Reciprocality

The cultural distinction between matter and consciousness could be methodical or practical as opposed to fundamental, that when we try to found either in the other we often end up pointing to invariances that are identical suggests that the distinction is precisely so: a methodical angle. Some strands of structural realism can maintain monistic ontology via invariances as condition for objectivity quite parsimoniously and consistently, and unifying materialism and idealism while at it just as it unifies philosophical rationalism and empiricism. One naivite on part of materialism is how the concept of time, which we gain via the invariant rate of diminution of phenomenal and cognitive intensity is supposed to pertain to objects which invariant rate of diminution depends on and is relative to sufficiently particularised locations which through being imposed by information from every other location outputs a rate of "time". Yet these accounts of material substance is hardly to find anywhere thus hypostatised time projected from the mind takes its stead. If we try to look for fundamental physical substances we end up with entities that instantiate properties that partake in dualities and are exhaustive of all possibilities, thus dichotomies like continuous/discrete, necessary/contingent, connected/spontaneous, the very same invariances that arises in phenomenological accounts of the behaviour of consciousness, suggesting the already mentioned mere practical nature of the distinction between mind and matter. The real question becomes how well we are able to stratify the distribution of contingencies, invariances and origins in the tenants of our personal experience and therewith determine when we have the "right" perspective in our everyday life, determining when our thoughts are merely our personal world and when they really are objective, not whether reality is material or conscious.

@theleelajoker It seems to me that you first acknowledge the general distinction between necessity and possibility, where survival is the form of necessity and every desire that goes beyond mere survival are the forms of possibility. Then you appear to point out that the distinction is not as strict as it appear at first glance, where a) the solutions to the problems that goes contrary to survival are optional instead of necessary and b) that the general tendency of acceptance of things that are entirely optional is itself a survival mechanism. My perspective is that a only works if the reason there initially were a desire to survive itself goes away, while b is accurate throughout the process of base survival.

You do not need a lot of math to imagine that 360 degrees (or any isotropic or homogenous metric) are insufficient to describe the simultaneity of matter. You do not need a lot of math to imagine that isotropic/homogenous metrics have their foundations in the unity of perception and generalisations from counting and that properties that pertains to entities that exists independently of the perceptions from where we abstracted metrics could just as well exist independent of these metrics. Definite positions are a relation between one position and another, out of any two coordinates an isotropic two-dimensional metric can always be derived, when a third coordinate point is introduced without itself deriving from that metric you will not neatly fit it into that metric. It should be straight forward from this to conclude that quantum particles without consciousness (or interaction with something from which a metric is generalised, thus consciousness) have no definite position. Why should this take away from their simultaneity, if all simultaneity requires is an equal age via respective continuous paths each path of which are independent of any isotropic metric that unifies them?

Can the energy of the ego be used to focus away from information that is unhealthy, were that largely why the ego were developed initially and are we justified in returning again and again to ego to focus better? I intentionally avoid substantiating these questions any further because I suspect it would only take away from their intended general meaning.

@LifeEnjoyer I am really asking whether ego is inherent to the rejection of a portion of those things we do not want, that what we want becomes apparent by focusing on what we don't is a separate issue.

If the idea of the person is different from the figure of the person, and there is nothing but figure in perception, then how come that the idea impresses on us simultaneously as the figure does and where does that idea come from?

Everyone sees the similarity between pens and pencils, but the tendency to maintain focus on that similarity has no obvious or clear-cut purpose. Few sees the similarity between socks and tables, and the tendency to maintain focus on that similarity has often an even less obvious purpose. A topologist would find the sock to be identical to the table in a certain way, and for someone who needs to write something down before they forget a certain message a pen and a pencil will aid them equally well. In both scenarios the very apparent differences are secondary to more abstract similarities, the more general properties that pertain to the items take precedence to the more particular properties. What does genius and madness have to do with this?

Bonusquestion Assuming that all things must either have consistency or inconsistency, or harmony and disharmony or congruence and incongruence what ensures that the figure and the idea of someone remains congruent? Are they ever incongruent? When they are incongruent then what generally happens? And if when such incongruence does happen we are the ones who resolves it, then must we change some of our beliefs about the world as a whole in that process?

Preferring the world as it is without your own involvement, to not disrupt or alter it in any way, how often and when last did you have a day like this? Is it enlightened? In which way do you on your better days prefer the world as it is instead of the way you want it or the way in which it comes together?

@Javfly33 Aren't you wittingly or not trying to fix the world already by the principle of not doing so, by wishing to affect those who thinks differently?

@Javfly33 What comes to mind when you consider something undisturbed, something you don't compare to or something your intensions could only negatively impact?

The superficial differences are real, the rest are just practical

Is it a first person perspective you want to have in a young state of mind or is it your particular character you want to have in a young state of mind? It appears to me that the latter is correct, your self is your particular way to love, your particular conscience and fixation, but why is it important that it must be experienced from a first person perspective (an integral whole)? Is there a difference between this insistence on the first person perspective and rejection of others? Isn't youth always myopic, idealised, stylised, simplistic, unaware and inefficient, could you live as a young person without being all those things many times over?

The bum on the street is you and me everyone can focus their mind, some tries to focus others mind as well, this is enlightenment and manipulation hand in hand and we all do it continuously

If the function it serves to identify as a "me" is to switch conscious focus at will so to not become drawn from object to object then how do we navigate the world without this "self"? When I lose the sense of "me" this consciousness becomes filled with something else, this is wobbly or unstable and is therefore prone to induce chaos and distress. How do you minimise your awareness on certain things without the aid of the illwill the self has against these things?

You are treating variables as though they add to one another, are conjoined, but they are mutually defined, connected and are dualities of one distributed entity. A sum of added parts / coinciding parts were one of the worst tragedies that happened to our intellectual circuits, they are effectively enforced accidents (inessentials) where any one part forcefully exists independently of the others. The modern language we use comes with the accident of every one combination of words that expresses meaning, the syntax of the sentence, and I believe this has forced us to think more syntactically about memories, the hypothesis from this is that tribes that only think by hieroglyphs or single words think wholes and are able to "see" the whole through the parts, that they think holistically because the accidental relations between things have not been forced on them through the way in which syntax of language efficiently allows one to think utterly differentiated things, partially from ones will and woe, at various points of the day or week which when generalised into entailments would be tremendously inconsistent with each other. When we employ immense amounts of conceptual thinking the inherent connections between parts can reemerge, where their distinction is falsified through investigation into the ground for abstractions (phenomenology, axiomatics and memories), such that nothingness derive from logical negation, negation derive from spontaneous distinction, ones sense of self is the same as others, limits unified with conditions, body identical with mind, the future identical with the past, space the same as time, algebra the same as geometry, energy as the same as space-time, logic as the same as identity etc.

To be clear, the thesis is that burnout is an effect of subject-relative higher cognitive efficiency because for every thought it processes more efficiently inherent constraints are approached more closely without that limiting the growth-vector/ synthesis of concepts, the unchangeable nature thus universal applicability of concepts could also be predicted simply from that. Thus the idea that you could think more efficiently x and y without that leading to z decouples the inherent relations without which the mind would not think in the first place. The condition-limit equivalence is also an argument for a macro-level (non-continuous) determinism which is translatable to an inherent psychological balance-mechanism which dictates that any action or non-action follows by an equal and opposite action or reaction in some or other way. To disagree with the equivalence will then imply disagreement with the balance mechanism, so if you think that the mind has a shadow, a conscience or values then what can be induced from them (inherent psychological balance) is negated by that disagreement. Edit: note on the point of the universality of concepts: if they weren't unchangeable why would humans intuitively read their children and younger people like a book? Are judgements sudden novelties or are they remnants from past experiences? Is the belief in the novelty of my present judgement a decoupling between the present and the past?

Where does the concepts of boredom and stimuli come from? Why are you stimulated by a conversation about neurology, principles, improvement, intelligence etc., instead of a conversation about the politics concerning the ownership of land in the sandbox at the closest kindergarten? My answer to that question is largely that you have grown to think of ownership, self, self-bias etc. in far more efficient and interconnected ways than you once did, but that this efficiency would be impossible without first having been the self-proclaimed owner of the sandbox, and that whatever comes afterwards are more and more complex bifurcations of that proclamation and its negation, that the significance of such proclamation is the substance of the system that overtakes it. The new branches on a tree grows out of what the tree already is, and these new branches render a higher toil on the tree in proportion to what they contribute than the previous generation, since the substance that allows it to operate is the same limit all throughout every generation, if this were not so then trees would die far later. You don't accept my proposition because you don't connect the inherent relation between the condition for the possibility of x with the limit of x. Once you distinctly identify how all systems are limited by their conditions you see how it entails that if all else were equal then a more efficient variant of a brain or mind will use more energy than a less efficient one, not in relation to a given task, for which the converse is true, but in relation to the set of all relatively-present tasks. It is possible that other variables minimises the effect, and that part of what life on this planet has done is to succeed at this, that would be a very interesting hypothesis and we should investigate it, but confusing that for the absence of condition-to-limit equivalency would be like confusing biology for physics. If conditions are equal to limits then just as the conditions will continue to be the walls you are bumping into so too will they be the growth that allows you to tear through them, if the growth-vector were to minimise the more one grew then the continuous limits that the growth vector up until then constituted would need to minimise too. Which would be absurd unless the system were initially unequal in condition and limits, which also would be absurd. The more easily you think concept x the more easily y is conceived alongside it, since concepts have their whole significance and origination in the perception and set of judgements both of which correspond with the growth-vector and its inherent limits all throughout your development. What I am saying may be clearer if you consider concepts as the aperture of the mind and the experiences it can and will imagine.

When we perceive something in earnest belief that the identity of the perceived object dwells in that object we are disconnected from the universal in it and disconnected from how that universal is our own intellect thus disconnected from the possibility of universals beyond our own intellect and therefore disconnected from a higher curiosity. Have you ever observed the face of someone in a restaurant or caffe and looked away without thinking twice about what you saw? This implies that there were nothing in the expression of their face that contradict your awareness of reality. If contradiction is necessary for you to think about the identity itself of something then this implies again that you continuously believe that the identity dwells in the object. But what if this changed? What if every item in perception were seen as yourself? What if the identity itself of every perception were distinguished from the stimuli of the senses? Wouldn't this be self-reference properly so called? What besides such complete separation between stimuli and identity thus convergence between identity and self would constitute enlightenment? What are the conditions necessary for distinctness in perception and are there distinct things that are in no way universal but instead utterly personal?

@zurew 1. The muscles are tools that gets employed from the motivation that lies in the mind, motivation is conceptual or semantic past a certain stage of infancy which means that there is not only a difference between the two but such a fundamental difference that one (mind/brain) is the foundation or threshold of the use of the other (muscles), 2. the muscles on the upper arms does not get more used when (if and only if) the muscles on the forearms have grown more efficient, just as the muscles on the legs does not work over-time when (again: if and only if) the abs have become more efficient at crunches, this implies a non-causal and non-inherent relation between growth of muscle groups, although the correlation would be significant since more efficient muscle group A would correlate with more overall exercise thus correlate with the need for muscle group B to grow as well. The mind is a whole other order of business, since the relation between concepts are directly causal and share inherent similarities, overlaps, associations etc., my argument took this for granted and could do so since it holds true against scrutiny. Now recognise that if my arguments against the relevant difference between muscles and the brain falls short this would not in and of itself imply that the burnout rate is not higher for cognitively efficient agents, but could just as much imply that the burnout rate is higher for both physically and cognitively efficient agents, remember also that the burnout section of the argument must have two components, one being correlational and the other causal, this is important to recognise since it is actually possible that there is less correlation between higher cognitive function and burnout at the same time as higher cognitive function is a direct cause for burnout, this is especially possible if the causal relation is an outlier in the statistics. Since I provide no scientific findings this should be taken as causal inference, thus my methods must be rather conceptual and comprise conditionals that build on simple and universal principles.

@Carl-Richard Imagine that your mind consumes more energy the more efficiently it processes a thought because this efficiency allows it to also process related or connected thoughts. Additionally, any surplus energy saved through increased efficiency is not stored but instead redirected to handling these additional tasks, leading to a higher overall energy expenditure per second than in the initial, less efficient system. The duality here would be accumulation or retention vs offset or redistribution But my response took into account the cognitive improvements themselves on the mind, which you appear to theorise as being substantial, not just their cause (the n-back exercise) which your comment responded to. On the one hand you look very optimistic on the positive effects the dual-n-back training have on the efficiency of the mind in relation to cognitive tasks but on the other hand you are very pessimistic that the consequences of this efficiency can be similar to what I believe to be the consequence of those who already possess a very efficient cognitive apparatus, that being mental burnout. But let us say that many of my assumptions are incorrect, the principle that more efficient systems produce a surplus of energy per task is tautological, and that this surplus energy is either offset or accumulated exhausts all non-magical possibilities, if your refined assumption that higher cognitive efficiency does not correlate with burnout is correct then this raises a few questions, 1. why the surplus energy is merely accumulated into some general energy bank, 2. how surplus energy can be offset to other tasks associated with the original and result in more energy spent without it correlating with burnout, 3. why burnout is trivially correlated with mental activity and instead a matter of physical toil or 4. why the surplus concept does not apply in this issue at all. To be clear, I am only asking questions and doing some consistency checking, I have no scientific knowledge in this area nor am I invested in any given stance on the issue, I ask these questions to get answers since it could reveal nuanced principles I have not considered.

@Carl-Richard Is it not likely that the more you improve your cognitive performance from these n-back exercises the earlier in your life you get burnt out or experience similar after-effects? Assuming that your mind is allowed to burn more energy the more efficiently it thinks any given thing because it thinks an associated or connected thing in addition to that thing when it thinks it more efficiently.

@Letho If this is true for some or all universals then it should be possible to investigate and create a thought experiment where their malleability are revealed, if you could do this I would test it and post the evaluation here afterwards as well as look for inconsistencies between it and my assertions here. The tension certainly is a factor of novel application of the universal, but I believe it is the world-idea and not the units of its metric that gets changed, even if those units ties thereby to units previously foreign. Are you implying that static universals goes contrary to the collapsing boundaries of perception and realisation, which I take to constitute our everyday intuition? Could one even have anything collapsable if it were everywhere made out of jelly? Can there be change in one thing without the absence of change in the other thing? Would the malleability of a baby grow into a unified sense of self without much of the unchanging behaviour of its parents? Could a rubber ball bounce off of the floor if it too like above were made out of jelly? If not then what is different in this topic which also encompasses change? And if there is no such difference then what besides the universals constitutes the rigidity necessary for change or growth? To your question on self-reference: Most of my nature, knowledge and relational principles are hidden from my direct continuous access, new truths spring from old ones, new angles arise from old angles, new motives spring from resolution between antithetical ones, what would make this enclosed, what would not be revelatory in it and which possible alternative revelations are there besides those that sprung from what we already are, whether through observation or thought?

@Letho Let us say a friend is behaving in a way that you can not understand, this way is neither beautiful or ugly, neither shallow or deep, neither kind or mean. Would their behaviour be so incomprehensible that it is entirely different from humanity at large? When you are incapable of judging the situation you may begin questioning the quality of your judgement itself, but this may be a needless restriction to acquired semantics. So what is the alternative? The alternative is to create a universal identity of their behaviour itself, the result is that the upcoming days or weeks one will find this behaviour in others and stand the chance to inquire with far more tools at to the causes (motive) that create them thus leaving the domain of synthetic semantic judgements for the domain of universal principles that dictates entailments the same way as the past dictates the future. Your conscience is only freed from circumspection when you see with clarity the absurdity of a given contrary.

@Letho I don't deny processes or continuous change in the composite of parts, but you seem to suggest that the universals are themselves changing, yet universals are relational or simple and relationality and simplicity is the inverse of composites and change. Some years ago you stated that my methods were rather deductive and your more inductive, this distinction appears to be relevant again as you find partiality where I find exhaustion. What can be gained from mere generalisations of particulars that can not be superseded by only thinking those particulars that entail universals? If it is knowable that all xs are ys and all fs are xs and no gs are xs then what is there to gain from piling up some fs today and then some gs tomorrow that may or may not be ys until discovery of xs? Why synthetic judgements that may be false and involves semantic content that couples with personal motivation when you can have universality at the expense of particular subjects? What do we gain except personal approval by correct coupling of the social semantics with referents, what besides personal motivation couples two things that did not couple purely intellectually? What besides manual efforts is employed towards these synthetic judgements and why prefer these to the spontaneous and infallible judgements of universals?