Reciprocality

Do you want a good advice in how to resist the resistance? Perhaps yielding to the first order resistance is the least taxing way to go about it, perhaps it happens for reasons that are entirely necessary or natural.

@Natasha Tori Maru As I see it, points are something we are making when there is contention in a back and fourth dialogue, at least that is the context in which it is most often brought up. When there is no such contention there is still meaning, the set in which some elements are points, and I believe you had trouble with deciphering the meaning and though there are some grammatical mistakes they are far from sufficient for that trouble. Digressions and parenthesis are double edged swords that sometimes do more harm than good. It is not so much a stream of consciousness as a syntactical necessity that I write inter connectedly and long windily aphoristically, as the alternate would require that I would only connect two or three ideas in each sentence and that would often require four times more writing for it all to add up. A lot of things introduces flow, it is present throughout all our writing.

@UnbornTao How silly of me, i forgot to add in the words "contemplation" and "insight" so that my contemplations and insights did not appear like showing off in your projections on them.

@UnbornTao Beyond my comprehension, absurd. It is all purposive, but I don't connect with the ultimate end, I can only predict so much. I am the whole thing, but not for reasons I am aware of. The "what" of this experience is prior to the distinctions of it and my thinking of it, all my thinking does is reorganise it into structures that gives me a sense of harmony and ease because if I weren't a system which sought harmony I would not be alive. Experience is will, primal instincts at every second, a semi coherent narrative and myopia. All the words that tries to answer your question of what experience is are reshuffled from another set of experiences and now used to describe a moment that is not really new at all. The reshuffling of the words are insufficient because all they represent are analogies between now and then, all I can do is ask why is it here at all and my answer is that I am inventing the possibility of the alternative.

@Nodar Bakradze I understand, you boast about a huge philosophical undertaking where you literally will pick up the torch of Heidegger and integrate all kinds of philosophical domains, but when challenged to solve the most basic problems that gave rise to those different traditions it is beyond the scope of the very thread in which it were posted and where people have the opportunity to decide whether it is worth taking seriously by asking questions that directly relate to it. "My philosophical project—deepened fundamental ontology—integrates each and every major breakthrough of premodern, modern, and postmodern epochs." When we ask ourself what do we really know about the world and what it really is, how much of it are merely conjectures or perspectives in our head then the answers comes in a limited set of different kinds, those kinds corresponds to the breakthroughs of premodern, modern and postmodern epochs and my questions directly satisfies that criterion, and if I and anyone else were to take you seriously than we are justified in learning about how you answer them.

@Nodar Bakradze If some concepts, such as time, space and logical categories such as those in the Kantian tradition, were given to us independent of particular experiences, due to being merely formal and not themselves having any content such as the ideas we do derive directly from perception does, then it would at least be plausible that they exist as necessary substances in addition to the one of our perceptive fields. This would directly contradict phenomenology, whose main object is to ground all semantics, meaning, truth and reality in direct perception, thereby avoiding the metaphysical "otherness" of an additional substance that transcendental realism, dualism and theism commits to. Phenomenology can be described in several ways, but each variation will have in common that phenomenology stands in antithesis to the mainstream intellectual traditions of the belief that essences as either pertaining directly to the world itself and existing in that world independently of the perceiver or through the invariant perceiver called god, and that phenomenology attempts to reveal why these additional assumptions are not necessary by grounding everything in phenomena, by various means. Traditionally it appeared that there were a sharp dichotomy between the concepts that pertain to unique entities that includes shapes and phenomena and those that pertain to everything without exception or structural concepts like disjunction, conjunction and negation, where those who believed that both originates in the mind a priori were called pure rationalist and those who believed both originated in perception were called pure empiricists. It may not be as sharp as were previously suggested, and this is what has to be proven if we were to state that realism about such things as object-identity are definitely false, which surely are ideas you are familiar with.

@UnbornTao It certainly does point us in directions, that is what gesturing does. And I did precisely what you are asking of me in the first comment, but instead of taking responsibility of understanding what it means and asking questions that pertains directly to it you just posit that it is very abstract, yet I do my best with what I got and extrapolate on it only to receive the exact same response. Direct and substance are bijective, you use another term to refer to the same universal pattern that could only be denoted due to the repetitive nature of that pattern and have thusly already committed to my framing of it.

@UnbornTao My answer sounds abstract because the question elicits concepts without any particular qualifications, we were to describe experience in general, right? Describing unique experiences does not have much bearing on experiences as such, which everyone who even takes the posts question seriously therewith agrees to. Up to a certain threshold where inherent limits are met, however bright two color-phenomena are they diminish at the same rate when you close your eyes, thus do not diminish in proportion to their intensity, but what would happen if they did? The various intensive magnitudes of sensory phenomena, which we can rightfully consider to be the matter or substance of our minds from where everything else derives and pertains, if they did diminish in proportion to their intensity, would accumulate and be present in "times" much later than they arose, and from such a lifelong experience we would be fated to derive a different concept of time, a concept which would pertain as much to that reality as the linear one do to ours, although such a reality would involve paradoxical timeloops where the principle of identity naturally no longer applies. If in our own experience, in which the only known substance exists, (and substance are rightly defined to be the that of which everything else is a predicate or derivative) we derive the concept of linearity of time from the precise parameters of that substance and have no second substance to apply of the concept of linearity to and we can articulate the precise invariant condition that in our experience and thus in relation to that substance known for it to yield linearity then why should anything else be a sufficient condition for linearity than those parameters, the invariant diminution? If no a. structure, concept, duality, medium or universal idea exist except in so far as the b. substance underlying them exists, and we can achieve a demonstration of the precise origin of the former in the latter, and no question involving the concept of "experience in general" avoids answers of the form denoted by "a", then anyone trying to answer those questions are justified in embarking on a journey in those structures.

Intensive and extensive magnitudes that due to their invariant diminution manifests as the linearity and continuity of time, both physically and perceptively.

@Nodar Bakradze Interesting stuff. Given your post-metaphysical phenomenology, do you ground primitive dualities, categories, logic, and concepts in perceived reality? If so, do you rely on arguments from plausibility, or do you demonstrate why the alternative 1. includes contradictions, 2. overextends the predicate in certain judgements or 3. shows that possibilities as necessarily contingent? If my questions are ambiguous ill be happy to elaborate on them and why they matter.

I'm trying to go back to a state of mind where I don't believe that I know anything.

@AION Schopenhauer would describe seriousness as the consequence of the firm belief that reality is no different than ones idea of it. I buy it.

@gettoefl Doesn't "identical" and "something" correspond to "invariant" and "variant"? If so then do you mean to say that 10 means "any varied set of 10 invariant elements"? Are there several of those sets, or is there only the one set of 10 invariant elements, and is it numbers? If so then where does the variance or "something" come from? If the variance comes from the entities that satisfies the number 10 (10 invariant elements/units) then why introduce the concept of identity among those 10? Are you saying that there is something about any 10 elements that is identical/invariant, but merely that about them that satisfies the criterion of a unit, although they are not identical in any other respect? If so then would it be accurate to say that numbers are the only viable thing that satisfies what they satisfy, that nothing could replace them, if so what is the general criterion that we can employ to determine whether other entities also are uniquely applicable, both necessary and sufficient?

@jimwell But when we comprehend does the comprehension go from the external to the internal or from the internal to the external (it is a given that the content in the comprehension goes from the external to the internal, but the comprehension is surely not merely content)? Overall (over long timeframes) it may be bidirectional but in that moment of comprehension I would suggest it goes only one way, where the comprehension is a simulation of internal models to predict the outcome of the external system, infer its causes or construct its structure. Are these three modes of comprehensions infallible? If so, how? And if not, is it accurate to state that you have comprehended something if the comprehension is false? And if so, what makes a comprehension different from a judgement? And if not, then comprehensions are indeed infallible. But if comprehensions are infallible then how do you know in the particular case whether the idea is a comprehension and not merely a judgement? Are there clear general criterions to determine whether the external situation is comprehended, can you know that you have comprehended without criterions? Can the difference between a judgement and a comprehension be meaningful without also being subject to criterions that corresponds with the particular cases that instantiate them, and if not how can meaning be created purely semantically or abstractly, and if it can how does it by-pass the problems of self-reference and paradox?

@Mixcoatl Sure, although agency emphasises a tendency our minds have, a tendency that relates more to your question than merely a mind in general does, it could be conceivable for instance that minds could be without agency, at least they are conceptually different. The agency of minds would not mean much without their interaction with environments, the environment contains the distinctions that minds with sufficient agency are able to identify, and when they do they can conceive of those distinctions merely in their mind, and when they do this these distinctions will be employed even on distinctions they did not initially derive from and be employed onto themselves (nothing shackles them to any particular situation), this happens spontaneously (no premeditation required) and it gives rise to many beautiful things, among which are what we call numbers.

@Carl-Richard Seems more likely that the point is to maintain very strong and clear estimates of the percentage of the "others" are developed to a meagre tier 1 stage and then it becomes conveniently unclear and hard to determine whether particular people actually are in a given stage. It is almost like one could expect there to be some form of relationship between 1. conceptualising conscious development in society in general and 2. how many people in the real world one have evaluated to be of a certain conscious development.

If nothing besides the distinction between two concrete things happened then they would not be identified, numbers presupposes identity thus whatever is required for something to be identified is also required for something to be a number. Sufficient agency is such a sufficient condition.

@Carl-Richard If that which were true of numbers at a basic level were not true of "many things" then we would have a hard time explaining why numbers can apply to all kinds of things. When we do nothing about the distinction between two things (which I take to be what you meant as applying to many things) except generalise that they are distinct we create a unitary system, since in the concept of a distinction we find the concept of 1 and 2, you could not both have a distinction and the ability to identify it in the sequential order in which you do it without creating the meaning of the concept of 1 and 2, whether or not you represent that concept with symbols.

Embrace yourself for the day when you explicitly asks Claude's extended thinking variant to evaluate your ideas critically, objectively and thoroughly.

We understand the idea, but we don't understand whether it applies. I understand that you feel that way, but I do not understand what you feel. I understand that seven horses on one ladder will make it break, but I don't understand that the ladder will break, what if it don't, could I understand something when that understanding is wrong? The general rule is this: We understand what we do not need to judge/determine, but among everything we must first judge there is nothing to understand.

It appears to me that you are asking whether anything could exist without existing as a substance, whether there are anything insubstantial. I would ask you similarly whether anything could be possible without first being actual, that perhaps possibilities are conceptual breadcrumbs from perceived experiences and that if nothing is possible without first being actual in some form that nothing is real without first being substantial. Isn't the separation between real and substance an invention of your mind as to what is possible? Again: why should anything be possible without first being actual in some form?

Units representing a generalised idea derived from the real distinction between experienced things occurred spontaneously due to how the ability to identify things presupposes the agency sufficient to hold that identity independently of the thing that bears it.

There are patterns of behaviours in various societies, these implies a state of mind where intentions resides. These consciousness models describe several of these patterns and predict that if one of them occurs in someone then a certain set of other behaviour patterns is likely to occur in them too. All roads leads to Rome, whichever pattern your behaviour exhibits it will be insufficient in certain contexts if you dear to challenge yourself sufficiently, the psychological evolution and trajectory that follows is similar across cultures. We age into these patterns of thinking and acting, we find people similar to ourselves who went through the same phases, the same phases they went through thousand years ago and will do in a thousand years from now. When we observe others we may infer which developmental phase they are going through and maybe even realise that they are exactly like us. All this were clear throughout history in every society, the macro-level intellectualisation is just a repetition of the immediately obvious in our perceptive field, because we went through some of the phases, just like the others. @Carl-Richard You speak about people on the forum not having <lived> the "tier 2" paradigm they spout, and suggest that only 2% of the population reaches this level, but what do you really know about most of the population? What is even the distinction in your mind between 1. who most of the population are and 2. that about them which is stuck in tier 1? How many 40 and 50 year olds (who may actually have lived a little bit) have you stared in the eyes after a thorough conversation and deemed to be "undeveloped tier 1"? I would certainly pay good money to actually rig you with a camera and speaker setup and see how straight your face would be as you spout that evaluation. How could you even evaluate whether someone were tier 1 or 2 if you don't even have the slightest clue the level of thought patterns they go through as they evaluate you?

The cultural distinction between matter and consciousness could be methodical or practical as opposed to fundamental, that when we try to found either in the other we often end up pointing to invariances that are identical suggests that the distinction is precisely so: a methodical angle. Some strands of structural realism can maintain monistic ontology via invariances as condition for objectivity quite parsimoniously and consistently, and unifying materialism and idealism while at it just as it unifies philosophical rationalism and empiricism. One naivite on part of materialism is how the concept of time, which we gain via the invariant rate of diminution of phenomenal and cognitive intensity is supposed to pertain to objects which invariant rate of diminution depends on and is relative to sufficiently particularised locations which through being imposed by information from every other location outputs a rate of "time". Yet these accounts of material substance is hardly to find anywhere thus hypostatised time projected from the mind takes its stead. If we try to look for fundamental physical substances we end up with entities that instantiate properties that partake in dualities and are exhaustive of all possibilities, thus dichotomies like continuous/discrete, necessary/contingent, connected/spontaneous, the very same invariances that arises in phenomenological accounts of the behaviour of consciousness, suggesting the already mentioned mere practical nature of the distinction between mind and matter. The real question becomes how well we are able to stratify the distribution of contingencies, invariances and origins in the tenants of our personal experience and therewith determine when we have the "right" perspective in our everyday life, determining when our thoughts are merely our personal world and when they really are objective, not whether reality is material or conscious.

@theleelajoker It seems to me that you first acknowledge the general distinction between necessity and possibility, where survival is the form of necessity and every desire that goes beyond mere survival are the forms of possibility. Then you appear to point out that the distinction is not as strict as it appear at first glance, where a) the solutions to the problems that goes contrary to survival are optional instead of necessary and b) that the general tendency of acceptance of things that are entirely optional is itself a survival mechanism. My perspective is that a only works if the reason there initially were a desire to survive itself goes away, while b is accurate throughout the process of base survival.