Nivsch

https://x.com/avner_vilan/status/2044015526209294518?s=20 " In recent days I’ve been hearing that people are starting to “move the goalposts” and change the definition of what a nuclear Iran actually is. All kinds of nonsense like “the danger is only in an operational weapon, not in a desert test,” or “they’ve always had the ability to enrich to 90%.” So let’s put things in order. I promise it will be simple—but we have to look reality in the eye and not make excuses for ourselves. There are several levels of risk when it comes to a nuclear Iran: Control of enrichment and weapons technology → fissile material → a “nuclear device” explosion → operational weapon → nuclear arsenal → use of weapons against us. Control of enrichment and weapons technology: They’ve basically had this since the mid-2000s. We’ve already passed that stage. Fissile material:This is the core issue. Under the JCPOA, they were about a year away from obtaining fissile material for a first bomb. They were allowed to accumulate no more than 400 kg enriched to ~3%, with any excess removed from the country, under strict international monitoring by the IAEA. After the U.S. withdrew from the deal, two major things happened: First, Iran expanded enrichment facilities in Natanz and Fordow and began enriching material at an industrial scale. By June 2025, they had accumulated about 450 kg of uranium enriched to 60%—which is 99% of the way to enough material for 11 nuclear bombs. In addition, there are about 130 kg at 20%, enough for another bomb and a bit more. Most enrichment work since the U.S. withdrawal in 2018 went into building this stockpile. 450 kg may not sound like much, but producing that amount requires significant industrial infrastructure and years of continuously feeding uranium into thousands of centrifuges. Second, beyond monitoring uranium and facilities, the deal imposed stricter oversight on Iran than on a “normal” country, due to lack of trust. Monitoring extended even to centrifuge component production. After the U.S. withdrawal, this oversight stopped, and the West lost the ability to track centrifuge production. That means hundreds, if not thousands, of centrifuges are now unaccounted for—and could be used to build a small clandestine enrichment site. Bottom line: On the eve of “Am K’Lavi” (operation), Iran was days away from obtaining fissile material for a first bomb, and weeks away from enough for an arsenal of 12 bombs. It had fortified enrichment facilities to do so. “Am K’Lavi” prevented an immediate breakout by disabling industrial enrichment sites—but left Iran with enriched material, hundreds or thousands of centrifuges, the knowledge, and most importantly the motivation. As long as Iran has enriched uranium, it doesn’t need large industrial sites like Natanz or Fordow. It can build a small covert facility with 2–3 cascades—something that could fit in half a sports hall. Building such a facility might take about six months. With 200–300 advanced centrifuges, they could enrich enough material for a bomb in about a month. If they had to start from scratch, it would take about two years per bomb—but that’s less realistic. Assuming we would detect such a facility is very dangerous. Intelligence coverage is excellent—but not airtight. We might even see indications and not understand them, as happened with Fordow. In other words, when we say it would take six months to build such a facility, no one says that those six months didn’t already start a year or two ago. Therefore, the main goal must be: Remove all enriched uranium from Iran. Not part of it. Every gram. Every 40 kg of uranium enriched to 60% equals roughly one nuclear bomb. Another key point: nuclear material leaves physical traces and cannot be hidden. Even years later, inspectors can detect residues—as happened with secret Iranian sites from the early 2000s. That’s why the red line has always been obtaining fissile material. I’m starting to hear defeatist voices saying Iran already effectively has the capability to reach 90%, and it can’t be stopped. Accepting that is a massive failure. Nuclear Device Explosion A “nuclear device” is the minimum needed to turn fissile material into an explosion—either a desert test or a basic bomb deliverable by aircraft or transport. Iran was already preparing for such tests in 2003. It wouldn’t be surprising if they try again in 2026. Turning enriched material into a bomb involves chemical and engineering processes—not trivial, but not extremely complex either. With enough margin for error, it could take 6–12 months, even starting from scratch. Claims that killing scientists erased Iranian knowledge are unrealistic. Iran has enough capable physicists. Tracking such activity is very difficult—few clear indicators, easy to miss without intelligence leads. Also, much of the preparation can be done before having highly enriched uranium. Once 90% material exists, a test explosion could be ready within weeks. Some will say: “But that’s not an operational weapon.” I say: bullshit. The day Iran conducts a nuclear test, no U.S. president will risk attacking it. Look at North Korea. That same day, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, UAE, and Turkey will accelerate nuclear programs—turning the Middle East into a nuclear region within years. And delivery doesn’t have to be a missile. A bomb could be smuggled via sea or land—in a container, truck, or yacht. Operational Weapon Next stage: a reliable warhead mounted on a missile. This is harder. Eliminating scientists may delay it—from about a year to 2.5–3 years—but we don’t know when the clock started. A covert team might already be working. Or Iran could even buy weapons from North Korea. And it can escalate further—arsenals, delivery systems, deterrence, second-strike capability—but that’s a place we don’t want to reach. Most of the consequences will already be felt once Iran conducts a nuclear test—not only when it has dozens of warheads. Conclusion We can debate policy—but first agree on facts: As long as enriched uranium remains in Iran, the regime is dangerously close to a bomb—and could achieve it without us knowing. Relying on intelligence alone is a dangerous gamble. We must not let people downplay the threat by saying “they don’t yet have an operational weapon.” The immediate goal: remove all enriched uranium. And equally important—acknowledge that past policy led us here. After leaving the nuclear deal in 2018 and failing to act meaningfully until 2025, Iran advanced significantly. We canceled an agreement that limited enrichment—but didn’t stop their progress while it was still manageable. Even if recent action came just in time, we must ask how we got so close—and admit the danger hasn’t passed. Today, fully dismantling their capabilities militarily would require a complex ground operation with a very high cost. The real question: Can we translate military achievements into a political outcome—removing the material and preventing enrichment for years? Eyes on the ball "

Israeli voices 🐦 April 14th

Noted

@MrTruf Man, this is getting too personal. If you want to be respected and actually talk about the issues themselves there is a way to do that.

From what I see now in other sources there were some specific cases of raids or even house to house searches, though they seem quite rare and not a general pattern. Most of the activity reported is still airstrikes or border operations.

Interesting

The interesting thing is that in the LGBTQ community all these things are even more fluid and vary, which kind of challenges these categories even more.

True. We are not neurologically wired for the modern world that has only existed for 100 years.

I edited to "Agency"

I don't mean to destructive acts but to things that men do that show agency in a playful healthy manner. This is nuanced of course, and only in certain moments.

Do you think the dynamics between men and women in tribal times was better than in traditional era?

I think this is explained by that in sex for example, people tend to get excited from completely different things than they want from their partner in other times. Sometimes the ancient brain is in charge and some other times another emotional needs are more important.

I don't think we should believe their content, but to investigate their inner logic.

It can be accurate on specific facts, but still be misleading or one-sided in the way it decides to connects the dots. That is why I prefer to cross check it with other sources. You can just say what is bothering you this is more effective.

Israel news 🗞 April 13th Tonight is the eve of Holocaust Remembrance Day in Israel.

I am trusting my brain. Every emotion and thought it brings to me is a good thing.

Do you have a link from another source? I prefer not to rely on Al jazeera on these issues because it tends to tell the story from a very specific side. At least to cross check it with another source. Also my phone flagged this link as unsafe.

Israel news 🗞 April 12th

@integration journey Do you have a link for that?

Israel news 🗞 April 11th

Israel news 🗞 April 10th

Israel news 🗞 April 9th Two MKs from the center-left vs two from the right.

Do you live in an urban or rural area? How is the north of Lebanon? Sorry to hear you are going through this. Hope the things calm down for you soon

Israel news 🗞 April 8th Ceasefire 🚧 Starting with opposition leader Lapid's statement. https://x.com/yairlapid/status/2041743545137057858?s=20

@Schahin In the Israeli system the prime minister isn’t directly elected, but becomes such if his party is the largest party in a coalition. Which means it has only a relative majority of the voters, not absolute. Netanyahu’s party usually gets around ~25% of the vote. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thirty-seventh_government_of_Israel