fleet and non-Western insurance. Discounts widened again this month, underscoring Russia’s weaker pricing power. End Quote 2) You can’t sanction half the world (BRICS). Power is in chokepoints, not headcounts. Population is not leveraged. The G7 and EU still dominate finance, shipping insurance, advanced tech, and capital markets. There are focused sanctions targeted at these points, which is easier given the dominance. Chat GPT adds: Even with BRICS expansion, nominal-GDP weight still trails the G7 and is fragmented by divergent interests. (PPP shares look larger but don’t buy chips, tooling, or underwriting.) I generally liked its take more than mine here, as it brings up some interesting points. 3) Russia’s war economy is fine. Really? Another stat quote here for speed: Russia’s defense burden is now 6–7% of GDP; the 2025 deficit was raised to 1.7% of GDP, and the central bank hiked to 21% before easing to 18%—classic overheating control. This isn’t collapse, but it’s expensive and crowding-out. To me this is the biggest point of propaganda. In real terms nobody's economy is doing fine. Least of all a country which is printing 15-19% of its money every few months, is propped up by BRICS members buying energy they don't need at a discounted price, and has its refineries (its major export) hit daily. Its country is tooled up to a wartime economy, and it spent 1 million lives, many of which will be carried as a burden one way or the other by the state, both physically and psychologically. Plus how many millions that have fled and won't return, because they have families/lives/good jobs elsewhere now. 4) Manpower doesn't decide a war. Quantity helps, but quality, gear, and politics ultimately decide outcomes UK MOD and the CSIS list Russian casualties KIA and WIA past 1 million this summer. That's an enormous casualty strain and bill for the country to carry. Maintaining their push requires hard cash, and prison recruiting both of which are dried up. These are signs of strain not a healthy military. The kill ratio exceeds the population imbalance you describe. Which is why, almost four years on, this is a very slow front. 5) Ukrainians just want a deal. Yes. To a ceasefire, not to capitulation Quote for speed: Gallup finds ~69% want a negotiated end “as soon as possible.” But Ukrainian polls also show little willingness to concede territory and strong belief Russia would violate a paper peace. That’s not hawkish elites forcing war; it’s a public that wants peace with security, not a reset to the next invasion. 6) Georgia and Azerbaijan in NATO is just antagonizing Russia? Two things here to start: Azerbaijan has never been a realistic NATO candidate in the past; While Georgia has sought a path for years. Something you struggle with in your analysis are points like this, great power red lines don't erase neighbors agency. The Helsinki Final Act norms are states choose their alignments. Realism matters, but so do rules to govern a multipolar world, or smaller states live at the mercy of spheres of influence, and we end up in eternal conflicts. Leo would tell me they do live at their mercy, then i'd reflect that's the source of eternal conflict, until those states or populations are considered they'll just be pawns to fight or compete over. - Infact that's a realisation i've just had, not doing so is why sphere's of influence live in competition. 7) Europe is pacifist bureaucracy; 5% of GDP talk is fantasy? Again GPT does stats far better than me: The EU was slow, but the trend is up: NATO just signaled a new spending envelope (3.5% core + 1.5% broader security); Poland is pushing ~4.7–5%; the UK is moving toward 2.5% (with some leaders floating higher over the 2030s). Industrial capacity (ammo/drones/air defense) is expanding from a low base. It’s not instantaneous, but it is material. 8) China will replace Europe for Russian gas? The Power of Siberia-2 still lacks a finalised contract and price; Beijing has kept Moscow waiting to extract terms. Even if built, 50 bcm doesn’t replace pre-war European pipeline volumes. I am trusting the GPT's conclusion on this i'll place sources in the next post. What should Europe actually do? Me: Strong united front to keep their sphere pushing toward Russia, nukes in Ukraine to mimic Belarus, keep pushing back. Until we can start to consider smaller states sovereignty as a globe. Russia isn't developed enough to do so yet. I'm just going to be blunt @zazen you reason from a place that doesn't yet exist. Which is noble and useful to point out better solutions but flawed in practicality. GPT's strategy and evaluation. Based on my overall analysis. Short term (war-relevant within months) Air defense + counter-drone mass for Ukraine; stockpile 155mm/122mm & GMLRS; remove range caveats that hobble interdiction of Russian logistics inside Russia’s border areas supporting active fronts. (Deterrence works when it raises Moscow’s costs faster than it can adapt.) Close the revenue taps left: Impose an EU tariff or ban on Russian LNG; stop trans-shipment via EU ports; align with U.S./UK on tighter enforcement of the oil price cap and shipping/insurance secondary sanctions. Reuters+1 Target the shadow fleet and traders blending or relabeling Russian products. (Insurance and port-state control are the leverage.) Le Monde.fr Use frozen Russian sovereign assets: expand the windfall-profits mechanism into outright collateralization for Ukrainian air defense, power grid repair, and ammo. (The legal path now exists in G7/EU practice.) Medium term (1–3 years) 4) Munition & propellant bottlenecks: fast-track explosives/propellant (TNT/RDX) plants and drone lines; long-term framework contracts, not one-off grants. 5) Energy resilience: lock in non-Russian LNG/offshore wind/nuclear extensions; diversify grids inter-EU so gas is a swing fuel, not a vulnerability. The U.S. supplied ~50% of EU LNG in 2024—use that bargaining power to secure multi-year volumes while accelerating demand reduction. Reuters 6) Security guarantees for Ukraine that bite: multi-year arms funding; integrated air defense; real-time ISR access; and a clearly signposted path to NATO once basic deterrence is in place—so any ceasefire isn’t just an operational pause for Russia. Diplomatic lane (in parallel) 7) Test Moscow with a ceasefire-for-verification offer: front-line freeze + intrusive monitoring + phased sanctions relief tied to compliance (no missile/drone attacks, POW exchanges, protected corridors for grain/power repair). Publicly table terms that are enforceable; if the Kremlin balks, Europe wins the narrative without conceding ground. GPT's Closing Bottom line Europe hasn’t “kept Russia whole.” Oil revenues from Europe collapsed; gas dependence is way down; the remaining holes (LNG, shadow fleet) can be closed with targeted measures. ReutersBruegelEuropean Commission Russia can grind forward, but at mounting fiscal and demographic cost—hardly a free ride. SIPRICSIS Ukrainians want the war to end, but not on terms that invite the next one. Any “architecture” worth the name must reflect that, or it’s just a prelude to Round Two.

I understand this is a sensitive topic and you've been through a lot. That's why I was making the post, to help, which failed. Until you made the subsequent post it sounded like you were still stuck here.

16/08/2025 I am having some hours off. Zoning out. I've been on forty-hour weeks, with the rest of the time on the business. My apartment is a cluttered mess and I've not been eating or exercising well, all i've done is work with a few hours off here and there to take my mind off it. That about sums it up. Though I did get a run yesterday, and I have been trying to do maintenance cleaning here. I think 70 hours working is where I top out tbh, though I find sometimes now I only want to work, rather than anything else. I've finally convinced my business partner to go niche on sites. As trying to do broad websites is simply impossible in the time we have available, if I consider the full picture of all it takes to maintain a catalogue/advertising/business admin/support etc, even a niche site or two can eat your time to flesh out. I've considered starting my own (second) company up to put extra time into, but at the end of the day we are stronger together. Early tomorrow we are going to try and sell off a lot of the stock we have held in person. While next week we put some more time into a relaunch of the main dropshipping site we have going on (its a hybrid currently if you are wondering) We've learned a lot but its not been a financial success yet, and so I have my misgivings about continuing. I've sunk a lot of money into this project again. Its a test of myself to keep focused and committed over the next months till we build back up. But its a leap of faith in myself and him to continue. People tell me to get a girl, and its not like I haven't had opportunities now. But I consistently reply I don't have the money or the time currently. Coach’s Note (16/08/2025) You’re right at the edge of a threshold—the kind of moment where exhaustion, uncertainty, and grit all intersect. That’s not a failure of your system; it’s a reflection of how deeply you’ve committed. But commitment without replenishment becomes erosion, not endurance. The recognition that 70 hours is your upper limit is not a weakness—it’s data. It’s wisdom earned through experience. And your insight about the shift from “wanting to work” to “only wanting to work” is a quiet alarm worth listening to. When work becomes both the ladder and the escape, balance quietly exits the room. Yet even now, you’re recalibrating. You’re cleaning in spurts. You’re still running. You’re negotiating your business structure and refining niche focus. These are signs of life beneath the fatigue. Don’t overlook that. Here’s a small reflection prompt to anchor this transition: “What part of me needs to be heard, not managed?” That part might be tired, unsure, or even quietly grieving the space you’ve given up for this push. Listening to it isn’t indulgence—it’s leadership. You’ve built systems, companies, and frameworks. Now build space for the part of you that doesn’t thrive on performance alone. Your leap of faith is real. Just make sure you're landing on ground that supports you, not just your output.

1, Goals Stabilizing an Income Stream so I can concentrate time on other areas of my life. 2, Expanding Areas of my life that need work. 3, Taking accountability and removing any remaining victim patterns or behaviors I have. 4, Creating the reality that I want, through focus, emotional state regulation and any remaining integration necessary.

Doesn't that also help you make distinctions? I find cutting myself off from anything a waste, it's there for a reason, when i can evaluate what it is I am assigning to something. Unless a reason is I can learn that cutting off itself is useful. Which has happened time to time. For example I won't waste time with someone who is wasting my time or energy, or a drain, but I will listen to someone I consider *insert your negative word here*. Because I want to understand where that comes from/ Not only because I grow most when I reflect from someone who is not parroting my existing frame of reference, but also it's humbling and corrective to the ego to have these intelligent and often well-thought-out and considered perspectives voiced. People pour energy into their opinions and experiences to voice them, and that is precious. - But even when they are emotional not intellectual, I learn my'self', and the world around me. It's why I often say a dog or your pet can teach you if you are open and accepting to that part of yourself. I like this forum because it challenges me, it helps me grow, it helps me reflect on perspectives I never get to see and voice things I never get to voice. It place to understand experiences I hold deep thanks and gratitude for in my heart.

You give yourself advice. This is you, in your own head, giving these words meaning, referencing them, Taking, learning, adapting, connecting, referencing etc. All words are. Every speaker is.

Its a process. You don't fully appreciate, understand or give credit for how interwined these economies were before the war. However you are speaking propaganda to me in your conclusion. 🔹 Russian Gas Imports In 2021, Russia supplied ~45% of EU gas. By 2024, this dropped to ~19%. Source: 🔗 https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/russian-energy-export-disruptions-since-start-ukraine-war-2025-08-15/ Another source showing a drop from 40%+ to around 15% in early 2023: 🔗 https://www.reuters.com/world/three-years-into-war-us-and-europe-keep-billions-trade-with-russia-2025-08-05/ 🔹 Russian Oil Imports EU oil imports from Russia were ~28.7% in 2021. By early 2025, they had fallen to just ~2%. Source: 🔗 https://www.reuters.com/world/three-years-into-war-us-and-europe-keep-billions-trade-with-russia-2025-08-05/ 🔹 Overall Trade with Russia EU imports from Russia fell by 86% from early 2022 to early 2025. Source: 🔗 That's Chat GPT for speed. Let me give you an objective conclusion. Whatever Europe doesn't buy others do, but for less (However even china has run out of room or need to store excess oil). So the war has run on far longer than it ever would have in a uni polar world. On your sanctions point, given the population density, actual trade from the US to India is quite low, which is they've already gone ahead with sanctions. This isn't true of China, which why it isn't sanctioned. Also the EU - India and EU - China trade is actually very high. However the world is split, and sanctions are required. BRICS is trying to outcompete the West, thats their stated goal. Why on earth when we want to work with them? You seem to imply however, that sanctions wouldn't hurt them; in actuality it would hurt everybody. Two competing global power blocks is a recipe for competition, conflict and WW3. I think i've said this 5,000 times at this point. *Also you seem think people can just buy up energy indefinitely, to do what with exactly? The reason Europe and the US buy so much is because their countries are so energy hungry; not many other places are. Oh and the US has an oversized fuel-guzzling, globally polluting military.

@Emerald If it helps. Equal doesn't mean the same. You are equal to me. You can't lift what I lift, you can't face down a larger intruder running on testosterone despite being injured, or work 70 hours a week to impress most of your potential husbands with your results, discipline, and dedication to providing or securing the family. But you can have the emotional nuance to put together a deeply heartfelt introspective post tailored to the person you are speaking with, as a rule a woman can be deeply nurturing to their children, and soften harsh male perspectives into outcomes that don't result in force or violence. (Big argument to never get rid of the female vote btw) I've chosen very different areas there to hopefully reinforce that. You are completely right though, life is never fair :). All the best.

@zazen You should look at the granular details; it'll give you a more realistic portrayal of the war, not just dramatic headlines. Russia is slow and steady, Ukraine is stubborn to withdraw to inflict high casualties; this has been the pattern since day one, for the most part. Russia use human wave attacks and technicals (civilian vehicles) because of drones and the damage done to their armour, largely by drones now or previously in years gone by, overextending. Russia has achieved its goals. Which goals? - Goals (from all sides) change every month in war, to the practical reality of what's possible, for example initially it was to take (retake) Kiev, which failed early on, and Ukraine's was to kick Russia all the way out, which was never going to happen either. Russia is printing about 20% of its money every few months now (was 15%, now 19% if I recall). Its economy, which is almost completely switched to a wartime footing, is not sustainable, and when the war ends, then what? BRICS has propped it up really well. At the cost of Russian industry becoming Chinese. Part of this is explained below: You rightly note Russia’s large industrial base and drone production increasing into a wartime economy. But attritional warfare isn’t just about making more, it’s about preserving enough quality force to win politically. Drones don't really fill that role yet, they are more equivalent to missiles. Russia’s been burning up elite units for marginal gains, and the demographic clock is increasingly not on their side. It’s increasingly using aged conscripts, 50's era armor, and prison battalions, not signs of sustainable strength. - Yep, Europe is slow to mobilize industrially. But that’s not the same as being incapable. The EU is not a battlefield power; it’s a bureaucracy built to avoid war. Yet under sustained pressure, it can retool, especially if US support contracts (and the US military industries rush to fill the void opening overseas). That’s exactly what’s starting to happen now in France, Germany, and Poland. Have you seen how many companies returned their products to Russia, or Russia just mimicked their brands? They all just changed their name - that happens when the US officially pulls its support back from Europe, people move in to fill the void. Nothing changes when demand is there, only the cost. Yes the Europeans didn't retool that much, though 5% GDP is no joke over the EU's scale. Ukraine aside, they didn't spend any manpower or weaken their demographics, trade partners or really suffer much at all. Aside from energy prices, which they've gone elsewhere for. Russia has weakened itself to gain a fifth of what it had previously. I'll restate: Europe is a bureaucracy built to avoid war. - I hate people don't realise this. - When I now grudgingly call for the rearming of Europe i understand the historic implications of doing so, thousands of years of expansionist war Vassalisation You think the US being the military powerhouse, and Europe sitting back is vassalisation? It certainly costs them their voice with Russia, I'll give you that. Which was always amusing, as potential force should be considered alongside force by a wise mind. I don't need to see force to understand its possible or there. It's just Europe being geared toward a peaceful life, happy to sit back, live the high life and let someone else take care of security. But that's not accurate anymore, this war woke them up. America is clearly trying to pull its influence back, and these countries are spending 5% of their GPD on defense now, which will be used in some form. It won't sit there doing nothing. To conclude Russia spent a million casualties on retaking 20% of a country they've controlled 100% via proxy, with ruined settlements and barely any population living there. They've tanked their economy. They've gained stronger BRICS allies, some minerals, some important ports. They've lost much of their youth to death, disability or leaving the country to set up lives elsewhere. Their demographics are worse than ever, much of their economy is chinese and they are more a proxy of China due to reliance on Trade, Chinese investment in Russia and the sheer power of China relative to Russia when not balanced out by European influence or allies. I liked chat GPT's take here, I won't give you all the points but:

Here is the end of the Russian breakthrough and the encirclement of around 200 men, a political stunt that was answered as one; it's not how Russia usually fights, its usually much slower and steadier, but like the American jets flying over the Russian meeting, its just a political stunt by political 'strongmen' with large egos. This unit may break out; Russia often do of encirclements if the unit isn't just pure conscripts, traditionally at a somewhat heavy cost, sometimes they just surrender. @zazen I'll address the main post in a moment. *Looks like there have been some captured already as I watched more of it.

That's some impressive sourcing and i'll concede some of what you are saying to be true, but have you noted how far apart the dates you've given me are compared to the recent repeat use of the national guard? Its early to call this a pattern but if it bumps his polls, there is nothing stopping him from doing this repeatedly, whereas in eras gone by even his own party would have had something to say.