Reciprocality

Its the fallacy of the false dilemma or false dichotomy It arises when we treat the law of excluded middle that deals with whole propositions as being either true or false and instead treat every subject of a proposition as constituting either of two oppositely defined properties. This is a substantial fallacy because proposing that x is false about y is without further qualification (or by itself) neutral with regard to what is true about y, (although not entirely neutral with regard to what is true about some of all subjects, if you wanted to have a consistent and generalised sub-propositional logic). To mitigate this kind of thinking is hard, because the reason we commit that fallacy is the very pattern recognition and conceptual grouping that serves us so well, so much so that the nuance we hold so highly is developmentally conditioned on and thinkable through the focus on those false dichotomies, that contextualise and situate them with the clarity necessary to do so. edit: minor additional qualifications

@Inliytened1 The connection is the interesting part The implication of the problems the questions elucidate is that selective bias creates tension between the full reality and the chosen reality, that this leads to us only occupying a part of ourself at any given moment, and not the whole self, not the whole reality.

If self-awareness were the generality among events AND events were disharmonious, what is it about the intrinsic properties of events that is in conflict?

@Emerald Events repeats and only thereby do we identify them, unless we identify a singular event through its similarity to another event. In both cases there is a generality, so far as they are conclusions the former would be called inductive and the latter deductive. Is this tendency for generality self-awareness? Or is the self-awareness additional to this tendency? Assuming the curious proposition that "events can in principle be in harmony" holds true and there were thousands of various events, maybe millions, and all of them were generalised, and all generalised events were self-awareness, would we rely on those events being themselves actually in harmony for that self-awareness to be in harmony with itself? And if those events do fail to be in harmony with one another, can that be an intrinsic property of the events themselves or is it a property of them already interacting with a disharmonious self? If the answer to this question is determinable, would it be critically important to answer it? -- If self-awareness were additional to the tendency for generality among events, would that be compatible with events only being disharmonious through their interaction with that self-awareness? If self-awareness were the generality among events, would that be compatible with events being disharmonious?

It will likely get better and worse as you age, by a similar logic that allows you to become both more and less similar to others your own age. Your internal consistency, integrity and character will make life better, but the vast exposure to different experiences and perspectives will make the world less consistent and this can make life worse.

It is not so much writing itself that is at issue there, it is more so the conception of a generalised other person, which funnily is the actual crux in our metaphysical speculations, more specifically: how to be freed from that concept and the immensity of the narratives connected to it

@Carl-Richard It is easy to solve paradoxes by proposing constraints on what counts as a subject in a statement, such as through simplicity (rationalistic ontology) or simply uniqueness of morphological (non-semantic) composites. From here the liars paradox would be refuted by not meeting the criterion of subjects in statements, since the subject already involves a higher order property (semantics). But this does not satisfy those who seek an ontologically invariant logic that applies synthetically beyond the experiential ground from where that logic draws its concepts, and this is where substitutional quantification comes in--where "other-reference" is baked in to the relation between the quantification over subjects and the dispersion of subjects satisfying quantification at all, hence substitution.

I'll also ask a more open ended question, have you considered whether substitutional quantification can allow us to rescue logic from paradox and thus without the embarrassing appeal to ontological or pragmatic constraints on what counts as subjects in propositions?

How will your critique handle the concepts of essence, independence and necessity, each supervening in the same way on the humanly every-day practice of reasoning? How primitive will you treat the concept of negation as being? And how do you utilise this concept without regressing to the rationality you criticise? Will you have a general account of the difference between concepts or principles that are contextually bound and not contextually bound--or will you deny invariance altogether and propose complete pluralism?

@Leo Gura Will the video involve paraconsistent logic, intuitionistic logic, fussy logic, mereology, process philosophy, coherence theory of truth and underdetermination as a basis for a holistic or relativistic alternatives to what you see as rigid rationality? Will you explore the developmental and phenomenological origins of concepts, the fallacy of reification and overextension that rationality unawaringly often commits to with regard to those? Will you explore the history of rationalistic ontology and epistemology and connect these to the problems holistic approaches solves? Will you explore the connection between paradox / self-reference to variable-quantification in first order classical logic, if so how do you do this without proposing a correspondence theory of truth with subject-criterions? Why would paradox be a property inherent to rationality if it can be avoided by better logics?

Who could have predicated that these ideas would transpire from instead of developing naturally by admission of everything one does not know, one develop on the basis of the assertion that one knows and is everything. Insanity becomes freedom from a supposed mass delusion, a delusion perpetuated by not initially admitting to knowing almost nothing. But you are only becoming less free by defining yourself in relation (whether affirmatively or negatively) to a delusion that only pertains to the limited way in which you understand why humans behave as they do.

The dual opposite without which the above statement would be empty or meaningless: A subject without context can only be analytically predicated—tautologically described—since, in the absence of delimiting conditions, no falsifiable claims arise, no predicates mutually exclude one another, and the subject’s “properties” collapse into purely definitional generalities whose overlapping instantiations extend everywhere.

Context is the totality of material conditions that (i) render claims meaningful and falsifiable, and (ii) delimit the field of possible predicates: those already conceptualised and determinable, those conceptualised yet indeterminate with respect to a subject, and those not yet conceptualised at all.

@Someone here Imagine a water hose spreading water on the lawn when the lawn is sufficiently moistened, how would we now stop the water? Would you try to stop it by placing your hands over the end-point of the hose? This may actually lead the water to spread even further, perhaps we can expect this to happen too by "dealing" with the anger that repeatedly arises in a repeating context? Turn the water supply of when the lawn is no longer in need of water-->remove yourself from the context that angers you, don't be so eager to anticipate, predict and control growth, allow it to happen naturally in the process of reflecting on your encounters, the way you have always done it-->naturally and retrospectively.

@Anton Rogachevski Alright, here comes the forensic analysis. The direct excerpts from your essay that motivated the paraphrases: Paraphrase 1 — “Suspend beliefs; beliefs obscure raw experience” “Set aside everything you believe to be true, just for a moment.” -> explicit instruction to suspend beliefs before inquiry. “our access to it was only through belief.” -> claims access to “what’s out there” comes via belief (mediated). “Eventually, these stories become so dominant that they replace the direct ‘live feed’ with an endless rerun of mental commentary.” -> explains the mechanism by which belief/thoughts obscure direct experience. Paraphrase 2 — “Reality is constructed / arises within direct experience” “the appearance of a wall inside of experience is a hologram.” -> treats perceived objects as appearances inside experience rather than independently given. “The creation of ‘reality’ occurs when thoughts floating in the void are glued together into a story.” -> describes a construction mechanism: thoughts “glued” into a story produce what you call reality. “’Reality’ is the dream of the unawakened void.” -> frames reality as arising from a dreaming/appearance process, not as a mind-independent noumenon. Paraphrase 3 — “Language and logic are limited; paradox/non-conceptual methods may be more suitable” “some of the ideas may seem paradoxical—even contradictory at times—but that’s because we’re pointing toward something that cannot be captured in conventional language.” -> explicit claim language cannot capture the target. “it’s paradoxical, so logic can’t grasp it.” -> direct denial of logic’s capacity to fully grasp the subject. “What we are trying to do here is to use thought to describe itself, and later to cancel itself.” -> indicates conceptual language is provisional and meant to be negated, supporting the use of non-conceptual methods. If any of these quotes are taken out of context, tell me which paraphrase you dispute and I’ll paste the surrounding sentence/paragraph for clarity. If you disagree with the explanatory line I gave for a specific quote, point to the exact sentence you think reads differently and I’ll show how the paraphrase follows from the text.