Reciprocality

@Ishanga Some could do that while others could not. Those who could go into virtually any culture and enjoy it would do so but not through their self-identity, that is what you say, correct? If that is so, leaving aside that I don't think it is true that they love outside their self-identity, how does it work that they can enjoy that other culture, what explains it and how does that explanation relate to their own self-identity and the reason it exists?

@Ishanga Appreciate the relevant post, but are you really engaging any of my premises, questions or assertions directly? Do you want me to decipher whether there is a contradiction between the meaning of sadghurus conception of a transparent state and the meaning of my conception of a state of loving self-identity? Or otherwise whether the two are compatibly speaking about the same subject or unproblematically speaking about two different subjects?

How do we love beyond our own identity? I think I fail that massively every day. When is the last time you did that?

To love sincerely we must show up to life like a sports fan shows up to an international game, we must show our country without needing others to see what we have shown them, isn't it. The question is how much is there to show?

The relevant buzzwords becomes cliche, and cliche happens because of the borrowed future inherent to language and human opportunism, thus the tendency for these undying words to be associated with their feigned use. Dignity Resilience Tolerance Animated Energetic Present Measured Enjoying Living Being ^They are perennial, wouldn't their significance change for those people who instead of experiencing the world through the needle of comparison, that tendency which always reflects most intensely their individuality, the coherence of the whole individual, started seeing distinct things as aspects of the same?

We spontaneously attribute properties to distinct things from comparing them, but only if we spontaneously fix on their sensorial difference. What does it take to see two very distinct items as the same, assuming there is anything similar between them? Our proclivity to attribute distinct properties to distinct things which goes beyond their sensorial distinctness is in one way identical between us all, but in another way takes on a different character between us all. Other people can consistently see the coherence between the character that judgement takes and our personal character, in fact they can see it as the surest thing in the world. We can say with confidence then that our personal character is the sufficient reason not for those distinct properties but for our attributing them. What happens if this proclivity of judgement, this spontaneity always reflecting the coherence of the individual person, suddenly ceased? Surely sufficient distinctness is a sensorial business, while sufficient similarity is a memorial one? In either case spontaneity is the arbiter, becomes translated into intelligibility, natural semantics. The distinctness of the two items in our senses is fixed on, they coincide in our consciousness, our ideas subsume them equally spontaneously, would we have reason to question our judgement if it happens by itself, without any conceivable hidden motive? For two very distinct items to be seen for their similarity, as then a first reaction to them, something must have changed in the character of the one who otherwise attributed ideas to their distinctness. My questions: 1. what must change in the character of such a person who at first impression sees the king and the beggar as similar? 2. what is different in a) our process of fixing on the concepts or ideas which depicts those similarities between those very different things and those concepts or ideas which depicts their difference? How does either of these mental representations relate to our culturally inherited semantics, how do they relate to the world, which are like diamonds surviving a hundred generations of force and which disintegrated in a generation or two?

Would one have the capacity to reflect in this way if in want of concrete experiences one can only compare the unexpected with either 1. its mere conceptual opposite (expectancy) 2. a fantastical scenario or 3. a socially induced judgement or idealisation? In the case all these questions can be answered in the affirmative, would that somewhat imply that someones lack of enjoyment of concealed motives in comedic situations have very little independently conceived basis (experience) for whatever they do find humorous and laugh mostly in accordance with how much something fails to conform to expectancies of the culture they were born into (socially induced judgement of situations)? If that were so, wouldn´t that correspond with the overwhelming evidence we all likely possess in our memories that people only laugh at others when they laugh at them with others whom they share their culture with?

There is no doubt that there little comedy that does not break our expectation in the punchline. Deadpan comedy appeals to whom? The obvious answer is that it appeals to those who expects in the comedian the intent of doing the unexpected and is entertained since though the unexpected is a comedic necessity the motive for it remains hidden throughout so that one get to reflect on whether it is plausible that the unexpected were in fact to be expected. But what can be said in general about the those with the tendency to enjoy this kind of comedy?

Do they have a certain personal distance to yet acute comprehension of the collective zeitgeist? Do they easily conceive many points of view? What are the conditions necessary to even ask ourself whether what we expected from a situation were "to be expected"?

What are the problems with sentimentality? What is it? It is very hard to conceive of a very general tendency as a problem to solve, but can it be done? How weak would we be without it when it is needed, assuming that it is needed when it visits us? Does it take a lot of strength to endure being that weakened without resolving to some self-pity? When we are out and about observing and reflecting, or generally feel just good, do we need any narrative then? In the case that sentimentality is just the self-pitying narrative we require when we become too observant of ourself in relation to how we wish to be or possess of things, perhaps accompanying the realisation that we will never possess even the means to achieve it, an oscillating tragedy, do we see ourself in this light when it happens, or do we need to wait? I talk about we, instead of either you or me, because humans are virtually identical and I observe again and again in us a resolve to some form of self-pity and accompanying narrative.

Also, if NP includes all subjective or semantic problems then that NP does not equal P is trivial. If there is no structure to the problem itself, if it does not analogically involve known quantities as well unknown ones then the fact that it can not be effectively solved by an algorithm is trivially obvious. The real question of dispute must then structure all relevant problems to NP on some basis that overlaps with the basis of the algorithm. In other words, that which constitutes the variability of the problem must 1. relate to that which constitutes the non-variability of the problem in a mere quantitative way, if their qualities are entirely separate then it is a contradictory problem. The relation between the known and unknown of the problem, by being a mere proportion between the two and bearing the same essence as the known, must too bear the same essence as those instructions employed in the algorithm, this is the nature of deduction, can you induce red from a composition of wavelengths? No. Is that an unsolved problem? No. So how can an algorithm which instructions share their basis with the problem they attempt to solve fail if given "almost" infinite time? For the same reason that your headphones sound somewhere between two and four times more loud when they are pretty close to your ears as when they are just twice that distance. What about infinite time? Since several infinites would here contradict the laws of logic, as in undermines the structure on which the very meaning of the problem is contingent, then infinite time would always be sufficient for even the most rudimentary algorithm to solve the most conceivable complex problem within their mutual limits.

If a problem is solved in a formalised system a computer will always calculate if this is the case if it has sufficient horsepower or sufficient time, something else would contradict laws of logic. However, though proofreading is excessive force (brute force) it does not involve the much more excessive force of variability, there is no solving for x in proofreading. Solving a problem via brute force begins with x, x can be solved for via the machine that reads proof, even x, y and z, but the curve will exponentiate real quick, but it will never go vertical, thus also here the laws of logic will stay intact. Logically speaking all problems that can be verified via a computer can be solved via a computer, practically speaking certain exponential curves outcompetes the limits of computation conditioned on the matter and time in the universe, so effectively speaking all problems that can be verified via a computer can not be solved via a computer. To conceptualise this we should resolve to basic epistemology, and proportion the known to the unknown. When it comes to the unknown of a proofreading there is non, just as when it comes to the exception to the identity of existence there is non. When it comes to the unknown of a problem that is not constructed out of the axioms that proofreads solutions you must now generalise new principles from these axioms blindly. The complexity of the problem (how many variables it consists of) will output an exponential difficulty in proportion to the richness of your the algorithmic instructions. It follows from definition that something is a less magnitude than itself exponentiated. The only possible counterargument takes problem with the premise of the exponentiation itself, which is only done by introducing a theory on inherent limits or "upper bounds". In other words that if a problem becomes sufficiently complex it exhaust itself such that what in the initial instructions held only for 1 now holds for exponentially more. Until someone create such a theory from upper bounds I will say that P does not equal NP.

If you imagine all causal relations to be analogous to a piece of elastic fabric in the wind, somewhat subject to the winds power, somewhat subject to its own, but always strong enough to maintain its own continuity both throughout and in the end, thus never tearing, and see yourself balancing between powers just like that piece of fabric then you will know better what you are asking when you find an answer to what high consciousness should be. Acceptance and responsibility over yourself in the unique way that only you who experience these "powers" could, and this is only done by knowing how far you can stretch, what your fibres are made of. See a lot, test yourself.

Contemplate it for yourselves. Less yapping, more contemplation. Creativity and art is conditioned on a state of mind which is disconnected not only from literal thinking but from the purpose of literal thinking. If when up in the airplane you look out the window and see clouds stretching to the horizon you imagine that they will stretch over the whole of the earth and the earth itself this would be an example of literal thinking. Why would your mind inform you of the earth this way in this moment? My answer is that if you first generalise from that occurrence and then imagine that nothing pertaining to that generality ever happened then you literally could not survive or relate to the world in any way. My answer to my question is that it instantiates general purposivity or teleology. If instead you imagine some of the many weird shapes clouds could take you are to his extent disconnected from reality and ends, this is fantastical creativity. And then there is art, art is a syntheses of both forms of thinking, art is analogy via depiction, if when looking at the cloudy horizon you imagine something entirely different from clouds which non the less relate to these clouds in a surprising way and have the skills to perfect the depiction of that relationship then you have real art. An astute art critic can intuit and explicate that relationship and show us whether the artwork succeeded or failed.

There is also this bizarre situation where since history is an interconnected mess most the concept we have which relates to beauty is a product of what people once found beautiful, in so far as we then use such a concept as a criterion to determine beauty we already involve the distribution of human opinions in our analysis. Examples: African, European, glamour, gothic, baroque, medieval If on the other hand we essentialise or simplify our criterion so that it no longer has any roots in semantics and history we should in principle be able to discover some of that which should be objectively beautiful, the funny problem is that we may not actually find any beauty in it. Examples: harmony, angular, natural, youth, symmetric, golden ratio

Objective and subjective are conceptual opposites, but this does not entail that they are dichotomous or that something, a musical piece or any other artwork, can not be both. We can identify thousands of conditions that maximise the likelihood that most people will enjoy a melody. If you begin your question of the existence of objective beauty or pleasure by expecting universality (that everyone agrees) then that can become a definition of the term that cuts you off from its etymology and makes your awareness of your convergence with others rather granular. Consider the "mere exposure effect" whereby people come to enjoy things merely out of habit or familiarity, is this an effect that testifies for objectivity or subjectivity? I would say both, depending on whether you mean beauty in general or beauty in particular. If you insist on a universality variation of the concept of objectivity (see b below) then consider how If you generalise the criterion sufficiently all beauty will become objective, but if you particularise the criterion sufficiently not all beauty will become subjective, only some, this even applies beyond humanity and could even become intuitive if you consider how in principle chaos outnumbers order and evolution selects for the latter. The distinction between a. criterion and b. distribution is prescient here, which type of objectivity are you looking for when you are faced with the challenge of differing taste? The first is deductive the latter is inductive. Is Mona Lisa a pretty painting via analysis of its characteristics under abstract conditions of beauty or is it a pretty painting if most people think so? If we want to be completely philosophically sound here do we not have to induce which criterion to go for and deduce the significance of the distribution of opinions?

@Ampresus I hope you will figure it out and remember that it will get better, let me provide an analogy to what I said above about enlightenment and mooji your self is like the surface of a liquid in a tub, don't expect it to crystallise into the position you push it, if you have huge problems in your personal life those will be the very reason that your personal self resists enlightenment, trying to reach that enlightened state at that precise moment will be like clicking two positively charged magnets together.

Take a walk together in a new surrounding where you discuss the topic of how well you two fitted together before the sudden unfortunate events, this should contribute to making a decision on what to do next in your relationship that will be less subject to emotional variation over the next few weeks. You should probably have some distance from each other too, if here is cause for any genuine remorse or guilt then it is far more likely to come forth after some time when the mind is done processing all the sudden changes. You mind is made to be obsessive about major life changes, Mooji has provided me comfort too because sometimes I need more time to deal with things but don't be fooled into thinking that "enlightenment" will evaporate those problems suddenly, this because enlightenment is a lifelong journey which is bottlenecked by your psychological and emotional constitution.

@UnbornTao I don't think he were looking for a magic pill, I think he were looking for methods that makes a mountain of a task shrink by not having to brute force ever aspect of it.

damnit

@Nilsi I appreciate that you push me to try to write more comprehensibly. We can likely all agree that @Carl-Richard is onto something about the distinction between knowledge and intelligence, and perhaps that in the general modern culture there is little clarity of that distinction and their relationship, in that we so often come to infer someones intelligence or lack thereof merely from their existence of their knowledge. I propose one way to clarify the distinction of these concepts through the statistical average of how small a section of a whole someone needs to determine the identity of that whole. I acknowledge that this is an counterintuitive approach to measure intelligence since it is in fact knowledge-based, I will come back to this counterintuitive problem in section b below. I underpin the above proposition by .. a. pointing out the necessary condition for any intelligence (situational memory), and that there is no difference between that memory base and the whole we imagine when it is identified through its parts, I validate this condition in my own experience by discovering the presence of situational memory in the meaning of all that I am thinking and allow myself to generalise from there. b. pointing out that the less is required for someone to identify x (a generality, a concept, an identity or a whole) the more space they will have available for those xes, I do not provide evidence for this assertion as I find it terribly plausible. c. pointing out that the more space is available for xes the more relationships one can see between them, the quicker the transition between them, the more mutual exclusion thus clarity of them and the more distinct from specialised knowledge they will be thus the easier to distinguish from any such specialised knowledge. These are not theorems, nor are they comprehensive theories, they are falsifiable assertions that ideally get subject to statistical methodology when attempted falsified, until then we explore its plausibility and test it against the scrutiny of our own memory and imagination. If we introduce problem solving into the mix (which is indeed the true mark of intelligence) we must suddenly account for a persons heuristics and cultural background and general tendency to actually think in terms of problems (unless you can show me why we don't need to, I will take it as a given), without accounting for those we would easily end up with the smartest people around near the bottom, since their ability to recognise wholes through parts are so extreme that they rarely ever had to solve any problem or potentially never even considered them as problems developing thereby a very limited set of problem solving skills. Perhaps these can be considered right brained?

This is like saying, "the faster you move through an art museum, the faster you can go do other things." There is actually a rather fitting Drake lyric about this mindset of spectacle: „I know a girl whose one goal was to visit Rome Then she finally got to Rome And all she did was post pictures for people at home 'Cause all that mattered was impressin' everybody she's known“ @Nilsi Certainly, and if I say that exercising gives better endurance it is like saying that you ought to become an olympic athlete. The implication in the art museum statement is that there is something you miss out on by passing through it, both the existence or absence of an equivalent situation what regards the generality of parts and wholes is independent of the meaning of the merely falsifiable assertion you responded to, that the less of a whole is required to identify it the more space is available for other wholes. Isn't it interesting that instead of responding to the way the more literal interpretation of my reply relates to its relevant discussion your alternative interpretation in both deviating from that relation and entirely overshadowing it by introducing your own mind-associations informs me that you are literally just speaking with that part of yourself you require to imagine other people. The irony is that the way you reply by going miles beyond its literal meaning sees a whole through a part, though in this case the relation between the two is a fictional subsumption of the part (my assertion about the increased space for wholes the less of a part is required to identify them..) to a whole (..the normative interpretation that therefore one ought to identify as many wholes and hast through as many parts as possible), instead of moving soberly in the reverse direction by analysing the actual statement, which would be very like your supposed point of spending time in an art museum instead of hasting through it.

Something is spontaneous if when it happens it does not happen as an inert effect of external processes in their mutual medium. First of all I will take it as a given that you understand that spontaneity and non-spontaneity are real separable entities or continuums, that all distinct things or processes in your life is an instant of either of the two concepts. I believe we can exemplify four distinct types of spontaneities: 1. bigbang, though really the universe as a whole "from beginning to end" (spontaneous creation of substance and their diminution via insufficient space, thus the formation of a higher-dimensional space-time continuum via their co-ordered bifurcation) 2. biological emergence (spontaneous creation of action and reaction to stimuli within simultaneity to it via intensive and dispersed sensorial continuums) 3. sufficient similarity/proximity between experience and memory (spontaneous creation of representation of the past upon sufficient similarity to the present, linked to: the item of Wittgenstein's family resemblance, Humes bundle theory, pluralism, empiricism, imprecision, correlation, categorical containment, addition, 1:(insert irrational number), condition for inductive methods) 4. self construction via self-correction (spontaneous instantiation of identities and proportioned spontaneous ideation of identities due to dissociation upon any form of non-instantiation, linked to: Leibniz indiscernibility of identity, monism, epistemic rationalism, proportionality, precision, a given quantity in relation to its identity, correspondence, 1:1, condition for deductive methods) My question in this thread will be whether there exist any spontaneities that does not pertain to these four categories, whether any of them are false or whether some of them are redundant. The non-spontaneous equivalent to each of the four must be instantiated for each of them to be more than mere concepts (for otherwise their spontaneous nature would at best be defined into existence through logic via solutions to the contradictions that happens in their absence, I should then give two hypothetical alternatives the latter of which assumes a minor form of realism via synthetic application of predicates: 1. Kants noumena, 2. sensorial stimulus, 3. absence of sufficient similarity/proximity (sensorial stimulus) and 4. absence of self (sensorial stimulus, possibly sufficient similarity/proximity in the mindstate of a monk). That something can be a spontaneity and a non-spontaneity at the same time (spontaneous biological emergence of sensorial stimulus and non-spontaneous sensorial stimulus, is not a contradiction but a direct and necessary feature of multiplicity of spontaneity-kinds. As an aside: I believe the lower numbers really includes the higher ones, but conceptually the relationship is reversed.

@Nilsi No but I would be happy to entertain an analysis of what I wrote suggesting that I did say so. Beethovens symphony is both 1. a multitude of sensorial stimuli and 2. an overlay of perceptions of beauty, enjoyment, emotion and even meaning that varies to some extent between people. Each sensorial portion of the piece will be a part of a whole that the listener identifies via their memory, and this is what the text you quoted takes as undeniable.

Only allow yourself to be confident about what you have learned if you can present it without external aid. (beware that this will be far more draining than the alternative) Be aware that your mind recalls things more vividly the more novel and distinct they are (the more dissonance they cause your knowledge base when you are confronted with them). Meditate beforehand, learn to zone out of yourself when you memorise, your self will come back to you when you need to think about what you remember. Be aware of the difference between associations and abstraction, you want to avoid abstracting when you learn particular things if your mind is made to forget particulars in favour of generals, I believe it is. Yet your mind will need to associate these particulars to one another to recall them effectively, focus on associations between these particular dataoids by creating maps with lines etc between them, this utilises your spatial reasoning to form memories, I believe spatial reasoning is 99% of almost all of ours mental capacity, there is virtually no limit to how much we can recall by utilising it. (if the barest of animals can do it so can you) Edit: the second and third advice are a bit paradoxical, zoning out of ourself in favour of better recall may not be doable if the information is very semantic-based, and if it were possible it may fail to cause sufficient dissonance for us to recall it. I cant solve this paradox atm but hope the advices carry some weight regardless.