Reciprocality

Also, if NP includes all subjective or semantic problems then that NP does not equal P is trivial. If there is no structure to the problem itself, if it does not analogically involve known quantities as well unknown ones then the fact that it can not be effectively solved by an algorithm is trivially obvious. The real question of dispute must then structure all relevant problems to NP on some basis that overlaps with the basis of the algorithm. In other words, that which constitutes the variability of the problem must 1. relate to that which constitutes the non-variability of the problem in a mere quantitative way, if their qualities are entirely separate then it is a contradictory problem. The relation between the known and unknown of the problem, by being a mere proportion between the two and bearing the same essence as the known, must too bear the same essence as those instructions employed in the algorithm, this is the nature of deduction, can you induce red from a composition of wavelengths? No. Is that an unsolved problem? No. So how can an algorithm which instructions share their basis with the problem they attempt to solve fail if given "almost" infinite time? For the same reason that your headphones sound somewhere between two and four times more loud when they are pretty close to your ears as when they are just twice that distance. What about infinite time? Since several infinites would here contradict the laws of logic, as in undermines the structure on which the very meaning of the problem is contingent, then infinite time would always be sufficient for even the most rudimentary algorithm to solve the most conceivable complex problem within their mutual limits.

If a problem is solved in a formalised system a computer will always calculate if this is the case if it has sufficient horsepower or sufficient time, something else would contradict laws of logic. However, though proofreading is excessive force (brute force) it does not involve the much more excessive force of variability, there is no solving for x in proofreading. Solving a problem via brute force begins with x, x can be solved for via the machine that reads proof, even x, y and z, but the curve will exponentiate real quick, but it will never go vertical, thus also here the laws of logic will stay intact. Logically speaking all problems that can be verified via a computer can be solved via a computer, practically speaking certain exponential curves outcompetes the limits of computation conditioned on the matter and time in the universe, so effectively speaking all problems that can be verified via a computer can not be solved via a computer. To conceptualise this we should resolve to basic epistemology, and proportion the known to the unknown. When it comes to the unknown of a proofreading there is non, just as when it comes to the exception to the identity of existence there is non. When it comes to the unknown of a problem that is not constructed out of the axioms that proofreads solutions you must now generalise new principles from these axioms blindly. The complexity of the problem (how many variables it consists of) will output an exponential difficulty in proportion to the richness of your the algorithmic instructions. It follows from definition that something is a less magnitude than itself exponentiated. The only possible counterargument takes problem with the premise of the exponentiation itself, which is only done by introducing a theory on inherent limits or "upper bounds". In other words that if a problem becomes sufficiently complex it exhaust itself such that what in the initial instructions held only for 1 now holds for exponentially more. Until someone create such a theory from upper bounds I will say that P does not equal NP.

If you imagine all causal relations to be analogous to a piece of elastic fabric in the wind, somewhat subject to the winds power, somewhat subject to its own, but always strong enough to maintain its own continuity both throughout and in the end, thus never tearing, and see yourself balancing between powers just like that piece of fabric then you will know better what you are asking when you find an answer to what high consciousness should be. Acceptance and responsibility over yourself in the unique way that only you who experience these "powers" could, and this is only done by knowing how far you can stretch, what your fibres are made of. See a lot, test yourself.

Contemplate it for yourselves. Less yapping, more contemplation. Creativity and art is conditioned on a state of mind which is disconnected not only from literal thinking but from the purpose of literal thinking. If when up in the airplane you look out the window and see clouds stretching to the horizon you imagine that they will stretch over the whole of the earth and the earth itself this would be an example of literal thinking. Why would your mind inform you of the earth this way in this moment? My answer is that if you first generalise from that occurrence and then imagine that nothing pertaining to that generality ever happened then you literally could not survive or relate to the world in any way. My answer to my question is that it instantiates general purposivity or teleology. If instead you imagine some of the many weird shapes clouds could take you are to his extent disconnected from reality and ends, this is fantastical creativity. And then there is art, art is a syntheses of both forms of thinking, art is analogy via depiction, if when looking at the cloudy horizon you imagine something entirely different from clouds which non the less relate to these clouds in a surprising way and have the skills to perfect the depiction of that relationship then you have real art. An astute art critic can intuit and explicate that relationship and show us whether the artwork succeeded or failed.

There is also this bizarre situation where since history is an interconnected mess most the concept we have which relates to beauty is a product of what people once found beautiful, in so far as we then use such a concept as a criterion to determine beauty we already involve the distribution of human opinions in our analysis. Examples: African, European, glamour, gothic, baroque, medieval If on the other hand we essentialise or simplify our criterion so that it no longer has any roots in semantics and history we should in principle be able to discover some of that which should be objectively beautiful, the funny problem is that we may not actually find any beauty in it. Examples: harmony, angular, natural, youth, symmetric, golden ratio

Objective and subjective are conceptual opposites, but this does not entail that they are dichotomous or that something, a musical piece or any other artwork, can not be both. We can identify thousands of conditions that maximise the likelihood that most people will enjoy a melody. If you begin your question of the existence of objective beauty or pleasure by expecting universality (that everyone agrees) then that can become a definition of the term that cuts you off from its etymology and makes your awareness of your convergence with others rather granular. Consider the "mere exposure effect" whereby people come to enjoy things merely out of habit or familiarity, is this an effect that testifies for objectivity or subjectivity? I would say both, depending on whether you mean beauty in general or beauty in particular. If you insist on a universality variation of the concept of objectivity (see b below) then consider how If you generalise the criterion sufficiently all beauty will become objective, but if you particularise the criterion sufficiently not all beauty will become subjective, only some, this even applies beyond humanity and could even become intuitive if you consider how in principle chaos outnumbers order and evolution selects for the latter. The distinction between a. criterion and b. distribution is prescient here, which type of objectivity are you looking for when you are faced with the challenge of differing taste? The first is deductive the latter is inductive. Is Mona Lisa a pretty painting via analysis of its characteristics under abstract conditions of beauty or is it a pretty painting if most people think so? If we want to be completely philosophically sound here do we not have to induce which criterion to go for and deduce the significance of the distribution of opinions?

@Ampresus I hope you will figure it out and remember that it will get better, let me provide an analogy to what I said above about enlightenment and mooji your self is like the surface of a liquid in a tub, don't expect it to crystallise into the position you push it, if you have huge problems in your personal life those will be the very reason that your personal self resists enlightenment, trying to reach that enlightened state at that precise moment will be like clicking two positively charged magnets together.

Take a walk together in a new surrounding where you discuss the topic of how well you two fitted together before the sudden unfortunate events, this should contribute to making a decision on what to do next in your relationship that will be less subject to emotional variation over the next few weeks. You should probably have some distance from each other too, if here is cause for any genuine remorse or guilt then it is far more likely to come forth after some time when the mind is done processing all the sudden changes. You mind is made to be obsessive about major life changes, Mooji has provided me comfort too because sometimes I need more time to deal with things but don't be fooled into thinking that "enlightenment" will evaporate those problems suddenly, this because enlightenment is a lifelong journey which is bottlenecked by your psychological and emotional constitution.

@UnbornTao I don't think he were looking for a magic pill, I think he were looking for methods that makes a mountain of a task shrink by not having to brute force ever aspect of it.

damnit

@Nilsi I appreciate that you push me to try to write more comprehensibly. We can likely all agree that @Carl-Richard is onto something about the distinction between knowledge and intelligence, and perhaps that in the general modern culture there is little clarity of that distinction and their relationship, in that we so often come to infer someones intelligence or lack thereof merely from their existence of their knowledge. I propose one way to clarify the distinction of these concepts through the statistical average of how small a section of a whole someone needs to determine the identity of that whole. I acknowledge that this is an counterintuitive approach to measure intelligence since it is in fact knowledge-based, I will come back to this counterintuitive problem in section b below. I underpin the above proposition by .. a. pointing out the necessary condition for any intelligence (situational memory), and that there is no difference between that memory base and the whole we imagine when it is identified through its parts, I validate this condition in my own experience by discovering the presence of situational memory in the meaning of all that I am thinking and allow myself to generalise from there. b. pointing out that the less is required for someone to identify x (a generality, a concept, an identity or a whole) the more space they will have available for those xes, I do not provide evidence for this assertion as I find it terribly plausible. c. pointing out that the more space is available for xes the more relationships one can see between them, the quicker the transition between them, the more mutual exclusion thus clarity of them and the more distinct from specialised knowledge they will be thus the easier to distinguish from any such specialised knowledge. These are not theorems, nor are they comprehensive theories, they are falsifiable assertions that ideally get subject to statistical methodology when attempted falsified, until then we explore its plausibility and test it against the scrutiny of our own memory and imagination. If we introduce problem solving into the mix (which is indeed the true mark of intelligence) we must suddenly account for a persons heuristics and cultural background and general tendency to actually think in terms of problems (unless you can show me why we don't need to, I will take it as a given), without accounting for those we would easily end up with the smartest people around near the bottom, since their ability to recognise wholes through parts are so extreme that they rarely ever had to solve any problem or potentially never even considered them as problems developing thereby a very limited set of problem solving skills. Perhaps these can be considered right brained?

This is like saying, "the faster you move through an art museum, the faster you can go do other things." There is actually a rather fitting Drake lyric about this mindset of spectacle: „I know a girl whose one goal was to visit Rome Then she finally got to Rome And all she did was post pictures for people at home 'Cause all that mattered was impressin' everybody she's known“ @Nilsi Certainly, and if I say that exercising gives better endurance it is like saying that you ought to become an olympic athlete. The implication in the art museum statement is that there is something you miss out on by passing through it, both the existence or absence of an equivalent situation what regards the generality of parts and wholes is independent of the meaning of the merely falsifiable assertion you responded to, that the less of a whole is required to identify it the more space is available for other wholes. Isn't it interesting that instead of responding to the way the more literal interpretation of my reply relates to its relevant discussion your alternative interpretation in both deviating from that relation and entirely overshadowing it by introducing your own mind-associations informs me that you are literally just speaking with that part of yourself you require to imagine other people. The irony is that the way you reply by going miles beyond its literal meaning sees a whole through a part, though in this case the relation between the two is a fictional subsumption of the part (my assertion about the increased space for wholes the less of a part is required to identify them..) to a whole (..the normative interpretation that therefore one ought to identify as many wholes and hast through as many parts as possible), instead of moving soberly in the reverse direction by analysing the actual statement, which would be very like your supposed point of spending time in an art museum instead of hasting through it.

Something is spontaneous if when it happens it does not happen as an inert effect of external processes in their mutual medium. First of all I will take it as a given that you understand that spontaneity and non-spontaneity are real separable entities or continuums, that all distinct things or processes in your life is an instant of either of the two concepts. I believe we can exemplify four distinct types of spontaneities: 1. bigbang, though really the universe as a whole "from beginning to end" (spontaneous creation of substance and their diminution via insufficient space, thus the formation of a higher-dimensional space-time continuum via their co-ordered bifurcation) 2. biological emergence (spontaneous creation of action and reaction to stimuli within simultaneity to it via intensive and dispersed sensorial continuums) 3. sufficient similarity/proximity between experience and memory (spontaneous creation of representation of the past upon sufficient similarity to the present, linked to: the item of Wittgenstein's family resemblance, Humes bundle theory, pluralism, empiricism, imprecision, correlation, categorical containment, addition, 1:(insert irrational number), condition for inductive methods) 4. self construction via self-correction (spontaneous instantiation of identities and proportioned spontaneous ideation of identities due to dissociation upon any form of non-instantiation, linked to: Leibniz indiscernibility of identity, monism, epistemic rationalism, proportionality, precision, a given quantity in relation to its identity, correspondence, 1:1, condition for deductive methods) My question in this thread will be whether there exist any spontaneities that does not pertain to these four categories, whether any of them are false or whether some of them are redundant. The non-spontaneous equivalent to each of the four must be instantiated for each of them to be more than mere concepts (for otherwise their spontaneous nature would at best be defined into existence through logic via solutions to the contradictions that happens in their absence, I should then give two hypothetical alternatives the latter of which assumes a minor form of realism via synthetic application of predicates: 1. Kants noumena, 2. sensorial stimulus, 3. absence of sufficient similarity/proximity (sensorial stimulus) and 4. absence of self (sensorial stimulus, possibly sufficient similarity/proximity in the mindstate of a monk). That something can be a spontaneity and a non-spontaneity at the same time (spontaneous biological emergence of sensorial stimulus and non-spontaneous sensorial stimulus, is not a contradiction but a direct and necessary feature of multiplicity of spontaneity-kinds. As an aside: I believe the lower numbers really includes the higher ones, but conceptually the relationship is reversed.

@Nilsi No but I would be happy to entertain an analysis of what I wrote suggesting that I did say so. Beethovens symphony is both 1. a multitude of sensorial stimuli and 2. an overlay of perceptions of beauty, enjoyment, emotion and even meaning that varies to some extent between people. Each sensorial portion of the piece will be a part of a whole that the listener identifies via their memory, and this is what the text you quoted takes as undeniable.

Only allow yourself to be confident about what you have learned if you can present it without external aid. (beware that this will be far more draining than the alternative) Be aware that your mind recalls things more vividly the more novel and distinct they are (the more dissonance they cause your knowledge base when you are confronted with them). Meditate beforehand, learn to zone out of yourself when you memorise, your self will come back to you when you need to think about what you remember. Be aware of the difference between associations and abstraction, you want to avoid abstracting when you learn particular things if your mind is made to forget particulars in favour of generals, I believe it is. Yet your mind will need to associate these particulars to one another to recall them effectively, focus on associations between these particular dataoids by creating maps with lines etc between them, this utilises your spatial reasoning to form memories, I believe spatial reasoning is 99% of almost all of ours mental capacity, there is virtually no limit to how much we can recall by utilising it. (if the barest of animals can do it so can you) Edit: the second and third advice are a bit paradoxical, zoning out of ourself in favour of better recall may not be doable if the information is very semantic-based, and if it were possible it may fail to cause sufficient dissonance for us to recall it. I cant solve this paradox atm but hope the advices carry some weight regardless.

Analogical thinking is intuition plus origination. If an item A and its identity is similar to an item B and its identity then how did you spot that similarity? The answer is that you originate a more general conception than the one which pertains to either item alone, if it pertains to both, since they were not identical, then the conception has no singular essence (family resemblance of Wittgenstein), while if it truly pertains to neither then its referent is elsewhere, differently mediated or non-real. Intuition is not just when you solve a hard problem without knowing how, it is there when you imagine the world as you wake up or when you imagine the lawn before you open the door. Analogy is heightened intelligence, since not only is the whole seen through the part but a new whole is created by two or more distinct ones (parts). It follows from their nature that we do not cash in on our analogies before much later in life. Edit: A rotten analogy is when the two items are already identical, or when you already have a word for their similarity.

There is no intelligence without the archaic form of knowledge called situational memory. Memories are the touchstone we test propositions against, it is even the subject of most of our propositions. Intelligence is the ability to identify things, when you see a tenth of your toothbrush you can identify the whole thing, why? Because your memories informs you of the whole when you see the part, but why? Could we answer that question by analysing the toothbrush? And if not must we then analyse its identity in the absence of its object? How little of the toothbrush do you need to see to identify it? How little of the person do you need to see to have an unchangeable conception of them? How much do you need to partake in society to spot not only the differences between individual people but also their cultural or innate commonality without having any other society to compare with? How often are you informed of the similarity between something in your vision and something of your past? The more such questions we ask the closer we get to a mean of them, this is our general intelligence, and as Carl-Richard stated, it is independent of any particular knowledge base. The less information is required for you to see the whole the more space will be available in your mind to see a bunch of wholes.

I should probably provide context why I believe that as opposed to the relation between physical phenomena in their mutual medium such as matter and gravity the relation between a self and an intelligible stimuli in heir mutual medium is spontaneous. The former (physical) effect is inert and besides the total medium is identical to the sum of all of both (the gravity and the matter). The latter (phenomenal) is certainly not inert and besides the total medium (phenomenal medium) comprises many more things than the sum of both (many more things than the intelligible perception and the self). Again, it is true that the physical relations in the former medium correlates and possibly causes the inscrutable relations of the latter (such as that nothing in the composition of words on a page and the meaning we find in them could by themself cause the reaction we have to them), but spontaneity is a concept with an essence that is directly abstracted from real things that are complimentary to other real things, there is no doubt about its application to the things without which we would not even conceive of its meaning, but there is doubt about its application to other kinds of things, such as the universe as a whole. Also, if we have a comprehensive map of the variables in both mediums there arises contradictions in the identities of the former variables if a different effect occurs than the one which does, while the latter medium is not even subject to the possibility of that contradiction.

@LastThursday This is why the definition which involves the medium between the occurrence and its exteriors were used, and this definition is the one which ensures that the concept of spontaneity and its compliment is actually instantiated by real examples, which first becomes a problem in relation to the universe as a whole, are you suggesting that it becomes a problem in relation to any of the other categories? quote 2: "As for point 3 I'd say the mechanism which creates an impression of the present (moment) is the same which creates memories of the past. a1: The apparent separation of the two is only that of categorisation - memories of the past are in fact still the present moment - the difference is only in quality in some way. a2: You could argue that this mechanism is the source of all spontaneity, and that the whole of reality is actually "something uncaused" every single moment." a1: When I said that the spontaneity of memories and the non-spontaneity of direct experience (sensory stimuli) are different this did not imply that the mechanism which once created memories of our past and the mechanism which creates an impression of the present moment is different, why did you think so? I am not discussing that topic, whether or not their difference is qualitative or not is irrelevant to whether or not we can affirm or deny the spontaneity of memory upon sufficient similarity to a present experience. Id be happy to discuss your assertion elsewhere on the basis that it has no bearing on my assertion, or on the condition that you can provide a plausible connection. a2: If it came to you actually arguing a2 above then surely it contradicts what you said bolded in the first quote? I refer to the statement that a spontaneity in general could actually be something inscrutable. quote 3: "Points 2 and 4 fall into the something inscrutable camp, in other words life (and identity) can be accidentally bootstrapped from other processes - self-correction is actually a loop of information flow, these loops can spontaneously form but are not necessarily mysterious." How is it inscrutable that an agent owing a self-identity is asked to do something that does not correspond to that identity that agent will spontaneously experience dissonance and spontaneously correcting for it that is absent in the complimentary case? In the case you were correct that accidental bootstrapped self-correcting mechanisms pertaining to identity did precede and cause their real existence, albeit indeterminately so such that they were inscrutable, why would this be relevant to whether they were medium-relatively spontaneous?

you are what the objects become when it appears that the objects are how you identify them when you are separated from the purpose for which objects are identifiable you disappear too (you were made towards that precise purpose)

I will try to reverse the order of the argument if it helps. When we understand the meaning of the concept of emergence better, or see more and more examples of things for which reason the concept exists, we can see how a top-down system of governance functionally contradicts that emergent process. That which emerges from something else does not need to exist in the parts it emerges from, is more than each of the parts taken separately or even collectively. A political system on the other hand must re-distribute the glue which holds it together into the minds of its followers, complimenting the behaviour of emergence precisely. A community of integrated spirituality has no ultimate purpose because spirituality is to be left only with the means itself to achieve what everyone else needs to maintain their respective self, left only with these means (knowledge, concepts, friendships, sensorial receptivity, whatever) in the absence of the wish to achieve anything through them the spiritualists discovers that these means are ends in themselves, are in fact the ultimate end, or perfection. Such a community will form its own unique behaviour, and that is as far as our knowledge of its politics goes because we are nothing like it.

I will make the above clearer by elucidating on the following question, are you doubtful whether the good old political systems operate on the same program as conceptual schematics and logic? In the case they do operate very similarly and conceptual systems judge/determine particular concrete situations by force (subsumption), then surely a spiritualist who no longer judges situations as literally being this or that way will only politicise themself through action that harmonise with those of a similar nature? Without a society where the majority are such a spiritualist there will only be possible for a political power dynamic operating on agreement of what the world is and what should be achieved, in a society of spiritualists on the other hand (spirituality according to the exposition in the first paragraph in my first comment) there are no truth, no grand narrative and no telos, instead there would be emergent expressions based on the peace and harmony between each agent made possible simply though the genuine integrity of each of them. To believe that you can have a spiritual top-down political system is amusing, a fairytale and historically illiterate.

If all there is left are the means for achieving untempting ends meaning inverts on itself, the medium for achievement couples with the closest thing there are to those ends, nay, the end (purposes) are seen directly in those very things. Spiritual politics are bottom upwards, it is bottlenecked by the nature of the bottom and the more detailed behaviour of such a political system could necessarily not be predicted through the theories you elicited in your post.

just listen