Reciprocality

The most obvious answer would be that though we can and will logically separate the meaning of a) stroking a cat and b) the characteristics of the cat these two things will not actually be separated merely for that reason, and their non-separation is tied to a subtler and deeper set of logic that pertains to the reality and not merely potentiality of the situation. We may use James Gibsons theory of affordances to illustrate it better, you don't premeditate the time when you will pet the cat, instead the behaviour and characteristics of the cat spontaneously makes you think of petting (affords you the idea of petting), plenty of these characteristics are for instance present in young children but disappears more the older the child becomes. Some of these characteristics are: cuteness, non-agency and innocence. That pets and small children react positively to petting is a given, the bodily pleasure is a given, they do not yet separate themselves from the one who is petting them via a rigid representation of a self, and thus do not need to calculate the emotional entailments of the situation that would dissimulate it.

@BlessedLion You are incentivised to believe that anything you said were not common knowledge, to imagine a recipient who do not already know, you are inventing the method of projecting a non-agent on others with every phrase you lean so heavily into. The real imagination here is the ego who has something to gain from these rhetorical constructs and methods, not the contexts and judgements that are connected to our environment via past perceptions and reflections.

They have infinites of energies because when they communicate with other humans their batteries gets reset from the shared understanding they feel in presence of each other and can do this uninterrupted by the toxicity of grand narratives and such coping mechanisms that certain others have to deal with when they try to interpret the signs that got lost on them decades ago.

@QandC For transcendental entities or principles to be meaningful things or existence must first be considered as contingent or "could have not been", such principles were traditionally the laws of logic, sufficient reason and parsimony but with Kant it became the most primitive accidents that are necessary for every thing to appear and therewith entirely inessential for the identity of each one thing, and so it was that space and time became the conditions for the possibility of experience in Kants view. Unfortunately he never demonstrated that the directly present experience in existence is contingent, it could very well be that the necessary accidents such as the concepts of time and space are the contingent variable which humans naturally abstract or identify from the relation between things in motion, just as humans construe the "possible" from decoupling representation from the presented.

Something else should also be clear: the world does not work in such a simplistic way that you can infer from someone not meditating that they have not integrated the benefits you associate with meditating from your own practice. The most general comprehension of the principle your assumption about meditation or self-help in general apparently violates is "modus tollens" which then yield the fallacy of "denying the antecedent".

@Rishabh R Because their development and maturity does not hinge on deliberate constructions of the gimmicks and platitudes they justifiably associate with self-help. It is on you to determine whether they are doing personal development via analysis of their practice, and this happens independently of peacocking on forums. Edit: chances are high that their development can occur without needing any of the words, abstractions, phrases, sub-cultures and beliefs associated with "self-help" or "spirituality" or whatever have you.

It appears that to say anything at all to anyone without triviality we must in our own head construe their absence of that knowledge, what is different between this tendency of construal and ego separation if there really is only one experience, thus one knowledge, and we all tap into it?

Hello people Inferring what must be true about something from the absence of another thing about it, why can this succeed? To say or write is to appear with an intent, this intent is ineffective without a prediction of the recipient for whom we are appearing, these predictions require some coherence among one another to not themselves becoming the problem, that coherence is a model of reality, is it always this model we tap into when we infer positives from negatives, when we infer that something particular causes something to lack a given expected property? What is going on with the narrative in our rhetorical intents, is there some universal law to these that can be identified, how invariant are the fibres or quality in these intents among us? At which level of analysis are they identical and could we say that most below that level are inessential to the real meaning of the intent that allows us to converse with anyone?

Reminder: We'll need the girlfriend part first.

@Carl-Richard Have you ever observed that people who are the most serious laughs the most whole-heartedly and energetically when they do laugh?

Humour is the awareness of 1. what people generally expects and believes and thus awareness of what is odd and does not conform with expectations and 2. what people generally focus on and value. Armed with 1 and 2 we can craft a joke that takes the unexpected turn, an exaggeration somewhat on point or a vigorous image that were insufficiently unwanted. Said at the Republican National Convention: Jimmy is probably malnourished, response: Ah, I knew he were a liberal all along! Humour is a matter of experience, the more experienced you are the more on-point your predictions will be and the more often you will recognise or think of the unexpected or humorous.

Solipsism occurs when the boundary between self and world dissolves while one remains convinced that their subjective experience constitutes objective reality.

@Anton Rogachevski What if the given object is itself a chair because 1. our way of conceiving it as a chair taps into the only possible way it can be spontaneously seen, and that this process happens prior to our capacity to have perspectives and see it in different ways, and 2. it exists only in so far as it is seen by agents with the capacity that identifies it as a chair? What if the Witgensteinian "family resemblant" criterions that are satisfied by particular "chairs" are precisely such criterions that via their extreme generality and/or ineffability will be subject-invariant but not subject-independent, that some subject is necessary for the chair to both exist and to be a chair in itself but that each unique subject is expandable or accidental for this contingency?

@Anton Rogachevski I stubbornly stuck with this way of writing until it became hard to restrain it, I believe we are all honing in on our personal stamp through practice because it is the only means that is the most harmonious to our thoughts and all our thoughts seek harmony with each other. Also, thank you for the compliment. You say that time is an illusion founded on memory, this appear entirely consistent with your other idea that memory is a Humean secondary impression, given that something that has the capacity to create illusions must be substantial and substance must be immediate, whether diminished or not. But what is the mechanism, the universal invariance, that ensures not only that this illusion occurs but potentially also that its alternatives are mere fictions? I would propose that diminution of substance independently of its intensity could be that kid of bedrock, particularly because I believe phenomenologically we have always experienced that the linearity of time accompanies this diminutive invariance and that proposals of counter variants breaks linearity via time-paradoxes because the "now" would accumulate where there is most intensity. I want to ask you this, in the formation of memory, must there be agency that identifies the separation between it and phenomena? Must that separation be identified for memory to form? When some memory becomes meaning--so much so that words or analogies are formed that applies in all kinds of situations--do that meaning share its substance with the memories they were founded on? If not, what is the ontology of this additional--presumably platonic--substance?

From the limits of resources thresholds are set, spontaneous recollections of particular moments satisfies the threshold and from repeated exposure to this we intuitively couple the word "importance" to that invariant structure, allowing us to know what other mean when they use the term. What I wanna know is at which point does the human or personal kind of important become unique or distinct from the universal structure of importance, can precise point of distinctness be somewhat generalised, can the universal structure of importance be separated from other universal structures, or does that separation only exist in our head via its inherent ability to decouple variables?

@UnbornTao Can we only refer to a phenomenon either in particular or in general? If so then when we refer to it in general what is different between this and a concept? And when we refer to the particular phenomenon could something else that were not identical to it have replaced it without us knowing? If something else could have replaced the particular phenomenon you referred to without you knowing then would that imply that concepts are inescapable also when we refer to a phenomenon? And if not, then what is the difference between the distinction between a) phenomenon and b) its replicability vs c) phenomenon and d) our concept of it?

Do you want a good advice in how to resist the resistance? Perhaps yielding to the first order resistance is the least taxing way to go about it, perhaps it happens for reasons that are entirely necessary or natural.

@Natasha Tori Maru As I see it, points are something we are making when there is contention in a back and fourth dialogue, at least that is the context in which it is most often brought up. When there is no such contention there is still meaning, the set in which some elements are points, and I believe you had trouble with deciphering the meaning and though there are some grammatical mistakes they are far from sufficient for that trouble. Digressions and parenthesis are double edged swords that sometimes do more harm than good. It is not so much a stream of consciousness as a syntactical necessity that I write inter connectedly and long windily aphoristically, as the alternate would require that I would only connect two or three ideas in each sentence and that would often require four times more writing for it all to add up. A lot of things introduces flow, it is present throughout all our writing.

@UnbornTao How silly of me, i forgot to add in the words "contemplation" and "insight" so that my contemplations and insights did not appear like showing off in your projections on them.

@UnbornTao Beyond my comprehension, absurd. It is all purposive, but I don't connect with the ultimate end, I can only predict so much. I am the whole thing, but not for reasons I am aware of. The "what" of this experience is prior to the distinctions of it and my thinking of it, all my thinking does is reorganise it into structures that gives me a sense of harmony and ease because if I weren't a system which sought harmony I would not be alive. Experience is will, primal instincts at every second, a semi coherent narrative and myopia. All the words that tries to answer your question of what experience is are reshuffled from another set of experiences and now used to describe a moment that is not really new at all. The reshuffling of the words are insufficient because all they represent are analogies between now and then, all I can do is ask why is it here at all and my answer is that I am inventing the possibility of the alternative.

@Nodar Bakradze I understand, you boast about a huge philosophical undertaking where you literally will pick up the torch of Heidegger and integrate all kinds of philosophical domains, but when challenged to solve the most basic problems that gave rise to those different traditions it is beyond the scope of the very thread in which it were posted and where people have the opportunity to decide whether it is worth taking seriously by asking questions that directly relate to it. "My philosophical project—deepened fundamental ontology—integrates each and every major breakthrough of premodern, modern, and postmodern epochs." When we ask ourself what do we really know about the world and what it really is, how much of it are merely conjectures or perspectives in our head then the answers comes in a limited set of different kinds, those kinds corresponds to the breakthroughs of premodern, modern and postmodern epochs and my questions directly satisfies that criterion, and if I and anyone else were to take you seriously than we are justified in learning about how you answer them.

@Nodar Bakradze If some concepts, such as time, space and logical categories such as those in the Kantian tradition, were given to us independent of particular experiences, due to being merely formal and not themselves having any content such as the ideas we do derive directly from perception does, then it would at least be plausible that they exist as necessary substances in addition to the one of our perceptive fields. This would directly contradict phenomenology, whose main object is to ground all semantics, meaning, truth and reality in direct perception, thereby avoiding the metaphysical "otherness" of an additional substance that transcendental realism, dualism and theism commits to. Phenomenology can be described in several ways, but each variation will have in common that phenomenology stands in antithesis to the mainstream intellectual traditions of the belief that essences as either pertaining directly to the world itself and existing in that world independently of the perceiver or through the invariant perceiver called god, and that phenomenology attempts to reveal why these additional assumptions are not necessary by grounding everything in phenomena, by various means. Traditionally it appeared that there were a sharp dichotomy between the concepts that pertain to unique entities that includes shapes and phenomena and those that pertain to everything without exception or structural concepts like disjunction, conjunction and negation, where those who believed that both originates in the mind a priori were called pure rationalist and those who believed both originated in perception were called pure empiricists. It may not be as sharp as were previously suggested, and this is what has to be proven if we were to state that realism about such things as object-identity are definitely false, which surely are ideas you are familiar with.

@UnbornTao It certainly does point us in directions, that is what gesturing does. And I did precisely what you are asking of me in the first comment, but instead of taking responsibility of understanding what it means and asking questions that pertains directly to it you just posit that it is very abstract, yet I do my best with what I got and extrapolate on it only to receive the exact same response. Direct and substance are bijective, you use another term to refer to the same universal pattern that could only be denoted due to the repetitive nature of that pattern and have thusly already committed to my framing of it.

@UnbornTao My answer sounds abstract because the question elicits concepts without any particular qualifications, we were to describe experience in general, right? Describing unique experiences does not have much bearing on experiences as such, which everyone who even takes the posts question seriously therewith agrees to. Up to a certain threshold where inherent limits are met, however bright two color-phenomena are they diminish at the same rate when you close your eyes, thus do not diminish in proportion to their intensity, but what would happen if they did? The various intensive magnitudes of sensory phenomena, which we can rightfully consider to be the matter or substance of our minds from where everything else derives and pertains, if they did diminish in proportion to their intensity, would accumulate and be present in "times" much later than they arose, and from such a lifelong experience we would be fated to derive a different concept of time, a concept which would pertain as much to that reality as the linear one do to ours, although such a reality would involve paradoxical timeloops where the principle of identity naturally no longer applies. If in our own experience, in which the only known substance exists, (and substance are rightly defined to be the that of which everything else is a predicate or derivative) we derive the concept of linearity of time from the precise parameters of that substance and have no second substance to apply of the concept of linearity to and we can articulate the precise invariant condition that in our experience and thus in relation to that substance known for it to yield linearity then why should anything else be a sufficient condition for linearity than those parameters, the invariant diminution? If no a. structure, concept, duality, medium or universal idea exist except in so far as the b. substance underlying them exists, and we can achieve a demonstration of the precise origin of the former in the latter, and no question involving the concept of "experience in general" avoids answers of the form denoted by "a", then anyone trying to answer those questions are justified in embarking on a journey in those structures.

Intensive and extensive magnitudes that due to their invariant diminution manifests as the linearity and continuity of time, both physically and perceptively.